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ABSTRACT
The principal concern of this study is to assess the influence of 
military and civilian regimes on public policy in sub-Saharan Africa.
The key question underlying this research is: Does it make any
difference for a country to be governed by a military or civilian 
government? Some research indicate that regime type does have policy 
implications? while others suggest that it does not. To determine the 
linkage <if any) between regime type and public policy four general 
hypothesis concerning regime effect on public policy are articulated. 
These are:
H, : Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where the
military controls the policy-making institutions than in 
those where they do not.
Hg : Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables
indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social 
sectors? whereas civilian rule will have the opposite 
effect.
1+j : Within any given African country? changes in regime type
should be associated with shifts in the pattern of spending 
priorities exhibited by that country.
: Socioeconomic development in the emerging nations of sub-
Saharan Africa is more likely to occur under military led 
regimes that are predisposed to modernization than under 
regimes headed by civilians who are similarly predisposed.
Three quantitative methods of analysis— the Multiple Interrupted Time 
Series (MITS) design? a "pooled" analysis of differences of means and 
"simple country" analysis— are utilized to evaluate regime performance 
in several sub-Saharan African countries.
More detailed analysis of the impact of regime type on public policy 
is provided with case studies of regime performances in Ghana? Liberia
and Nigeria. The Ghana case study deals with the linkage between regime 
type and agricultural productivity. In Liberia, government policies as 
they relate to foreign affairs is examined. The case study of Nigeria 
deals with the impact of regime type on industrial development.
The picture that emerges from this analysis suggests that most 
military and civilian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are 
indistinguishable in terms of economic policy outputs and outcomes. 
However, there is one category of public expenditure in which there is a 
clear distinction between the two regime types— defense spending.
INTRODUCTION
Both civilian and military-led regimes can be found in contemporary 
sub-Saharan Africa. However, direct military intervention aimed at 
supplanting of civilian authority in a sub-Saharan African country can 
be traced back to November, 1958, when officers led by Gen. Ibrahim 
Abboud seized control of the Sudanese government. This was followed by 
a period of stability which lasted until the mid-1960s when, in rapid 
succession, the governments of Congo-Kinshasa (November, 1965), Dahomey 
(December, 1965), Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria 
(January, 1966) and Ghana (February, 1966) all fell victim to coups, 
thus, making the military coup the most popular method of effecting 
leadership change in sub-Saharan Africa.
Prior to the mid-1960s there was relatively little scholarly research 
on the role of the military in African countries. With the increasing 
incidence of military coups on the continent, a few students of African 
politics recognized the military as a critical group in shaping the 
course of nation-building. Thus, the African military became a relevant 
subject of political inquiry. However, the major emphasis in early
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research was on describing the political context which precipitates 
military intervention in national politics. The greater part of the 
literature was concerned more with coups, countercoups and the collapse 
of civilian regimes than with the actual functioning of military 
governments. In time, a few scholars took the significant next step 
beyond explaining coups. They sought not only to explain military 
interventions (Nordlinger 1970; Feit 1973; Welch 1974), but also to 
evaluate the performance of the military as a ruling group (McKinlay and
Cohan 1975; Jackman 1976; Bienen 1987; Joseph 1987). This dissertation 
is in keeping with this later trend.
When Margaret Thatcher was asked before her first electoral victory 
what her access to power would change in Britain, she answered in one 
word: "everything" (von Beyme 1984, 5). It is often with this 
expectation that things will change, and hopefully for the better, that 
citizens vote in new leaders to manage the affairs of a country. A 
military coup in Africa, like an election victory in a Western 
democracy, installs a new government into office. As is the case with 
the installation of a new governing party in a Western democracy, direct 
military intervention in a Third World country is associated with 
expectations of new policy initiatives.
Some scholars have attempted to discern the impact of party 
alternation on policy outputs and outcomes in Western societies (Winters 
1976; Jennings 1979; Rose 1980; Bunce 1981; Garand 1985). Valerie Bunce 
has examined the effect of executive succession on public policy in some 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe. However, no detailed study has 
attempted to examine the policy implications of military/civilian 
alternation in power in sub-Saharan African polities. This dissertation 
is at once an attempt to remedy this situation, and to compare and/or 
contrast public policy under African civilian and military regimes.
Goals of this Study 
The principal concern of this study is to assess the influence of 
military and civilian regimes on public policy in sub-Saharan Africa.
The key question underlying this research is: Does it make any
difference for a country to be governed by a military or civilian
xi
government? Given that military intervention in politics is often 
precipitated by a need to fulfil some specified objectives or solve 
certain critical problems? how will the policy process be affected by 
regime change? Does regime change necessarily yield policy change7 Are 
military and civilian regimes associated with different policy 
priorities, or is the African political and economic environment such 
that policy outputs and outcomes are not sensitive to regime type. Some 
observers maintain that regime type does have policy implications, while 
others suggest that it does not matter. It is the goal of this study to 
offer some illumination on the issue, as it relates to sub-Saharan 
Africa.
Another aim of this study is to learn if and why some regime types 
seem to fare better than others at coping with similar problems (such 
as, declining productivity, inflation and unemployment). By comparing 
regime response to similar problems, important lessons may be learned. 
Some of these lessons may provide guidelines to future leaders on what 
policy choices to make and which not to make.
Organization of the Study
In the first chapter, the literature on military intervention in 
Africa is examined in an attempt to explain why military intervention 
has become the single most popular instrument for bringing about 
leadership change in Africa. The literature seems to suggest that 
economic considerations are the most common and perhaps the most 
important causes of military coup d'etats. Also reviewed in Chapter One 
are the works of some of the more prominent scholars who have studied 
regime performance in Third World settings. A preliminary review of the
x i i
literature on this subject indicates that considerable disagreement 
exists among scholars, for example, concerning the policy consequences 
of civilian vis-^-vis military rule.
In Chapter Two, the hypotheses by which this study will be guided are 
explicitly stated. Three general hypotheses concerning regime effect on 
public policy are articulated:
Hj : Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where the
military controls the policy-making institutions than in 
those where they do not.
Since exceptionally high percentages of defense spending can lead to 
decreases in the proportion of total public expenditure which is 
allocated to social and economic sectors, it is also hypothesized that.
Hi : Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables
indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social 
sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the opposite 
effect.
From the foregoing hypotheses a general hypothesis regarding regime 
effect on public policy is articulated, as follows:
Hc. : Within any given African country, changes in regime type
should be associated with shifts in the pattern of spending 
priorities exhibited by that country.
Also in this chapter, the two methodologies— quantitative and case 
study— to be employed to evaluate regime effect on public policies are 
laid out. Both methodologies are being employed because each makes a 
distinctive and valuable contribution to this study. For example, the 
case study approach often does not allow for generalizations, but 
facilitates detailed analysis of specific subjects. On the other hand, 
by allowing researchers to study more than a handful of countries at a 
time, the quantitative approach allows for generalizations, but does not 
reveal the underlying and particular factors which make for specific
xi i i
policy outputs and outcomes. Both approaches are employed with the 
expectation that one approach would check the biases of the other.
In Chapter Three* the quantitative methods of analysis to be employed 
are specified. They include the Multiple Interrupted Time Series (MITS) 
design. The MITS design is employed to evaluate regime performance in 
the six countries for which sufficient longitudinal data are available. 
In order to evaluate regime performance in all the countries (including 
those which did not have sufficient data to allow for the use of the 
MITS design), two additional methods of analysis will be employed.
These are "pooled" analysis of differences of means and "simple country" 
analysis.
Following brief explanations of the methods of analysis and the 
operationalization of relevant concepts, the quantitative results 
relating to the impact of regime type on budgetary allocations and 
regime performance is presented in terms of outcomes in six policy areas 
(economic growth, agricultural production, industrial production, 
defense, education and health expenditures). Particular attention is 
paid to budgetary allocations for defense, education and health, and the 
contribution of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to the GDP.
More detailed analysis of the impact of regime type on public policy 
begins in Chapter Four with a case study detailing the performances of 
alternating civilian and military regimes in Ghana. In order to discern 
clearly the impact of regime type in 6hana, the performance of 
successive regimes as it relates to a major sector of the country’s 
economy is evaluated. Since agriculture has always been the principal 
sector of Ghana’s economy, this chapter focuses on agricultural policy
under alternating civilian and military regimes from Nkrumah 
<1957-1966), to Rawlings (1981-1985).
In Chapter Five an attempt is made to determine whether there is any 
correlation between regime type and foreign policy behavior. To this 
end, the following hypothesis is tested: Regime change is more likely
to bring about variation in foreign policy than continuous leadership 
(Rosenau 1971, 111-17; Sang-Seek Park 1980, 138-43). Liberia, a country 
that underwent a violent regime change in 1980 is chosen to provide the 
case study to evaluate the impact of regime type and foreign policy 
behavior. Among other things, the volume and direction of trade, and 
Liberia’s unique relation with the United States, are examined.
The case studies conclude in Chapter Six with an examination of the 
accomplishments of alternating Nigerian regimes as they relate to the 
development of the manufacturing industry. Following the approach of 
earlier case studies, an attempt is made to determine whether it makes a 
significant difference for a nation to be governed by civilian or 
military leaders.
In the final chapter, an attempt is made to draw together the 
findings of the preceding four chapters as they relate to regime 
performance. Using the four hypothesis which were specified in Chapter 
Two as guide, the nature of the impact of regime type on public policy 
is analyzed. More importantly, an attempt is made to provide some 
explanations for the sensitivity or insensitivity of policy outputs and 
outcomes to regime type. In the process the impact of environmental 
constraints (including domestic institutions such as the civil service) 
on the formulation and implementation of public policies is evaluated.
xv
Among the important constraining characteristics of the civil service in 
sub-Saharan Africa are the following: routinization, functional
specialization, and organizational hierarchy.
Another important constraint which is addressed in Chapter Four is 
the impact of the international environment on public policy. Thus, the 
part of the advanced industrial nations, the international marketplace, 
the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions as 
they effect the ability of the governments in sub-Saharan African 
countries to promulgate and implement public policy is examined.
xvi
Chapter One
MILITARY COUPS AND REGIME CHANGE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Introduction; Independent Africa
In the late 1950s, the African possessions of Britain, France and 
Belgium, beginning with the Sudan in 1956, Ghana in 1957 and Guinea in 
1958, began to gain their independence. In 1960, no less than sixteen 
former colonies became independent (see Table 1.1). As colonial rule 
came to an end, the independence of African countries was proclaimed 
amid much jubilation and optimism. Expert observers predicted a bright 
and stable future for the new states on the continent. They portrayed 
African politics as potentially democratic. Even the military coup in 
the Sudan in 1958, the attempted overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie of 
Ethiopia in 1960, and the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio of 
Togo in 1963 did little to dampen the optimistic predictions and 
expectations.
At no time or place during the euphoric days of independence were 
the members of the armed forces portrayed as important players in the 
political future of Africa. Even James S. Coleman, one of the most 
respected commentators on African politics, asserted that "except for 
the Sudan, none of the sub-Saharan African states has an army capable of 
exerting a political role...." (Coleman 1966, 313-1**). This observation 
was based on some startling facts about the African military of early 
1960s. For example, of all the countries in sub-Saharan Africa only the 
Sudan, where the British had provided military training since 1918, had 
at the time of independence, a significant proportion of African 
officers. With its relatively large educated elite, Ghana had only ten
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Table 1.1
Dates of Independence of Sub-Saharan African States in 
Chronological Order of Independence
Sudan 1 January 1956
Ghana (formerly Gold Coast) 6 March 1957
Gui nea 2 October 1958
Cameroon 1 January 1960
Togo 27 April 1960
Mai i 20 June 1960
Senegal 20 June 1960
Madagascar 26 June 1960
Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo) 30 June 1960
Somalia 1 July 1960
Benin (formerly Dahomey) 1 August 1960
Niger 3 August 1960
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) 5 August 1960
Cote d ’Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast) 7 August 1960
Chad 11 August 1960
Central African Republic 13 August 3 960
The Congo (People’s Republic) 15 August 1960
Gabon 17 August 1960
Nigeria 1 October 1960
Mauritania 28 November 1960
Sierra Leone 27 April 1961
Tanzania (as Tanganyika) 9 December 3961
Rwanda 1 July 1962
Burundi 1 July 1962
Uganda 9 October 1962
Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania) 10 December 1963
Kenya 12 December 1963
Malawi 6 July 1964
Zambi a 24 October 1964
The Gambia 18 February 1965
Botswana 30 September 1966
Lesotho 4 October 1966
Maur i tius 12 March 1968
Swazi land 6 September 1968
Equatorial Guinea 12 October 1968
Guinea-Bissau 10 September 1974
Mozambique 25 June 1975
Cape Verde 5 July 1975
The Comoros *6 July 1975
Sao Tome and Principe 12 July 1975
Angola 11 November 1975
Djibouti 25 June 1977
Seychelles 27 June 1977
Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) IB April 1980
Source: Africa South of the Sahara? 1988, p. 79.
*Date of unilateral declaration of independence.
percent of its officer corps Africanized in 1957, when it became 
independent. In July 3960, the Force Publioue in the Belgium Congo 
(later called Zaire), did not have a single African officer in a force 
totalling more than 2^,000 men (Gutteridge 1975, 6-7).
While they did not indigenize the officer corps of the African 
militaries, the British and the French did, make in contrast, some 
effort to provide their colonies with functioning political institutions 
before independence. They converted governors' advisory councils into 
parliaments, manned by duly elected representatives. They also 
established western-style legal systems with their safeguards for civil 
rights (Kotecha and Adams 1981, 52). To be sure, the British did much 
more in this respect than the French.
Consequently, upon achieving their independence, most former 
British and French colonies inherited or adopted a parliamentary form of 
government. Heading the governments of these new states were prime 
ministers responsible to duly-elected parliamentary majorities. 
Provisions were also made for independent judiciaries, protection of 
individual rights and other democratic institutions and practices.
The new leaders of Africa were generally anxious to get on with 
the job of "nation building." Their immediate concern was with the 
construction of much needed infrastructures, such as roads and railways, 
along with the provision of essential amenities, including schools, 
dispensaries, running water and electricity. The new political leaders 
paid very little attention to the military. After all, the military had 
played no positive role in the process of decolonization and the 
achievement of independence. Indeed, in some quarters, they were
perceived as agents of the colonial powers* since* during the colonial 
era African soldiers had often participated in the suppression of 
nationalist sentiments. As Gutteridge (1975* 6) observed:
There had been a legacy of fear and distrust of 
soldiers in many African countries. Nationalist politicians 
saw them as agents of imperial rule suppressing political 
demonstrations and protecting European property. Though 
they had won glory by serving overseas in the two world 
wars, their imperial activities caused them to be regarded 
in some quarters as armies of occupation or at best as 
mercenaries in the service of foreign powers.
These sentiments were reinforced by the presence of a high
proportion of European officers in most post-colonial armies (Guinea in
1958 being a notable exception). Partly because of the low esteem in
which the military was held, and partly because former colonial powers
continued to provide external military support for some of their
colonies (e.g., Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Senegal), military matters had a
low priority in the agenda of the new rulers of Africa. In fact, some
African leaders, including Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe
of Nigeria, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania
(formerly Tanganyika), advocated a policy of "non-militarization" for
their countries. However, only Dawda Jawara of the Gambia went beyond
such rhetoric and dispensed with a national army altogether. He chose
to provide for paramilitary duties by means of an expanded national
police force (Liebenow 1986, 242).
The Hi 1itary Intervenes 
The first few years following the achievement of independence were 
relatively peaceful. Unconstitutional actions by the military were 
viewed as aberrations that did not reflect the future of Africa.
Furthermore* many of the newly-independent countries achieved some 
modest economic gains. Some— including Cameroon, the Ivory Coast (now 
Cote d ’Ivoire), Gabon, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria— had high economic 
growth rates. But beginning in the mid-1960s, conditions took a turn 
for the worse, as economic and constitutional order began to break 
down. Within the space of one four-month period in the mid 1960s, the 
governments of the Congo (November 25, 1965), Dahomey (December 22, 
1965), Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria (January 1966) 
and Ghana (February 24, 1966) all fell victims to military coups. By 
the end of the decade, there were ten more coups, bringing the total 
number of military interventions up to twenty-two in twelve African 
states. In the 1970s, this trend continued (see Table 1.2). In time, 
throughout Africa stable civilian oligarchies began to disappear.
Today, parliamentary systems survive in only a handful of sub- 
Saharan African countries: Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius and Zimbabwe.
The remainder are either one-party states or are governed by military 
juntas. Of the states that gained independence in the 1960s, less than 
a third have had civilian regimes continuously since independence 
(Kotecha and Adams 1981, 64). Since 1960, there have been only nine 
examples of regular constitutional succession in all of sub-Saharan 
Africa: Gabon (1967), Liberia (1971), Kenya (1978), Botswana (1980),
Senegal (1980), Cameroon and Mauritius (1982), Tanzania (1985) and 
Sierra Leone (1985). Four of these examples occurred at the death of a 
ruler and another four followed voluntary resignations.
For the majority of African countries, the military coup has 
become so frequent as to constitute a routine and anticipated means of
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Table 1.8
Successful Military Coups in Sub-Saharan African States, 1958-1985














Col. Christophe Soglo 
Maj. Kouandete 
Lt. Col. Kouandete 
Maj. Matthieu Kerekou










Lt.Col. Sangoule Lamizana 
Gen. Sangoule Lamizana 
Col. Saye Zerbo 
Maj. Jean-Baptist Quedraogo 
Cpt. Thomas Sankara
Burundi Nov. 1976 Lt.Col. Jean-Baptist Bagaza
















Cpt. Marien Ngouabi 
Cpt. Marien Ngouabi
Equatorial Guinea Aug. 1979 Lt. Col. Teodoro Mbasogo











Col. Ignatius K. Acheampong
Fit. Lt. Jerry Rawlings 
Fit. Lt. Jerry Rawlings
Guinea Apr i 1 1984 Col. Lansana Conte
Guinea-Bissau Nov. 1980
Liberia Apr i 1 1980 Sgt. Samuel K. Doe
Madagascar May 1978 
Jan. 1975
Mali Nov. 1968 Lt. Moussa Traore
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Table l.B Cont’d.
Country Coup Date Coup Leader
Maur i tania July 1978 
Jan. 1980 
Dec. 1984
Col. Mustapha Salek 
Lt. Col. Mohamed Haidalla 
Col. Quid Sid’Ahmed Taya
Niger April 1974 Lt. Col. Seyni Kountche





Maj. Gen. Mohammed Buhari 
Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida
Rwanda July 1973 Maj. Gen. J. Habyarimana
Sierra Leone March 1967 Brig. David Lansana
Somalia Oct. 1969
Sudan Nov. 1958 
May 1969 
April 1985
Gen. Ibrahim Abboud 
Col. Gaafar Nimeiry 
Lt. Gen. Swar ad-Dahab
Togo Jan. 1967 Lt. Col. Etienne Eyadema
Uganda Jan. 1971 
May 1980 
July 1985
Maj. Gen. Idi Amin 
Gen. Basilio Okello
Seychelles June 1977




Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1988.
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changing top political leadership. Coups in Africa have affected regime 
change much more frequently than have elections and other forms of 
constitutionally sanctioned methods of change. Thus, referring to 
Nigeria, its former president Shehu Shagari proclaimed: "In this
country there are, in the end, only two parties, the civilians and the 
soldiers" (cited in Johnson, Slater and McGowan 19BA, 628-AO).
At one time or another, over three-quarters of independent African 
states have experienced attempted or successful military coups. By 
1985, only six African states had not witnessed some form of extra-legal 
armed involvement in national politics by military elites since 
achieving independence. These states are Botswana, Cape Verde,
Djibouti, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Lesothd (McGowan and Johnson 19BA, 
633-66).
Although the primary concern of this study is to evaluate 
regime performance, it will perhaps be appropriate initially to identify 
some of the factors facilitating military interventions. As Bienen 
(1978, 4) observed:
When we understand the reasons for specific military 
interventions and we explore the links between the military 
and other political institutions and groups, we can better 
assess the future evolution of armed forces in society and 
can better judge the militaries’ capacities to deal with 
specific problems. The factors that explain military 
intervention also help to reveal the limits of the 
militaries’ political capacities and the constraints on 
transition from military rule. Even if we have no general 
theory to explain military intervention, a dissection of the 
specific components of an intervention may reveal the 
potentialities of the kind of rule that the intervening 
military will exert.
Explaining Military Interventions
Many arguments have been put forth to explain the high incidence 
of military coups in Africa. These arguments indicate that military 
coups are the result of a complex mix of factors. Among these are 
political? economic? military? cultural and ethnic differentiation? 
personal? and foreign influences.
Political Factors Affecting Military Intervention
An examination of the literature on military-led coups in Africa 
reveals that political factors are strong determinants of them. Among 
the forces which have been identified as facilitating military 
intervention in politics are failed civi1ian , leadership? inadequacy and 
weakness of existing political institutions? and the inability of 
incumbent existing regime to gain legitimacy.
Failed Civilian Leadership
A number of coups seem to have been undertaken for the express 
purpose of correcting the failures of the civilian leadership. Where 
the military establishment perceives the performance of the existing 
civilian government as inconsistent with the process of nation-building? 
it may intervene in order to implement what it deems to be necessary 
changes. For example? when soldiers assumed power in Somalia in 1969, 
they did so in order to implement basic political changes. And, after 
they seized power? to a far greater extent than the previous civilian 
administration, they pursued? a policy of mass-mobi1ization (Wiking 
1983, 30).
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Welch (1970) also argued that a regime’s performance failures are 
an important factor in explaining the timing of an intervention. 
According to Welch <1970, VIII), "Opportunities to intervene occurred in 
many forms— widespread strikes or demonstrations against the government, 
severe economic difficulties, the undesired dependence of the government 
upon the armed forces to maintain control over a rapidly deteriorating 
situation." Similarly, Liebenow <1986, 247-48) argued that the civilian 
leadership’s use of the military to cope with political situations 
(riots, strikes), only served to intensify the political role of the 
military at the expense of civilian authority. Extensive dependence on 
the military to maintain control not only revealed the weakness of 
civilian authority but also encouraged the military to believe that its 
intervention was indispensable for political stability. Coups in a 
number of African countries— Dahomey (1963), Zaire (1965), Nigeria 
(1966), Upper Volta (1966)— appear to meet these general criteria.
Inadequacy and Weakness of Existing Political Institutions
Huntington (1968, 4) perceived military intervention as the result 
of the inability of existing political institutions to keep pace with 
the rapid mobili2ation of new groups into politics. When existing 
political institutions become strained due to the demands placed upon 
them by newly-mobilized members of the society, the result is often 
increased political violence. Where normal political channels cannot 
accommodate citizens’ demands, they will express their demands by other 
means, such as demonstrations, strikes, and as far as the military is 
concerned, coups.
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The Ethiopian coup of 197̂ * provides an excellent example of how 
inadequate political institutions can encourage a military coup. The 
failure of the attempted land reform in 1967-69 made it clear to 
civilians and military officers who wanted change that this could not be 
brought about through the existing institutional structures (Schwab 
1979, 125-35). Then, in the early 1970s, when drought struck northern 
Ethiopia, the demands for reform grew stronger. The drought affected 
the food and water supplies of the armed forces, which were already 
unhappy over the dangers of the Eritrean campaign (Ethiopian forces had 
long been involved in a struggle to suppress the Eritrean nationalist 
movement and to ensure the continued dominion of Ethiopia over Eritrea). 
The failure of the existing governmental structures to adequately 
address the problems associated with the drought and to accommodate the 
grievances of the military brought matters to head.
On January 12, 197^, soldiers in a small garrison in southeast 
Ethiopia rebelled against their officers over poor food and a shortage 
of drinking water. The Emperor did nothing, the soldiers were not 
reprimanded. News of the Emperor’s response, or lack of it, quickly 
reached other regions in the country. Soon enlisted men and NCDs of the 
Second Division at Asmara began broadcasting their complaints over a 
radio station. The Emperor hastily changed prime ministers and promised 
to make the prime minister responsible to parliament. The military 
responded by forming a secret coordinating committee, later to be known 
as the Dergue, and military leaders announced that the armed forces 
would no longer automatically obey the prime minister. While they 
proclaimed their loyalty to the Emperor, leaders of the coup began to
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systematically arrest all those around him. On September IE, with all 
his close associates already jailed, the Emperor was placed under house 
arrest, although the Dergue did not formally proclaim the end of the 
monarchy until March 1975 (Cartwright 1983, E71-7P; Ottaway 1978).
For Liebenow (1986), the inherent weakness of African political 
parties also fosters a climate in which military interventions can 
occur. With a few notable exceptions, such as National Council of 
Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), formerly the National Council of Nigeria and 
Cameroon and the Action Group (AG) in Nigeria, political parties in 
postcolonial Africa have lacked organizational strength. Due, in part, 
to the obstructionist policies and practices of colonial administrators, 
African civilian politicians failed to acquire the organizational skills 
needed to create and manage viable political parties (Liebenow 1986, 
EA0-A1 ).
Furthermore, even where strong and potentially viable parties did 
exist, they tended to be oriented to a specific region or cluster of 
ethnic groups. In Nigeria, for example, the NCNC was essentially an 
eastern and Ibo party mechanism, while the AG was of western and Yoruba 
orientation. Except for a handful of countries, there were no truly 
national parties in Africa. And as Liebenow (1986, E91) pointed out, 
civilian leadership has endured only in those few countries (Tanzania, 
Cameroon, Malawi and Zambia) where broad, cross-cultural political 
parties have been successfully created.
In the Cameroon, for example, the only national party, the 
Reassemblement Democratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC) [established in 
1966 as Union Nationale Camerounaise (UNO 3, was the result of a merger
1 3
of the governing parties of each of the country’s two states (East 
Cameroon and West Cameroon), and four opposition parties. Consequently, 
RDPC had representatives from all major groups in Cameroon. The same is 
true of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM— the revolutionary party of Tanzania) 
which was the result of a merger between the Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU) and the Zanzibar-based Afro-Shirazi party. The CCM has 
many affiliate organizations from diverse groups in Tanzania (Africa 
South of the Sahara 1972, 840; 1985, 1004). In Malawi, membership of 
the country’s only political party, the Malawi Congress Party (MPC), is 
compulsory for all adults. Aside from these countries, there are a few 
others, which although they lack broad-based political parties, have 
nonetheless been able tD maintain durable civilian regimes. They 
include Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Gabon.
The durability of civilian regimes in Mozambique and Zimbabwe is 
for the most part due to the fact that the parties assumed a military 
posture during the anticolonial struggles. But, upon achieving 
independence, FRELIMO in Mozambique and the Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) in Zimbabwe took steps to isolate the military wings of 
their organizations from political affairs. The militaries in these 
countries have not had occasion to step into the political arena to 
settle disputes between competing political elites. Furthermore, 
civilian political leaders in Mozambique and Zimbabwe have relied on 
their regular police rather than soldiers to maintain internal order.
By contrast, civilian rule has prevailed in the Ivory Coast, 
Senegal and Gabon because of the presence of external military support. 
The stationing of French troops in these countries has permitted
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civilian leaders to remain in control of the state, irrespective of 
whether the party was broad-based or organizationally strong (Liebenow 
1986, 841-42).
Inability of Existing Regime to Gain Legitimacy
Welch and Smith (1974, 26-30), argued that, "the ease with which
the armed forces assume political power varies inversely with the
legitimacy enjoyed by the existing civilian government." The loss of
0legitimacy- has been used by military elites in several African 
countries to justify their intervention in politics.
For example, the ouster of President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria in
December of 1983 was encouraged by the regime’s loss of legitimacy. The 
last three years of Shagari’s administration had witnessed a rapid 
deterioration of economic conditions in Nigeria. But the military took 
no action until it became obvious that the administration no longer 
enjoyed the same level of public support as it did prior to the 
presumably "rigged" elections of 1983. The elections had been marred by 
violence and allegations of electoral malpractice.
The electoral victory of Shagari’s National Party of Nigeria (NPN) 
and the legitimacy of his newly-formed government were called into 
question in the face of what Chief Awolowo, leader of the Unity Party of
Nigeria (UPN), who described the process as "vote-rigging of a scale
qunprecedented in African history. "■ Based on the Nigerian case, the 
ease with which the military assumed power just four months after the 
elections seems to lend credence to the proposition that the military is 
more likely to intervene in politics where the existing regime lacks 
legitimacy.
15
Economic Factors Affecting Military Intervention
Of all the factors which encourage military intervention? perhaps 
none is more significant than the nation’s economic condition. Economic 
difficulties create the opportunity for soldiers to intervene in 
political system. Most African countries have been and remain 
economically depressed. In 1983? the U.S. State Department noted that 
"Africa is the only area in the world where national growth rates are 
often negative and where per capita food production is declining"
(Bureau of Public Affairs 1983, 1). It is therefore not surprising that 
in nearly all of the countries in which coups have occurred in Africa 
over the past three decades, coup leaders have pointed to economic 
problems, such as those cited by the State Department, to justify their 
decision to intervene.
There is consensus among scholars that the state of a nation’s 
economy affects the probability of a coup occurring within it. In her 
study of coups in Africa, Nelkin (1967, 231), concluded that "the issues 
which best account for the ease of military access to power, relate to 
economic circumstances and their social consequences." Nordlinger 
(1977, 89), and Welch (1970, IB), have also cited economic decline as a 
factor that encourages military intervention.
A typical example of a country where economic decline has 
encouraged military intervention is Benin (which has experienced six 
coups since achieving independence in 1960). Successive coup leaders in 
this former French colony of Dahomey have invariably pointed to 
deteriorating economic conditions to justify their actions. The 
importance of economic conditions is also reflected in at least two of
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the five military coups in Ghana— the first ousted President Nkrumah in 
1966 and the second saw the overthrow of Dr. Busia in 1972. Economic 
considerations were also the primary factors that prompted military 
interventions in Mali (1968), Congo-Brazavi1le (August 1968) and Nigeria 
(July 1975 and December 1983).
The relationship between economic performance and military 
intervention was empirically evaluated by Staffan Wiking (197A, 7A-77). 
He showed that income, in terms of per capita GNP, in African countries 
varied significantly with the incidence of coups in these countries. Of 
the "poorest" fifteen “Couintries on the continent, all but two had had 
military coups. On the other hand, only six of the "richest" fifteen 
had experienced military intervention (Wiking 1983, 37).
Military Factors Affecting Military Intervention
Some scholars have argued that factors internal to the African 
military establishment can encourage or inhibit military coups. The 
African soldier is particularly sensitive to actions that are not 
consistent with the military's collective corporate interests. In this 
regard, reductions in the budgetary allocations to the military, or 
attempts to limit the military’s autonomy, are of particular 
significance. As several scholars have observed, the likelihood of 
military intervention increases when the existing government fails to 
provide adequate funding for the military or interferes excessively in 
the military’s affairs (Nordlinger 1977, 6A-76; Liebenow 1986, 2A0-50; 
Welch and Smith 197A). For example, the ouster of the Ghanaian prime 
minister, Dr. Busia in 1972, was, in part, due to the declining living 
standard of the country's armed forces. Also, the coups in Uganda
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(1971) and Liberia (1980), were partly justified on the grounds that the 
existing government had neglected the material requirements of the 
military (Wiking 1983, 786-98).
Military coups are also the result of excessive involvement in 
military affairs by civilian leadership. Once again the Ghana coups of 
3966 and 1972 provide excellent examples of the consequences of 
excessive interference in military affairs by an existing civilian 
government. These coups may not have occurred or at least may have been 
delayed, if the civilian regimes of Nkrumah and Busia had not introduced 
political considerations into matters which were essentially military. 
According to Robert Price (1971, 399-430), the military’s resentment of 
Nkrumah’s removal of the very popular General Ankrah from his position 
as commander of the army was one of the major factors that precipitated 
the 1966 coup. The leaders of the 1972 coup not only charged Prime 
Minister Busia with lowering the living standards of the Army personnel, 
but also with manipulating promotions within the military (Wiking 
1983, 86-87). Uganda, where the personal conflict between Milton Obote 
and Idi Amin culminated in the ouster of the former in January 1971, 
provides another instance of military intervention resulting from 
civilians moving against military personalities (Decalo 1976, 173-230).
Perhaps nothing is more challenging to the military’s corporate 
interest than the creation of independent military or paramilitary 
organizations. Some African leaders have incurred the wrath of their 
regular army by creating armies of foreign-trained and well-equipped 
personal body guards. According to Liebenow (1986, 249), the "creation 
by Nkrumah of a President’s Own Guard Regiment— recruited, trained and
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equipped independently of the regular army— was the second professional 
irritant (the first was the dismissal of General Ankrah) contributing to 
the 1966 coup in Ghana." Similarly, the attempt to recruit mercenaries 
from abroad was used by the military to justify the 1966 overthrow of 
King Ntare V of Burundi.
Military Coups and Cultural Pluralism
Ethnic and regional differentiation constitutes another important 
reason for military intervention in African politics. Thus Welch and 
Smith <197^, 26-30) propose that: "The likelihood of military
intervention rises as the intensification of conflicts arising from 
ethnic or class cleavages threatens the status and power of the dominant 
group or class." While it is often difficult to identify specific 
instances of military intervention as being prompted solely by ethnic or 
regional factors, nevertheless, such factors have certainly played a 
role in quite a few coups. The first short-lived coup in Sierra Leone 
in March 1967, for instance, was a direct result of reluctance by the 
Mende tribe to relinquish to another tribe the control it had exercised 
over the country since independence (de Villiers 3976, 60).
Although soldiers rarely justify their intervention in politics on 
ethnic or regional grounds, it has been the most important consideration 
on more than one occasion. In the coups in Somalia (1969), Uganda 
(1971), and Chad (1975), the coup-makers accused the previous regimes of 
having pursued a policy of "tribalism," but it was only in Uganda that 
this accusation was specifically used to justify military intervention 
(Wiking 1983, 119). Dissatisfaction with the way in which the civilian 
leadership was handling the regional problems in the Sudan was, in part,
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responsible for at least one of the coups in that country. Colonel 
Gaafar Nimeri and Babaka Awadallah, the two leaders of the 1969 coup in 
the Sudan* blamed Prime Minister Muhammed Mahgoub and his fellow 
politicians for their inability to resolve the traditional problem with 
the southern areas of the country. Ethnic and or regional problems also 
lay behind the coups in Nigeria (1966)* Togo <1967), Dahomey <1972), 
Rwanda (1973) and Mauretania (1978) (Wiking 1983, 93-119).
Personal Factors Affecting Military Intervention
Although coup leaders often emphasize other factors (economic, 
organizational, cultural) as the reasons influencing their decision to 
intervene, the striving for status and the desire to hold and exercise 
power cannot be ruled out in assessing the motives behind some coups in 
Africa (Decalo 1976, .15-22, 173-230; de Villiers 1976, 54-66).
According to Decalo (1976), the most important reason for the 1965 
coup in the Central African Republic was the personal ambitions of the 
army chief of staff, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Bokassa had manifested 
his desire to exercise power on numerous previous occasions, including 
once when he unilaterally assumed the position of minister of war 
(Decalo 1976, 17).
The personal element in African military coups was perhaps most 
clearly manifested in the 1971 coup in Uganda. Although Idi Amin cited 
some of the aforementioned factors as motivations for his decision to 
intervene, more cogent reasons were Amin’s personal fears. As Decalo 
(1976) pointed out, Amin’s decision to intervene preempted President 
Qbote’s call for his removal from his position as commander of the army. 
According to one report, a few hours before the coup, Obote had called
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from the Singapore Commonwealth Meeting to have Amin arrested (Decalo 
1976» 18). Furthermore? in October of 1970? Amin’s powers had already 
been reduced by the creation of two command positions equal to his own; 
and he was also the target of at least two inquiries (one into the death 
of a top army officer and the other into the misuse of defense funds). 
Finally, there was the personal conflict between Amin and Obote (Decalo 
1976, 18-19). All of these considerations coalesced to provide a strong 
motive for Amin to intervene.
Foreign Factors Affecting Military Intervention
A significant omission in most of the literature on coups is the 
importance of foreign influence on the military’s propensity to 
intervene in African politics. In the light of available evidence this 
would appear to be an unjustifiable omission. Although there are 
difficulties involved in proving foreign influence, there are instances 
where such influences seem clearly to have been at work. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and its sister organization the World 
Bank, provide excellent examples of how foreign institutions can 
influence political affairs in African and other countries. One such 
example is the Sudan, where in 1985, President Nimeri was persuaded to 
acquiesce to the wishes of the IMF in the removal of food subsidies and 
the devaluation of the currency. The subsequent increases in the price 
of food and fuel sparked a general strike by professionals such as 
lawyers and doctors and demonstrations by students. Public discontent 
with the regime culminated in the ouster of Nimeri on April 6, 1985 
(Clark 1985; Africa South of the Sahara 1988, 9A9).
Another important foreign factor is reflected in the so-called 
cases of "contagion" or "demonstration" effect of coups. This idea 
holds that the threshold of tolerance by the military for an existing 
regime is drastically lowered when there is an increase in the frequency 
of successful military coups elsewhere on the continent. Coups, in 
effectj breed coups! When the continent is viewed as an interacting 
system it becomes evident that a process of feedback is at work. In 
this regard, the wave of coups in 1965 and 1966 is very striking. It is 
perhaps not easy to demonstrate that there were direct connections 
between events in Algeria (June 1965), and the seven other countries in 
which coups occurred between October 1965, and February 1966. However, 
there is no doubt that, by the mid-1960s, African politicians as well 
military officials were much more in touch with one another and with 
political life on the continent as a whole, through frequent meetings 
within the framework of international organizations inside and outside 
Africa as well as in informal international activities.
For West Africa, in particular, more direct links between coup- 
makers can be traced. Colonel Lamizana of Upper Volta (now known as 
Burkina Faso), Colonel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, General 
Soglo of Dahomey (now Benin), knew one another since they served 
together in Indochina and, according to Aristide Zolberg (196B, 86), it 
is likely that the presence of one of them at the helm of his country 
creates new status aspirations among the others. Helen Kitchen (1963) 
cites the case of Colonel David Thompson, commanding officer of 
Liberia’s National Guard, who was arrested on suspicion of plotting a 
coup and is alleged to have said three weeks after the assassination of
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President Olympio of Togo: "If only 250 Togolese soldiers could
overthrow their government a Liberian army of five thousand could seize 
power easily" <1963? 9). Another aspect of the phenomenon of contagion 
is suggested by General Soglo? who explained that his takeover in 
Dahomey was prompted by the fear that the elections scheduled for early 
1966 might crystallize the north-south cleavage and result in disorder 
similar to that which prevailed among the Yoruba of neighboring Western 
Nigeria during and after the electoral campaign of October 1965? and 
about which Dahomians? many of whom are also Yoruba? were well informed 
(Zolberg 1968? 86).
Conversely? Soglo’s successful takeover probably affirmed the 
resolution of Nigerian officers to topple the civilian regime of Prime 
Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Their success? in turn? may have 
inspired their Ghanaian counterparts? with whom they shared not only 
British professional traditions but also an exposure to the disastrous 
consequences of political disorder gained while serving with the ONIJC in 
the Congo. Furthermore? Zolberg <1969? 179) has argued that? "the 
phenomenon of contagion contributed to the normalization of military 
rule as well: its establishment in one country enhanced both the
opportunities available to other groups and the legitimacy of stepping 
in to save the situation. In the light of their shared experiences? 
military leaders became even less hesitant to establish military rule 
from the outset."
The most important aspect of contagion is related to the strength 
of the regime in power. As Welch and Smith < 197<A) and Feit <1973) 
observe? coups seem to have occurred mainly in countries whose regimes
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are obviously weak. According to Zolberg (1968, 87), "the revelation of 
this prevalent weakness made even the more firmly established regimes 
much less formidable. It is as if a spell had been broken..." and 
"...the army has now seen that the Emperor stands naked." Although it 
is reasonable to expect "the more firmly established regimes” to be able 
to resist coup attempts successfully, this has not been the case in 
Africa. For example, the two most enduring regimes in Africa, the 
imperial regime in Ethiopia and the one-party dominant civilian regime 
in Liberia, fell victims of military-led coups in 197^ and 1980 
respectively.
No matter what the prevailing conditions may be, the military’s 
ability to topple the government of a country is, to a significant 
degree, dependent on the acquiescence of the general public. Ultimately 
the people must first manifest their displeasure over the performance of 
the existing regime before the military can intervene.
Regime Type and Public Policy: State of the Literature
As the foregoing clearly indicates, a general body of knowledge 
exists explaining military interventions. What tends to be neglected, 
however, is the issue of the performance of soldiers after they have 
assumed control of the government. Do military rulers perform any 
better or worse than the civilian leaders whom they replace? Or as 
Claude Welch (1971, 213) puts it, "Can a military-based government cope 
more successfully with the difficulties civilian regimes encountered?" 
Are some of the nation’s problems susceptible to solution by means 
congenial to the governing military junta, in ways that escaped the 
preceding civilian regime?
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Social and political conditions prevailing in contemporary Africa 
almost preclude any rigorous analysis of this question. For example, 
available statistics are very uneven, and there are many variables which 
ideally ought to be investigated in any attempt to answer such 
questions. Notwithstanding these difficulties, some studies have 
examined and tried to explain the performance of different regime types 
in Third World settings. Some scholars have argued that military 
regimes are more "progressive" than civilian ones; others have contended 
that military rulers are essentially conservative; and still a third 
group has maintained that there is little or no difference between 
military and civilian regimes. The remainder of this chapter will 
review and analyze these contending perspectives on military regime 
performance in the Third World.
The Military as a Progressive Force
Some scholars have suggested that the likely consequences of 
military rule are: economic growth; the modernization of economic and
social structures; and more equitable distribution of scarce economic 
values and opportunities (Pye 1962; Daadler 1962; Johnson 1962). As 
sponsors of this kind of change, military governments are depicted as 
positive forces, whose politization is to be commended. According to 
the leading exponent of this school of thought, Lucian Pye, the 
continuing modernization of the military's organization and weaponry has 
instilled in the officers the belief that their society ought also to be 
modernized. Said Pye:
Above all else the revolution in military technology 
has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries 
to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their
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countries are economically and technologically 
underdeveloped. Called upon to perform roles basic to 
advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers 
can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial 
changes in their own societies (1962? 280).
Thus the pursuit of social and economic change arises from an 
awareness of backwardness brought about by improving military 
technology. Pye cites the overseas experience of the military officers? 
and "their distance from civilian societies? including attitudes and 
judgments? that are remote if not completely apart from those of 
civilian life?" as factors that cause the military to "focus more on the 
standards common to the more industrialized world" (1962? 281). The 
progressive consequences of military rule? it is further argued? stems 
from the fact that alternative organizations are weak? and that the 
military? as a major avenue for social mobility? attracts the most 
talented and confers on its members substantial experience with rational 
organization and sophisticated modern technology.
Recent studies of regime performance in Latin America (Cohen 1985? 
Sloan and Tedin 1967), argue that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are 
more efficient than other regime types at promoting economic 
development. Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are essentially 
military regimes governing with the tacit approval and collaboration of 
technocrats and domestic bourgeoisie (O’Donnell 1973). Although the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian model is a South American phenomenon? these 
studies can still be instructive in the inquiry into regime performance 
in Africa. After all? the National Liberation Council in Ghana (1966- 
69), and the Mohammed-Obansanjo regime in Nigeria (1975-79)? exhibited 
some characteristics of bureaucratic-authoritarianism [i.e.? the rule of
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the military in conjunction with technocrats] (Cammack, Pool and Tordoff 
1988, 123).
Using interrupted time-series analysis, Cohen compared the 
performance of democratic and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in 
Brazil, Colombia and Argentina. He observed that such regimes have an 
advantage over democratic ones in effectively implementing the type nf 
policies necessary to facilitate economic growth. However, he noted 
that economic gains were often made at enormous political costs (e.g., 
suspension of constitutional rights, censorship of the media, arrests, 
exiles, and executions).
In their study, Sloan and Tedin (1987) employed a multivariate 
model and year-by-year data from 1960 to 1980 in twenty Latin American 
countries to analyze the relationship between regime type, regime age, 
and public policy. They employed two independent variables (regime type 
and number of years a specific regime has been in control of government) 
in an attempt tD explain variations in policy outputs. They identified 
five regime types. These were democratic, bureaucratic-authoritarian 
(BA), communist, "traditional authoritarian" (TA) and "transitional."
According to Sloan and Tedin (1987, 104), TA regimes were either 
personal dictatorships or "oligarchic democracies." The label 
transitional regime was used to account for any year in which a country 
experienced a change in regime control of government.
Having identified the various regime types, Sloan and Tedin then 
proceeded to evaluate regime effect on five separate policy areas. They 
were: domestic economic performance, agricultural production, military
spending, external debt and domestic social performance. Like Cohen
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(1985) they found that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes were the most 
effective in achieving economic growth. However? they compiled poor 
records when it came to controlling inflation and avoiding external 
debts. On the other hand? democratic regimes performed adequately and 
had the second-best record in all five policy areas.
The Military as a Conservative Force
A second view of military regime performance? that of the military 
as a conservative force? was advanced and gained wide acceptance from 
the late 1960s onward. A number of scholars have argued that? because 
military officers belong to the most "organized" institution in 
developing countries? once they assume power they will be primarily 
concerned with the attainment and preservation of order. According to 
advocates of this view? even where social and economic factors are 
proclaimed as justification for a coup? a military government does not 
often possess the political and organizational skills to bring about 
change in the desired direction. As soon as it becomes evident that the 
goals of economic growth and social change are difficult to achieve? 
military governors will tend to focus their resources on preserving 
order (Bienen 1971). Other scholars argue that in addition to 
maintaining order? military rulers are also very much concerned with the 
protection of their own interests and those of the middle classes. In 
this view the military is seen as a conservative force with little or no 
concern for the promotion of modernizing policies.
Nordlinger (1970) employed statistical analysis of economic change 
under military regimes to advance the hypothesis that military 
governments do not really act as agents of modernization. However? he
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later modified his hypothesis by stating that) "within a particular 
social and political context <when there is hardly a middle class to 
speak of) and when workers and peasants have not been politically 
mobilized) soldiers in mufti sometimes allow or even encourage economic 
modernization" (1970) 1134). He maintained) that for the most part) the 
military in emerging countries assumes power in order to advance its own 
interests. Under military regimes) the interests of the military are 
paramount? even when they conflict with the aspirations and interests of 
larger segments within the society or the nation as a whole (Nordlinger 
1970, 1134).
Relying upon the World Handbook of Social and Political 
Indicators, Nordlinger found that in those countries in which there was 
direct military rule during at least part of the period from 1957 to 
196E <n=18>, the average percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) 
spent on defence was 3.65 but the corresponding figure among those 
countries in which the military did not serve as governors, but did 
exert a good deal of political influence (n=E0) was 3.4; and in those 
countries in which the military’s activities remained circumscribed 
within their instrumental role (n=36) it was 1.9 (1970, 1135).  ̂ Thus 
it appears that the proportion of GNP devoted tD defense is almost twice 
as large in countries overtly ruled by the military as it is in 
countries with non-politicized military. The conclusion seems 
inescapable that when the military accedes to power, its interests 
become paramount.
Nordlinger also puts forward a proposition regarding the influence 
of the officers’ middle-class interests and identities as these
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influence public policy under military regimes. While agreeing with the 
general hypothesis that the military acts to protect middle-class 
interests? he advanced a supplementary hypothesis stating that "soldiers 
in mufti will protect the status quo only where the middle-class 
interests are seen to be threatened" (1970, 114P-43). From his analysis 
based on data collected by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris (1967), 
Nordlinger inferred that military governments failed to sponsor economic 
modernization in countries where more than ten percent of the active 
male population was employed in middle class occupations—  
i.e., commerce, banking, insurance, technical, professional, managerial, 
administrative and clerical positions (1970, 1143).
Later works by Edward Feit (1973) and Claude E. Welch and Arthur 
K. Smith (1974), rely on case studies to develop some useful 
hypotheses. Feit (1973) argued that the most military governments 
evolve through three stages. The first stage is characterized by direct 
control of the polity by military officers. In this stage all principal 
offices in the country are held by military officials. This stage is 
usually of a short duration and is followed by a second phase, in which 
civilian cadres, mostly from the administrative arm, are drawn into the 
regime, which now claims to be apolitical. At the same time, a cohesion 
without consensus is built. This cohesion is an alliance of mutually 
hostile social forces, which are balanced against each other by the 
military government as means for maintaining power. This coalition 
holds together only as long as each component believes that its interest 
will be best served by remaining within it, and that none will profit 
more than it will itself. Since any serious attempt at social
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regeneration will break the coalition, any effort at regeneration is 
inhibited from the outset. In the end, observed Feit, the hostility of 
the opposing interests comes to the boil, and the coalition breaks 
apart, taking the military regime with it.
To avoid this, and to initiate the promised regeneration of 
society upon which the military’s claim to power is based, the regime 
shifts to a third phase, in which it moves from being presumably 
apolitical to being avowedly political. In this phase, the leaders seek 
a mass base as a means of legitimizing the regime and inducing 
progress. To this end, the military regime creates sets of symbols to 
which it attempts to condition the masses. The regime also creates mass 
parties in which the people can be trained to a given political ritual. 
However, the mass parties are unable to hold the allegiance of the 
masses, because the coalition essential to maintain the sense of 
representation, which is a major role of the mass party, cannot be 
maintained. Eventually the hollowness of the ritual becomes evident, 
destroying any mass following the military regime may have acquired.
The military regime fails because it can neither hold together the 
disparate and hostile social forces it has had to harness, nor maintain 
the mass support that it needs to maintain some semblance of legitimacy 
(Feit 1973, 6-19).
Feit’s model reveals that because of the constraints imposed by 
political and organizational factors which limit their ability to 
initiate or maintain socioeconomic development, military officers do not 
make good governors.
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In their consideration of military regimes, Welch and Smith <1974) 
identify four principal types: predatory, reformist, radical and
guardian. According to these authors, the great majority of recent 
military regimes have reflected the propensity of military officers in 
emerging societies to establish themselves as the unique custodians of 
the "national interest."
Guardian military regimes place an overwhelming value on political 
stability and order or on their own corporate interests. Unlike radical 
and reformist regimes, military guardians consider change to be of 
secondary importance, and they prefer that change takes place through a 
gradual and orderly process. They are primarily "law and order" men.
The authors identified four major categories of military 
guardianship. These are: direct, arbiter, factional, and postcolonial.
Of these, the postcolonial variety is the most prevalent in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The other forms of military guardians apply mainly to Latin 
America.
In direct guardianship, the military leadership assumes direct 
responsibility for government by ruling for indefinite periods. In 
arbiter guardianship, the military tend to act indirectly as custodians 
of national interest, supporting civilian elites they deem acceptable 
and setting limits on the policy choices open to government leaders. 
Factional guardianship is similar to arbiter guardianship. However, in 
the latter pattern, the armed forces are relatively weak and 
organizationally fragmented. Consequently, they are unable to effect 
fundamental changes.
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The principal objective of postcolonial guardians is to restore 
orderly processes to a social order distorted by misgovernment. The 
authors suggest that> the net effect of this African variety of military 
guardianship appears to be oriented more to true guardianship. By 
restoring stability and investor confidence, the military rulers serve 
the interest of economic development and stimulate the growth of the 
middle class.
Having described the four principal types of military regimes, 
Welch and Smith then turned to the case studies of civi1-mi 1itary 
relations in Thailand, Nigeria, Egypt, Peru and France (France stands 
apart from the other four countries discussed by the authors). Although 
the French military were instrumental in bringing down the Fourth 
Republic, they did not threaten to supplant the civilian government 
(Welch and Smith 1974, 205-33). The case studies reveal that the scope 
and character of the political role of the military are conditioned by a 
large number of interacting institutional and environmental variables. 
Nevertheless, Welch and Smith still conclude that the outcomes of 
military intervention and its implications for socioeconomic 
modernization and political development conform to a pattern which they 
called the "Garrison-Managerial State." According to this idea, as 
military institutions throughout the Third World have become more 
differentiated and specialized, and as officer corps have become more 
professionalized, the performance in office of military politicians has 
tended to be more bureaucratic than political in both motivation and 
effect. Military rule focuses primarily on policies that serve the 
narrow interests of the armed forces. Secondarily, they seek the
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preservation of public order. Thirdly? the military seek the promotion 
of stable industrial growth; and lastly (if at all)? the military 
advocate policies designed to bring about social and economic reform 
<1974, 260).
In a study dealing with regime performance in Africa? Berg- 
Schlosser (1984) identifies four African regime types (polyarchic, 
socialist? civil authoritarian and military) and evaluates their 
performance on three main levels. The first level includes achievement 
of socioeconomic development? the second is the degree of dependence on 
external economic and political forces; and the third level is the
achievement of a good political order (1984? 134).
The results of his analysis contradicts the widely shared view 
that democracy hinders economic growth in developing countries. Berg- 
Schlosser finds that polyarchic systems fare quite well both in terms of 
GNP growth and the improvement of the basic quality of life. They also 
have the best record when it comes to normative standards? such as the 
achievement of a good political order (e.g., protecting civil liberties 
and guaranteeing freedom from political oppression). Military regimes
did not fare as well as their civilian counterparts. According to Berg-
Schlosser (1984? 121-51) "military regimes clearly show themselves to be 
no remedy whatsoever for the problems of Africa? either in terms of 
their economic performance or of their observation of normative 
standards."
A sort of compromise between these two views (progressive and 
conservative) on military regime performance? is offered by Huntington
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(1968), who suggests that the effect of military rule is dependent on 
the level of development of the country under consideration:
As society changes* so does the role of the military.
In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the 
middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the 
mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the 
conservative guardian of the existing order. Thus 
paradoxically but understandably, the more backward a 
society is the more progressive the role of its military; 
the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative 
and reactionary becomes the role of its military 
(1968, SSI).
Thus, according to Huntington’s argument, both views of military 
regime performance are essentially accurate. However, the question is 
how to distinguish between backward and advanced societies. It would 
appear from his discussion that Huntington was referring to the level of 
social and economic development. However, no matter what standard of 
measurement is applied, when compared to nations in other regions of the 
world, nearly all of those in Africa will be classified as backward. 
Thus, at least in the present context, Huntington’s hypothesis seems 
consistent with that of Pye. On the other hand, in regions where 
economic and social development are at a relatively more advanced stage, 
military regimes will tend to act as conservative forces. This implies 
that African military governments are likely to constitute a force for 
economic and social progress, whereas their Latin American counterparts 
will tend to act as conservative forces inhibiting social and/or 
economic change. To be sure, there are some Latin American nations 
(including Bolivia and Peru), which are as backward as many in Africa.
Within Africa itself, there is very little difference from one 
country to the other in terms of the level of social and economic 
development. With the notable exception of oil-rich Gabon, and sparsely
populated Seychelles (with average annual per capita GDPs of 
approximately $700.00 and $500.00, respectively) over the last ten 
years, the annual average per capita GDP for most of the remaining 
African states fell some where between $350.00 (for Zambia, Swaziland, 
Mauritius and Cote de’Ivoire) and $60.00 (for Mali, Zaire, Equatorial 
Guinea and Ethiopia). At these low levels of economic development, 
Huntington’s hypothesis is not likely to be of any meaningful 
significance. Thus, if they are to illustrate Huntington’s theory, 
African military regimes should act as “progressive" forces, since all 
societies in Africa are underdeveloped.
Regime Type Makes no Difference
Some studies of regime performance have concluded that there are 
no significant differences between military and civilian regimes. In a 
cross-national, aggregate study of all independent, non-Communist 
countries with a population greater than one million, R.D. McKinlay and 
A.S. Cohan (1975) find that military rule in the Third World has no 
discernible economic policy consequences. They conclude that "the 
occurrence of a military regime does not have a pronounced effect on 
economic performance when MR (military regime) are compared to CRM 
(period of civilian rule in countries that have experienced military 
regimes)" (1975, 20). They also find that military regimes have no 
significant effect on economic performance when both MR and CRM are 
compared with CR900 (low income countries which have experienced only 
civilian rule). With regard to overall regime performance, McKinlay and 
Cohan conclude that military regimes in the Third World are not a
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homogeneous group that can be clearly differentiated from civilian 
regimes (1975, 1-30).
Another significant contribution in this field of research is the 
attempt by Robert Jackman (1976) to evaluate the merits of some of the 
foregoing arguments about military regime performance. Using the 
Adleman and Morris (1967) data, along with a new set of data covering 
the period from 1960 to 1970 for seventy-seven Third World countries, 
Jackman (1976) assesses the validity of various hypotheses about the 
impact of military rule. He specifies a general model which allows for 
the evaluation of the arguments of Pye (1962), Huntington (1968) and 
Nordlinger (1970). His findings do not confirm any one of the competing 
hypotheses. He concludes:
In short, military intervention in the politics of the 
Third World has no unique effects on social change, 
regardless of either level of economic development or 
geographic region.... We can conclude that blanket 
statements portraying military governments in the Third 
World as either progressive or reactionary are without 
empirical foundation. This implies that many observers may 
have been mistaken in attributing unique political skills to 
the military, whether directed toward progressive or 
conservative ends. We can also conclude that military 
regimes do not assume different mantles as countries of the 
Third World become wealthier. In short, the simple 
civilian-military government distinction appears to be of 
little use in the explanation of social change (1976, 1096- 
97) .
Conclusion: Some Critical Observations
The foregoing studies have offered insights into how military 
officers, and in a few cases civilians, perform upon assuming political 
control of the state. This review clearly indicates that, in coping 
with the problems of developing countries, answers to questions 
regarding regime effectiveness are still inconclusive. With the
37
exception of three studies (Pye 1968; Cohen 1985; Sloan and Tedin 1987), 
the proponents of these theories all arrive at the conclusion that 
military rule has a negative, or at best no, impact upon social and 
economic change in third world countries. These scholars all arrive at 
their conclusions by different routes. Nordlinger (1970), McKinlay and 
Cohan (1975), Jackman (1976), Berg-Schlosser (1984), Cohen (1985), and 
Sloan and Tedin (1987) do so by employing statistical analysis, while 
the others use case studies.
The conclusion of several of those scholars who believe that 
military regimes are positive agents for economic and social 
modernization seems to be based on several unwarranted assumptions. The 
first is that the education and training which soldiers receive 
"socialize" them into professional men, with attributes that make for 
good governors. Second, there is the assumption that such acquired 
values or attributes are transferable into situations or occupational 
roles which are not primarily military. The third assumption is that in 
the process of governing a civilian society, these military values are 
transmitted to the rest of society in a way that regulates societal 
behavior and that, consequently, changes such societies for the better.
A number of studies in professionalization appear to support the 
first assumption, particularly for the officer corps. Yet, these 
studies can be applied to African military elites only with considerable 
caution. The training whictn produces a top military professional is in 
general usually of exceptional duration (Moore 1970, 6). The rapid 
"Africanization" of the officer corps within African nations after 
independence inevitably produced conditions in which the usual officer
38
training periods were shortened. For example, in January of 1960, the 
officer corps of the Nigerian army was only 18 percent Nigerian, but hy 
the end of 1965 it was totally Nigerianized (Welch 1987, 103). Five 
years was too brief a period to adequately train the number of Nigerians 
needed to replace expatriate officers. The Nigerian military suffered 
accordingly, and, in 1976, a major in the Nigerian army, lamenting the 
decline in the quality of officers in the country’s army, observed that 
"the degree of professional proficiency in the Nigerian Army of today," 
was significantly inferior to that of the Nigerian pre-civil war soldier 
< Ogbebor 1976, 13).
Aside from the effect of indigenization, the prosecution of wars 
(civil wars in Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan) creates the necessity 
both for rapid and crash training, as well as for quick promotions, 
because of manpower needs to prosecute such wars. Also, in military-led 
governments, the movement of senior officers to staff civilian 
administrative positions brings about premature promotions of junior 
officers to senior positions. The result is the presence of 
considerable mediocrity among the professional officers corps within 
these nations.
Evidence also reveals that members of the military in most African 
countries do not all live in isolated barracks. The lack of barracks 
facilities and the size of the army ensure that the education and 
training of military personnel are conducted in facilities which are not 
insulated from interference by civilians. Civilians and soldiers mix 
freely at shops, markets, sporting events and other public places to 
such an extent that it can be argued that there is considerable
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"civilianization" of the military. The absorption of military values 
and attitudes will be less effective when other social groups can 
interfere, albeit indirectly, in the educational and training processes 
of the military. The fact that professional men of quality are in short 
supply and professional training has been constrained by several factors 
in independent Africa, necessarily makes it difficult to agree with 
those scholars (Pye 1962; Daadler 1962; Johnson 1962) who argue that 
military officers possess special qualities which make for good 
governors.
Pye’s assertion that possession of modern military equipment and 
overseas experience of training or duty would make military officers 
eager to have their own countries modernized seems plausible. However, 
it should be borne in mind that the influence of training in the west 
becomes increasingly less important as the date of independence recedes. 
Many African countries have their own military academies, and it is not 
uncommon for some countries to have their officers trained in several 
foreign countries (including the Soviet Union, China and Eastern 
European countries). Furthermore, the same arguments about the 
influence of overseas training on military officers could be made for 
African civilian elites (including politicians). With very few 
exceptions, African civilian elites receive most of their higher 
education overseas. Many African politicians spent several decades 
overseas before returning home to lead their country to independence. 
They include: Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi
Awolowo of Nigeria, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda who returned to Malawi in 1958 after forty years in Furope and the
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United States. Moreover, the link between education or training and 
political behavior in African polities is one that is difficult to 
establish. Inferences from military experience or training to military 
political behavior become less valid to the extent that officers are 
subject to pressures and expectations from other groups. This is of 
particular significance in the Third World and especially in Africa.
The increasing politicization of the military profession in Africa helps 
to develop a politicized ethos. Hence it is to be expected that 
overseas training would become a less valid predicator and influence on 
the behavior of military rulers. When outside pressures mount and 
politicization increases, the spectrum of options open to the military 
and the values attached to each alternative will play a greater role in 
determining actual behavior.
Nordlinger’5 (1970) argument that increases in military spending 
in countries with military regimes leads to a decline in performance of 
other sectors of the economy may also be based on a faulty analysis.
The proper question to ask is: How detrimental to economic development
is increases in military spending? It would be necessary to compare 
defense budgets with allocations for other sectors of the economy. This 
becomes a matter of evaluating data for individual countries, but this 
was not provided by Nordlinger. Another factor that Nordlinger did not 
accommodate is the possible spill-over effect of increases in defense 
spending. Increases in defense spending have been known to stimulate 
growth in other sectors of the economy (e.g., the United States 
experienced tremendous economic growth during and immediately after 
World War II, for the most part because of increased defense spending).
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Thus, it may be that increases in military expenditure under military 
regimes do not preclude the ability of military governors to act as 
agents of economic modernization.
The different approaches employed by these observers can impose 
significant limitations on the validity of their findings. Such is the 
case, for example, with the studies by Feit (1973) and Welch and Smith 
(1974), which suffer from a problem common to most case studies. The 
applicability of their findings tend to be geographically- and 
temporally-bound. For example, where Feit’s model proved useful for 
explaining the performances of the military regimes that constitute the 
six case studies in his book (Spain, Argentina, Pakistan, Burma and 
Egypt), it did not prove to be an adequate model for explaining military 
regime performance in tropical Africa. Thus, some military regimes in 
the region (Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Liberia, Togo and Niger) have 
actually skipped Feit’s first stage, going directly to some variation of 
the second stage. Still other regimes remained at the second stage 
until they were toppled or voluntarily return to the barracks. Other 
regimes have gone through the first and second stages without actually 
reaching the final, "mass-party" stage. However, Mobutu’s regime in 
7aire seems to have gone through all three stages (Willame 1970, 149; 
Africa, March 1985). In the West African experience, only the former 
French colonies of Mali, Benin and Togo have experimented with the 
formation of political parties by the ruling military. A similar 
situation exist in the Congo Republic.
Unlike the case study approach, the quantitative approach allows 
for generalizations, but it rarely permits the critical evaluation of
^E
specific cases. Furthermore, the usefulness of the quantitative 
approach is heavily dependent upon the reliability of available data.
The difficulty in obtaining accurate and reliable data from Third World 
countries is a familiar problem in the social sciences (Janowitz 1977, 
El). Many factors mitigate against the gathering and storage of such 
data. These include: political expediency, lack of modern technology,
and difficult geographic conditions.
Statistics relating to the military tend to be the most suspect.
In military regimes, the "juggling" of statistics is a common practice. 
Moreover, the affairs of the military tend to be shrouded in secrecy 
(especially for foreigners) and military rulers are usually very 
reluctant to give information to researchers.
Furthermore, in some instances, the duration of military or 
civilian rule has been too brief for a meaningful longitudinal study.
For example, Eric Nordlinger’s (1970) study, which concluded that 
military rule was essentially conservative, is based on cross-national 
data for the period of 1957-196E. A similar study by Robert Jackman 
(1976), over a longer period of time 1960-1970, produced a different 
conclusion. These results suggest that statistical data from African 
countries, and especially those with military governments, should be 
used with extreme caution. Despite these limitations, investigators who 
employ statistical analysis in evaluating regime performance in third 
world countries still perform a very useful task. Among other things, 
their efforts serve the purpose of directing our attention to some 
relevant indicators for the evaluation of regime performance. More
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importantly) they can serve as foundations upon which future research) 
using improved data> can be based.
Endnotes
After a successful military coup in January 1986, a military 
government was established in Lesotho.
Legitimacy refers to the perception on the part of citizens that a 
given system of government is just and proper. Where legitimacy 
exists, it provides a surer basis for regime survival than force 
alone could ever do. A regime acquires legitimacy only when its 
actions conform to a generally accepted tradition and/or 
constitutional and legal order. Max Weber identified three types 
of legitimate authority on which regimes may be based. They are 
traditional (where people believe in the sanctity of traditional 
institutions, e.g., monarchies), charismatic (where citizens 
accept an individual’s right to rule because of a belief that he 
is endowed with special powers or qualities, e.g., De Gaulle, 
Stalin, Mcio, Nasser, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Kenyatta and Toure), and 
rationality (where citizens accept the legality of established 
rules and the right to govern of those who come to power in 
observance of these rules, e.g., the United States, Western Europe 
and the Soviet Union). Weber felt that regimes based on 
rationality are the best (Weber 1947, 324-429).
Africa News, 22 August 1983; West Africa, 22 August 1983.
Nordlinger’s study included 74 countries grouped into four 
regions: Latin America (N=21); Middle East and North Africa
<N=15); Asia (N=15); Tropical Africa <N=23). Of the tropical 
African countries only the Sudan had a military government during 
the period 1957-1962.
Chapter Two
REGIME TYPE: PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
The key concern of this study is to determine whether it makes any 
socioeconomic difference for an African nation to be governed by the 
military or by civilians. No serious discussion of this question will 
be complete without at least brief reference to Africa’s historical 
traditions as they relate to regime types.
Precolonial and Colonial Traditions
Historical traditions have had a significant impact on the affairs 
of contemporary Africa. To be sure, these traditions, colonial ones in 
particular, have set important limits within which rulers of independent 
Africa have functioned and continue to function. Of particular 
significance, at least as far as this study is concerned, is the role of 
the military in the political system.
The role of the precolonial African soldier varied from one time 
and place to another. For example in the so-called "stateless 
societies" (e.g., the Kungs of the Kalahari and the Ibos of Eastern 
Nigeria) which developed no identifiable form of central government, 
there was no place for the soldier or warrior. On the other hand, the 
soldier played an important role in the establishment and maintenance of 
the various Sahelian empires (Ghana, Mali, Songhai and Kamen-Bornu).
The Sahelian empires were located south of the Sahara. The empire 
of Ghana which rose and fell between about 500 A.D. and 1S50 A.D. was 
situated in the region between the bend of the Niger at Timbuktu and the 
middle reaches of the Senegal and Gambia rivers; it occupied most of
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present-day Mali* the southeastern regions of contemporary Mauritania 
and eastern Senegal. The empire of Mali* which flourished from the mid­
thirteenth century to the later part of the fourteenth century, occupied 
all of ancient Ghana. At its height the king Qf Mali’s authority 
extended form the Gambia and the lower Senegal valleys in the west, to 
the western region of contemporary Niger to the east, and from the 
southernmost part of Algeria in the north to the northern regions of 
Guinea and Burkina Faso in the south. The Songhai empire, which reached 
its height in the sixteenth century, covered all of ancient Mali and 
extended further east to occupy most of present-day Niger and northern 
Nigeria. The empire of Kamen-Bornu evolved over the same time as the 
Mali and Songhai empires. However, at its height in the early 
fourteenth century, it was only about half the si2e of the Songhai 
empire, extending from north of the River Benue in northeastern Nigeria 
and northern Cameroon to the south, to all of modern day Chad and 
eastern Niger to the north.
In Mali and Songhai, the king who appointed the generals was 
himself the commandei— in-chief of the army and personally directed 
military operations. In each empire the army was divided into several 
corps assigned to the defense of different provinces. The generals 
commanding the various units of the army had purely military powers. 
There was a clear distinction between civilian and military authority 
(Diop 1987, 53-59, 115-24).
The primary role of the soldier in precolonial Africa was to 
engage in foreign expeditions. Military expeditions were undertaken 
either to secure existing borders or to facilitate territorial
m
expansion. For example, Mansa Musa the most famous king of Mali used 
his army which was said to be about 100,000 strong, to tighten the grip 
of the central government on the provinces to ensure peace and order, to 
conquer new states or reconquer states which may have broken away from 
the empire (Boahen, Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 28). However, rulers rarely 
directed their military establishments against their own subjects (Diop 
1987, 107).
In spite of the current trend toward authoritarian forms of rule 
in Africa, the notion that rulers have to be accountable to their 
subjects is not alien to Africa. In many parts of precolonial Africa, 
governments were established according to democratic principles. For 
example, long before European penetration of Africa, traditional rule in 
Botswana was based on a system of consultation and free discussion on 
matters of public interest in the assembly known as the "lekgotla." The 
ruler in the Botswana political system derived his powers from the 
people. This is expressed in Setswana as, "Kgosi ke kgosi ka batho," 
meaning the chief is the chief by the will of the people (Magang 1986, 
103-108). A similar principle is clearly evident in the Sotho proverb, 
"A chief is a chief by the people; a people are a people through the 
chief" (Potholm 1988, 25).
In many societies in precolonial Africa there were effective 
restraints on governmental power. Although these checks were not often 
written down and not often formalized, they were no less real (Busia 
1951; Magang 1986; Maquet 1971). In precolonial Ghana, for example, the 
Asantehene (titular monarch) can be "de-stooled" for behaving in a 
manner that is inconsistent with Asante traditions (Busia 1951). Among
48
the Swazis, the king was always referred to as the "Ngwenyama-in- 
council," to signify his reliance on the council to sanction his 
actions. Among the Sotho peoples, the national "pitso" (assembly) was 
open to all and its approval was vital for any major policy decision 
(Potholm 1988).
To be sure, there were also examples of authoritarian systems in 
precolonial Africa. For example, the Fulani empire which came into 
being after a holy war (jihad) to reestablish Islam in what is today 
Northern Nigeria, Chad, and Northern Cameroon, led to the establishment 
of some of the most highly centralized, conservative and hierarchical 
political systems in precolonial Africa. Autocratic rule through 
hereditary emirs was the customary form of leadership. Eligibility for 
leadership in the emirates was conferred by birth and was viewed as a 
"gift of Allah" (Coleman 1960, 39; Smith 1955, 93; Theen and Wilson 
1986, 514).
A different pattern of authoritarian rule was established among 
the Nguni peoples of the south east coast of Africa. Traditionally 
farmers, the Ngunis were transformed into warriors under the command of 
an absolute ruler, the warrior king. With its military political 
system, the Zulu kingdom— which reached its pinnacle in the reign of the 
ruthless King Chaka— has been likened to that of Sparta in ancient 
Greece (Oliver and Crowder 1981, 86; Magang 1986, 103).
Although they were often deemed to be nonpolitical, in fact, 
military forces in colonial Africa served the profoundly political 
purpose of upholding European rule. They were often used along with
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colonial police forces to suppress political dissent, such as strikes 
and demonstrations (Welch 1987, lb-11, 101-103; Gutteridge 1975, 6).
For example, in 1906, the British declared martial law when the 
Zulus under Bambata refused, among other things, to pay a toll tax. 
Perhaps the most celebrated use of force by a colonial power in Africa 
was in the 1950s, when the British army was called upon to suppress the 
Mau Mau movement in Kenya (Phillips 1984, 59-64). The pattern was the 
same for other European powers all over the continent. Colonial rule 
was maintained by the use of force and intimidation (Oliver and Crowder 
1981, 166-67).
Since Africa was subject to rule by several colonial powers 
(British, French, Portuguese, Belgian, Spanish, Italian, and German), 
the colonial legacy has varied from one part of the continent to 
another. Yet all colonial systems shared a number of characteristics 
that effectively influenced the course of politics in Africa.
All colonial systems in Africa were imposed or at least maintained 
by the use of force. The systems of government were essentially 
authoritarian. In all the colonies, every important decision was made 
by the colonial administrator and imposed on the citizens of the 
colonies. The political patterns were overwhelmingly hierarchical, and 
Africans were systematically excluded from decision-making roles 
(Schoolman 1988).
Despite the claims made about their virtues, the Westminster and 
French models of parliamentary democracy where never practiced in any 
African country throughout the colonial period. Although they had never 
been developed under colonial rule, these models of democracy were
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nevertheless imposed on the colonial peoples at independence <Legum 
1986, 175-85; Magang 1986, 103-108). It is no wonder that* in most 
African countries* the Western system of democracy collapsed almost 
immediately after independence.
Whereas no direct connection seems to exist between the role of 
soldiers in precolonial and postcolonial Africa, more direct links can 
be traced from the role they played in the colonial era and the role 
they have played since independence. For example* it is not uncommon 
for soldiers in independent Africa to be called upon to suppress 
domestic dissent. Like the colonial rulers before them* civilian rulers 
in postcolonial Africa often make use of the military to maintain 
control over their citizens. Some observers have argued that the use of 
soldiers to cope with political challenges to the regime (strikes, 
demonstrations and riots), encouraged the military to believe that their 
intervention was necessary for political stability (Liebenow 1986, 247- 
48). One result is that military systems have become the most common 
form of government on the African continent.
African Political Systems: A Typology
When attempting to categorize political systems, researchers often 
look at a variety of system characteristics. Among these are the basis 
of legitimacy, the party system, the pattern of recruitment of the head 
of the executive, the formal vertical and horizontal separations of 
power, the actual power structure, the scope of political control, 
constitutional provisions and the ideological orientation of the system 
(Shi Is 1962; Easton 1965; Apter 1965; Dahl 1971; Powell 1982; Berg- 
Schlosser 1984).
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Because very few African leaders, if any, govern in accordance 
with the provisions of existing constitutions, it is not worthwhile to 
use constitutions as the basis for determining African system types. 
Nevertheless, some useful efforts have been made to construct typologies 
which may be applied to African regimes (Welch and Smith 1974;
Nordlinger 1977; Berg-Schlosser 1984; Ayoade 1986).
For the purpose of this study, I will use a modified version of a 
typology of African political systems developed by Berg-Schlosser (1984, 
181-51). Berg-Schlosser identifies the following four categories of 
political systems: polyarchic, socialist, authoritarian and military.
For this study, I have adopted only three variations of his four 
categories. These are multiparty (democratic), one-party/dynastic and 
mi 1itary.
The category of socialist systems has been excluded from the 
present classification of system types, because of the difficulty 
involved in identifying African Marxist-Leninist countries. According 
to Berg-Schlosser socialist systems are noted for having, "effective 
single-party organization, a more centralized system of government, and 
an ideology that pursues a more self-reliant and noncapitalist road to 
development with the aim of a more egalitarian social order" (1984,
130). Although the leaders of many African countries have espoused what 
has sometimes been called "African socialism," "developmental 
socialism,” or "communitarian socialism," none of them has been able to 
put it into practice successfully (Sargent 1987, 805-807).
As a number of African leaders have discovered, proclaiming a 
country’s socialist destiny and either achieving it or making it persist
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are not necessarily the same thing. Thus far, so-called socialist 
revolutions on the continent (e.g., Angola, Burkina-Faso, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Tanzania), have faltered before 
they even got off the ground. External forces such as the world 
economy, have produced conditions that make the implementation of 
socialist goals impossible, even if everything had gone well internally. 
But as Lyman Sargent observed:
Internally, all Third World countries face a multitude 
of problems. Among the worst problems are rampant 
corruption, extreme differences of wealth, threat of 
military takeover, and tribal and religious conflict. As a 
result, no Third World country has been in a position to put 
developmental socialism into practice even if external 
factors had been perfect (1987, 207).
A number of African leaders that once advocated socialism have 
discarded this ideological orientation in favor of pragmatic 
considerations in determining government policy. For example, in the 
People’s Republic of the Congo, collectivist methods, inspired by 
Marxism-Leninism, have been discarded in favor of entrepreneurial 
methods. The minister of agriculture said simply, "Marxism without 
revenue is Marxism without a future" (Sklar 1986, 135).
Finally, almost every country in sub-Saharan African has what 
Almond and Verba have called a "parochial" political culture (Almond and 
Verba 1963). This is a political culture in which citizens are only 
indistinctly aware of, or not concerned with, the central government. 
Consequently, the modern political arena in a typical African country 
will tend to cover a very small proportion of the whole country. Linder 
these circumstances, it is doubtful whether the solid popular base 
required for an effective socialist party can be built. These are the
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principal reasons for excluding a category for so-called "socialist" 
political systems— a step which should not have any significant impact 
on this study.
The classification of political system upon which this study will 
be based* therefore* is derived from three major system characteristics. 
The first is the executive selection process (i.e., whether the chief 
executive is elected, inherited the office or installed by coup). The 
second criterion refers to the autonomy of the chief executive and his 
cabinet (e.g., whether the assembly, if it exists, can veto executive 
decisions). The final characteristic refers to the presence of 
political parties and party competition (how many political parties are 
there, and whether free competition among parties is allowed).
The characteristics used here are not only sufficient to 
accommodate all of the system types in Berg-Schlosser’s classification, 
but they also capture major variations in the general form of African 
regimes. More characteristics could be included, which would possibly 
yield finer distinctions and a more elaborate typology. However, these 
three seem to cover the key differentiating features among regimes and 
for our purposes should produce a useful classification of sub-Saharan 
African regime types.
The first three of Berg-Schlosser’s categories of political 
systems are associated with civilian regimes. A civilian regime can be 
said to exist in countries where civilians occupy key government 
positions and openly determine national policy, goals, and objectives. 
There are many expressions of civilian regimes. A civilian regime can 
take the form of a multiparty (democratic) system, a single-party
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system* or a monarchy. It may espouse socialism or capitalism. For 
this study, the various expressions of civilian regimes are classified 
under two broad categories: multiparty and one-party or dynastic (see
Table S.l).
Multiparty (democratic) systems are competitive systems in which 
candidates from two or more political parties are able to openly and 
freely contest election for the purpose of assuming control of 
government. In Africa, European forms of democratic systems 
(Westminster and French presidential model) were installed by the 
colonial powers in many countries at the time of independence. Not many 
of these have survived (see Table £.1) and even where the original 
system has been maintained to a certain extent, it has undergone a 
number of significant modifications (Sklar 1983, li-£4; Berg-Schlosser 
1984, 130). Consequently, some civilian regimes that are less than 
fully competitive, but clearly not one-party systems have been included 
under this heading (e.g., Kenya 1963-1981).
One-party systems are characterized by a single dominant party 
structure, along with strongly centralized and highly personalistic 
leadership (Berg-Schlosser 1984, 130-31). There are no free and open 
elections; public opinion is closely controlled. Because of the 
similarities in their central characteristic (i.e., single-party 
structure), Berg-Sch1osser’s socialist and authoritarian categories are 
merged into this one-party category of civilian regime (see Table E.l). 




Classification of Political Systeais in Sub-Saharan Africa* 1960-1985
COUNTRY CIVILIAN REGIME






Botswana 1966-85 -- --
Burkina Faso 1971-73 1960-65 1966-70; 197**-85
Burundi 1962-66 1967-76 1977-85
Cameroon 1960-72 1973-85 --
Central African Republic --- 1960-6551980-81 1966-7951982-85
Chad 1960-62 1963-7** 1975-85
The Congo 1960-6** 1965-68 1969-85
Cote d ’Ivoire -- 1960-85 --
Equatorial Guinea 1968-70 1971-79 1980-85
Ethiopia -- 1960-7** (mon. ) 1975-85
Gambia 1965-85 -- --
Ghana 1960-63 196**-65 1966-69
1970-71 --- 1972-79
1980-81 -- 1982-85
Guinea-Bissau -- 1975-80 1981-85
Kenya 1963-81 1982-85 --
Lesotho 1966-85 -- --
Liberia -- 1960-79 1980-85
Madagascar 1960-71 -- 1972-85
Malawi -- 196**-B5 --
Mali -- 1960-68 1969-85
Mauritania 1960-6** 1965-78 1979-85
Mauritius 1968-85 -- --




Rwanda 1962-73 -- 197**-85




Somalia 1960-69 -- 1970-85
Sudan 1965-68 1960-6** 51969-85
Swazi land -- 1968-85(mon.) --
Tanzania -- 1961-85 --




Zaire 1960-6** -- 1965-85
Zambia 196A-72 1972-85 --
Zimbabwe 1980-85 -- --
Sources: Africa South of the Sahara (1988), Berg-Schlosser <198A> *
Legum (1970-87).
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A military regime or system is one in which military officers 
occupy key government positions and openly dictate national policy? 
military definitions of national goals prevail? dominating the mass 
media of communication and both public and private discussion; and 
military-dictated priorities supersede competing goals and policies 
(Fidel 1975? 1). Military regimes can also espouse socialism or 
capitalism? and they might even have dynastic pretensions (e.g.? Emperor 
Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Empire). Military regimes are 
noted for the violent means (coup d ’etat) by which they assume and often 
maintain power (Berg-Schlosser 19B4? 130-31). Although there are 
various expressions of military regimes (Welch and Smith 1974?
Nordlinger 1977)? all regimes that satisfy the foregoing definition of 
military system will be so identified.
African Regime Types: Performance Expectations
Good reasons exist to expect one regime type to perform better 
than another according to certain performance indicators. As already 
noted? many students of African politics argue that the structural 
organization of the military? combined with the technological and 
managerial skills possessed by members of the armed forces? help to 
orient the military toward the goal of modernization. Furthermore? 
civilian regimes? particularly those that have a democratic system of 
government? are viewed by many as a luxury that Third World countries 
can ill afford (Andreski 1969; Chirot 1977; Hewlett 1980). However? 
other observers have argued that modernization cannot occur without 
democratic institutions (Lipset 1959? Coleman I960; Rostow 1971). For 
example? in a study of emerging nations of Asia? Africa and the Middle
57
East, James Coleman (1960, 532-44) concluded that "the major hypothesis 
that economic development and competitiveness are positively correlated 
is validated when countries are grouped into major differentiating 
categories of competitiveness and where mean scores of economic 
development are employed."
In the following pages, the main arguments regarding regime 
capabilities will be presented. From these arguments, certain 
hypotheses will be derived that will guide the study.
Civilian Regime: Multiparty System (Democracy)
The most fundamental characteristic of a democratic system is the 
notion that citizens should be involved in the making of political 
decisions, either directly or through elected representatives. Whether 
directly or indirectly, citizens are encouraged to have some say 
regarding public policy. This type of system demands constant political 
activity by the people— debates, the formation of associations, 
preparations for and participation in elections, and party competition. 
Many commentators have questioned the usefulness or wisdom of 
instituting such a demanding system in the newly emerging countries of 
the Third World. There are positive and negative positions on this 
issue.
The positive perspective holds that a competitive system will 
facilitate economic and political development in Third World countries. 
According to this perspective, the only way to identify obstacles to 
development is through citizen participation. For it is the average 
citizen who has to confront the problems of society in his everyday life 
and who, consequently, is best informed about what needs to be done.
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Thus, only a system that makes allowance not only for feedback from the 
governors to the governed, but also from the governed to the governors, 
can enable the government to identify and direct resources to sectors 
where they are most needed. A democratic system, it is further argued, 
encourages economic growth because it is the only system that is 
conducive to free competition. And, since free competition rewards 
initiative and enterprise, this type of system should facilitate maximum 
increases in productivity.
Furthermore, the positive argument asserts that only a competitive 
system can guarantee responsive public officials. Public officials who 
wish to be reelected, or elected in the first place, must convince 
voters that their term in office will be beneficial to the country. One 
way of doing this is to be responsive to the changing needs and demands 
of the society and its population.
Conversely the negative argument views democracy as a system that 
Third World countries can ill afford. According to this perspective, 
citizen participation is an impediment to national development. The 
powers of decision makers are limited; and the command structure is 
ordered in such a fashion that decision makers are slow to make 
important decisions, because they are bound by an established legal 
order. Thus, it often takes too much time for even beneficial programs 
to be implemented.
Furthermore, in the culturally pluralistic countries of Africa, 
the adoption of a democratic system could be destabilizing. Because 
substantial portions of the population still do not accept the 
legitimacy of the state, democratic procedures, such as elections, could
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provoke major political disturbances (de Villiers 1976, 82-83; Powell 
1982, 41-43).
For example, a general election in Rwanda in 1961 was preceded by 
violent clashes between the two major ethnic groups in the country: the
Hutu and the Tutsi. In April and May 1972, factional struggles in 
Rwanda’s southern neighbor, Burundi, led to one of the most appalling 
ethnic slaughters ever recorded in the annals of modern Africa.
Following an abortive Hutu-led coup in April, a campaign of repression 
was carried out by the Tutsi, resulting in an estimated 100,000 Hutu 
deaths. From 1961 to 1964, ethnic clashes in Rwanda claimed an 
estimated 20,000 lives (de Villiers 1976, 82-83; Africa South of the 
Sahara 1988, 305-306, 825-27). Racial antagonisms have also played a 
significant role in Kenyan politics. The 1961 election in Kenya was 
marked by racial violence between the Kikuyus and Masais. Further 
indication of the negative impact of democratic processes on the 
politics of ethnically differentiated societies include the racial 
clashes that flared up soon after the 1960 General Election in the 
former Belgium Congo.
Another problem arising from the cultural diversity of African 
countries is that it makes democratic compromise difficult, if not 
impossible. The different groups clamor for scarce resources and for 
control of government. This leads to what Daniel Chirot (1977, 224), 
refers to as "democratic paralysis." Even in more advanced democracies 
conflicts over what Dan Usher calls "assignment" can be especially 
troublesome. For a democratic political system to survive there must be 
a prior agreement among citizens on a set of rules or consensus for
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allocation of resources (Usher 1981, viii). In such a society it is 
necessary to have general agreement (what Rousseau called "the general 
will") concerning certain substantive assumptions underlying the 
government. Where this is lacking, as is the case in most of sub- 
Saharan Africa, in practice democracy can in fact be very destabilizing.
Whereas some observers see free competition as a positive aspect 
of multiparty systems, others maintain that such competition is often 
accompanied by considerable nonproductive expenses. They suggest that 
the newly emerging countries need a planned economy if they are to 
attain a rapid and sustainable level of economic growth. They hold that 
economic planning is not compatible with a representative form of 
government. Although a representative assembly can agree on the need 
for planning, the argument goes, it is not likely that it can work out a 
production schedule. Such a schedule must have a uniformity and 
continuity that exclude the compromises typical of democratic 
institutions (Tingsten 1965, 161). Furthermore, when a representative 
assembly handles planning, the changes and additions to the program that 
might result from compacts between different groups in the assembly 
would tend to introduce disorder and waste into the system and interfere 
with the application of certain essential parts of the original program. 
Problems such as these can only serve to maintain the underdevelopment 
of the newly emerging countries of Africa.
At this juncture it is perhaps proper to note that reputable 
studies have shown that the greatest advancements, both socially and 
economically, have generally occurred in the more democratic societies 
(Lipset 1959; Powell 1982; Berg-Schlosser 198<t). Nonetheless, even
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defenders of democracy, including this writer, recognize that, to a 
large extent, democracy is dependent on a disciplined and educated 
electorate (Tingsten 1965, IIP; de Villiers 1976). As experience has 
shown, this is a rare condition in modern day Africa. Another criterion 
for democracy— a stable middle class— is also lacking in many African 
societies. Furthermore, democracy presupposes consideration as well as 
tolerance. In a true and just democracy, the majority must uphold civil 
liberties and respect the political rights of the minority. This is 
rarely the case in Africa, where the majority often uses its position to 
establish such a concentration of power so as to make certain that the 
minority cannot assume power.
The basic unity or consensus that is requisite for democracy is 
absent in Africa. Consequently, for the majority of African nations, at 
this stage of their political development, the popularly-elected 
government is not necessarily the best kind of government.
Civilian Regime: One-Party System
Like their democratic counterparts, African one-party systems have 
their advantages and disadvantages. The major advantage that has been 
ascribed to one-party systems is that, by mobilizing the country’s human 
resources, the single party can ensure support for the task of national 
construction and develop stable loyalties to government leaders. Yet, 
while this may be true of other single-party systems, African one-party 
regimes are not well equipped to perform these tasks.
Like the political party in African multiparty states, the 
dominant party in African one-party states is often very weak. Nearly 
all of the disadvantages of one-party regimes are attributable to this
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weakness. First? because of the cultural diversity of African 
societies? no single party (socialist or otherwise) has been able to 
command the allegiance of significant segments of the population. 
Normally? the African political party is ethnically- and geographically- 
based. Some ethnic groups support it? others are hostile to it or at 
best indifferent. Thus? a ruling party in an African one-party state? 
supported equally by all ethnic groups in the country? is an unrealistic 
expectation.
Houphouet-Boigny’s Parti Democratique de Cote de’Ivoire (PDCI) 
comes closest to this ideal? but even it has not completely eliminated 
ethnic divisions. Ethnicity remains the basis of its organization 
(Lewis 1970? 86). In Ghana? Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) 
government was faced at independence in 1957 by a number of regionally 
based opposition political parties. But? by 1964? when Ghana officially 
became a one-party state? Nkrumah had successfully eliminated all 
effective opposition. Although his one-party state reduced ethnically- 
based opposition? it only did so to the extent of uniting Ghanaians from 
all regions against his dictatorial regime (Boahen? Ajayi and Tidy 1986? 
151-52). Similarly, Sekou Toure had hoped to use his Parti Democratique 
de Guinea (PDG)? the only political party in Guinea? to eliminate 
ethnicism in that country. However, his collectivization of agriculture 
aroused much opposition among the Fula? who became the focus for growing 
discontent with the PDG dictatorship (Boahen, Ajayi and Tidy 1986? 152).
Second, the governing party in single-party states usually vies 
with other organizations for control of the society. Notable among 
these are the armed forces? the bureaucracy? and trade unions. As a
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result the efforts of African one-party regimes to suppress dissidence
and to prevent organized opposition from forming have seldom been
successful (LeVine 1966, 91).
Third, in many one-party states, the single party has proven to he
of questionable efficiency in performing governmental functions. The
absence of legal opposition within the one-party system make it much
harder to identify and address important problems. Although one-party
states often have parliaments, more often than not they are merely
"rubber-stamp" assemblies in dealing with the actions of the president.
Finally, African one-party regimes are highly unstable. One-party
governments can maintain themselves only by building up an extensive
secret police which roots out opposition groups before they can do harm
to the regime (e.g., the Soviet Union). But in fact no African one-
party regime can aspire to this degree of efficiency. For example, Gus
Liebenow (1986, 640-42), has attributed the high incidence of military
intervention in African politics to the weakness of existing political
parties. Writing about African political parties, Henry Bienen (1970,
99-100) observed that:
...as the victorious parties formed governments, they lost 
functional relevance and coherence.... No matter what roles 
parties have been assigned, almost everywhere in tropical 
Africa— whether in single party, multiparty, or nonparty 
states— they perform few.
Civilian Regimes: Dynasties or Monarchies
There are only a handful of dynastic systems in contemporary 
Africa. The only two countries with such regimes in sub-Saharan Africa 
are Swaziland and Lesotho. Lesotho has a constitutional monarch (King 
Moshoeshoe II) with very limited powers. Thus, the only monarch with
6<t
absolute power in black Africa today is King Mswati III of Swaziland.
As is the case with African single-party systems, absolute monarchs in 
Africa have to vie for control with other organizations (including the 
military, the civil service and trade unions). Furthermore, the size of 
African royal families means that dynastic regimes not only have to 
compete with external organizations for control but sometimes, also with 
factions from within the royal family.
The main source of support and consent for dynastic regimes is 
custom and tradition. In such systems citizens acknowledge that 
monarchs have ruled in the past and, according to tradition, they should 
continue to rule. And as long as citizens remain loyal to tradition and 
are insulated from outside influences, all will be well with monarchies. 
However, in an increasingly interdependent environment, a monarch’s 
ability to insulate his subjects from new ideas from abroad is very 
limited. As the population assimilates new and foreign ideas the 
ability of dynastic regimes to maintain themselves will be undermined.
As the foregoing suggests, the civilian regime in sub-Saharan 
Africa may not always be the most effective in achieving national 
developmental objectives. Under civilian leadership, national unity of 
purpose and method seldom prevails. Civilian political institutions are 
often incapable of successfully arbitrating the competing demands of 
various groups within the population. If anything, civilian leaders are 
often obligated to satisfy the demands of highly specific constituencies 
whose interests may not only be different from those of larger segments 
of the population but may be anti-development as well.
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Unlike most of their counterparts in the west, none of the African 
varieties of civilian regimes can claim to have the ability to 
"authoritatively allocate resources." Ethnic divisions between and 
within political parties often results in victorious parties forming 
governments that do not possess effective legitimatized authority.
This, in turn, affects the capacity of the state to carry out its public 
policies forcefully and effectively. Consequently, African civilian 
regimes are often unable to initiate or execute development schemes 
(Duigan and Jackson 1986, 87). More importantly, these regimes are 
rarely able to control state institutions of repression in their 
respective countries. Even the dictatorial one-party and dynastic 
regimes cannot always prevent the organization or expression opposition. 
This fact greatly limits the capacity of African civilian regimes to 
promote national integration and achieve political stability, which are 
necessary for development.
Military Regimes
Aside from the regime types already identified, the only other 
species existing in sub-Saharan Africa is the military regime. As 
indicated earlier, military regimes are the most prevalent on the 
continent. They can, of course, assume a variety of forms. We are 
relying upon the classification by Eric Nordlinger (1977), who 
identified three types: guardians, moderators and rulers.* Yet
military rule is essentially authoritarian. Just as is the case with 
the other regime types, there are of course positive and negative 
aspects to military rule.
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One of the positive aspects of military rule has to do with the 
fact that, in nearly all the states of sub-Saharan Africa, the military 
has the advantage of being the most highly organized group. In making 
decisions they are guided by established standard operating procedures 
which tend to focus on the most efficient, most effective, and quickest, 
means for the realization of specific goals. The military is structured 
hierarchically, where authority flows downward and responsibility 
upward. Hierarchy is also punitive, based upon the threat of the 
harshest disciplinary measures, and a normative belief in unquestioning 
obedience of the state as a result of military training (Levy 1971, ^3- 
^5). Because of their preoccupation with order, and their emphasis on 
hierarchy and chain of command, new military rulers are more likely to 
insist that existing government institutions function in a similar 
manner. More emphasis will be placed on adherence to rules and plans. 
Consequently, the effectiveness of government is likely to increase, 
making military rule perhaps more effective than civilian leadership 
(Fidel 1975, 19).
Perhaps the most important positive aspect of military rule is 
manifested in the absolute or relative advantage of the military vis-£- 
vis other power centers with regard to the control of resources 
available for use against adversaries. This fact results in part from
character traits that are peculiar to the military. According to
Janowitz <1977, 103), "the military establishment— regardless of its 
societal context— has a unique character because the threat of violence 
is a permanent reality to its leaders.... The unique character of the
military derives from the requirement that its key members be
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specialists in the use of violence." The fact that most military 
regimes in tropical Africa have actually governed without extensive use 
of violence should not obscure the significance of force as the basis 
from which they exercise their political power. Within military regimes 
there are significant variations from one regime to another in the 
commission of repressive acts. Nevertheless» the threat of the use of 
force is always present.
It is nearly universally acknowledged that the capacity of the 
military to govern derives from its control over the instruments of 
violence (Fidel 1975; Janowitz 1977; Bienen 1978; Macridis 1986). It is 
this fact that provides military rulers with a positive advantage over 
their civilian counterparts. As Kenneth Fidel <1975, 9) argues, either 
competing demands or gross indecision in government policy-making can 
lead to civil and economic chaos. The military, he suggests, may be the 
only group in the nation capable of making hard development decisions 
and imposing these decisions upon other segments of the population. In 
the absence of other strong forces capable of implementing development 
programs, through the use or threat of force, the military can impose 
difficult solutions. For example, the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC), which ruled Ghana for a few months in 1979, vigorously 
enforced its price control policy. There were instances where soldiers 
used their guns to threaten market women and other traders to sell their 
goods at and low controlled prices (Pel low and Chazan 1986, 61).
The arrest of a few citizens and the imposition of limited 
political oppression can often suffice to suppress or destroy opposition 
to a military regime or its policies. On the other hand, civilian
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rulers tend to be less anxious to offend their various support groups or 
coalitions by adopting unpopular measures. Thus, comparing operating 
procedures under civilian and military regimes in Nigeria, one cabinet 
member of the former western Nigerian government of Brigadier Adebayo 
said:
In the military regime there is no constituency 
whatsoever. Anyone who wants to influence the Governor has 
no constituency to back him up in anything he wants. During 
the civilian regime the reverse takes place. The premier 
would consider the influence of a person in the cabinet but 
also his influence outside the cabinet.... In the military 
regime there is no question of being affected in judging 
cabinet members by how many people vote for them. If it is 
a civilian regime, the Prime Minister must be alert to 
losing support of the most influential people (cited in 
Bienen 1978, EOE>.
The last positive, and perhaps the most important, quality of 
military rule is that, in fragmented societies, it may serve as a focus 
of solidarity. It has been suggested that African military rulers are 
better equipped than rival groups to deal the problems associated with 
ethnic fragmentation. According to Dennis Austin (1966, 70-71), 
military elites have the advantage sometimes of starting with a "clean 
slate;" they are not committed to a particular group interest and thus 
are free to make decisions in the national interest. Another scholar 
has observed that, "African armies tend to be the most detribalized, 
integrated and cohesive institutions in their respective states"
(Lefever 1970, SO).
According to Janowitz (1977, 109) the operational experience of 
the armies of new nations may contribute to their internal cohesion. 
Extensive and successful experience contributes to a sense of 
professional self-esteem and social cohesion. For example, ex-colonial
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African armies with experience in World War II include troops from 
French West Africa (especially Senegalese troops in North Africa) and 
Nigerian and Ghanaian soldiers (serving in East Africa and Burma). 
Similarly the military in post-independent Africa have had enough 
successful experiences to foster their internal cohesion. For example, 
Rwandan soldiers have had several successful engagements with Tutsi 
infiltrators from Kiru (Congo) and Uganda (Janowitz 1977, 109). 
Ethiopian, Nigerian, Ghanaian, Sierra Leonean and other African troops 
have had effective operational experiences in United Nations operations 
in the Congo and Lebanon.
The importance of national unity in the crucial stage of 
post independence development cannot be overemphasized. Thus, at least 
on the African context, the corporate solidarity of the military rulers 
provides them with a significant leadership advantage over the 
ethnically-factionalized political parties. Because the military lives 
in a nationalist environment and, both as a function of professional 
socialization and role performance, are concerned with issues of 
national survival, military officers from various ethnic background are 
often willing and able to work together (Fidel 1975).
Although the ethnic divisions found in African societies are 
sometimes reflected in their military establishments, these divisions 
are not always as pronounced within the military as they are in other 
organizations, such as political parties, trade unions, and the civil 
service. A major reason for this may be the "us-against-them" mentality 
which has developed over the years within some African armies. The 
frequent use of African armies by civilian and military rulers (not to
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mention former colonial administrators) to suppress domestic dissent and 
to maintain control over the population have often resulted in 
situations where soldiers were distrusted and disliked, even by members 
of there own ethnic group. In recent years, there have been numerous 
instances in which civilians have attacked soldiers and destroyed their 
property to protest the actions of military rulers. After a recent 
series of clashes between civilians and soldiers in Nigeria, for 
example, the response of the military rulers prompted a Lagos-based 
national news daily to editorialize as follows: "The picture that
emerged was one of a cleavage between the military and civil society as
if civil society were an enemy at war with the military. It was a
0picture of ’them against u s . R e f e r r i n g  to the same sequence of 
events, Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka noted that "the theme is 
usually becoming ’we versus them’" (Onanuga 1989, 9).
During the colonial era, some African armies were perceived as 
agents of imperial rule and, at other times (especially under military 
regimes), they have been regarded as armies of occupation (Gutteridge 
1975, 6; Liebenow 1986, 247-48). The hostility that some Africans 
exhibit toward their armies is reflected in a statement made by Alao 
Aka-Bashorun, president of the Nigerian Bar Association, who observed 
that "in the 1940s and 1950s, anyone who joined the army was regarded as 
one of a kind and even your parents detested your entry. I thought we 
now have a new army. I am surprised that kind of army still exists" 
(Onanuga 1989, 9-10). Aka-Bashorun made the statement in the wake of a 
court boycott by lawyers to protest the Nigerian military government’s 
continuous disregard for established judicial processes and the
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detention without trail of the prominent Nigerian lawyer, Chief Gani 
Fawehi nmi.
When confronted with distrust and hostility by the civilian 
population, soldiers are apt to seek refuge in the barracks and other 
military facilities. As a result of their common experiences, 
notwithstanding the differences in ethnic backgrounds, soldiers have 
often found solace and security in the company of other soldiers.
Within African armies, the friendship and understanding which develops 
from close and continuous association with soldiers from other ethnic 
backgrounds can reduce the misconceptions which have so often been the 
cause of ethnic intolerance in many African societies. Consequently, 
soldiers may be the best equipped to deal with the issues of ethnic and 
cultural fragmentation that is at the root of many of the continent’s 
problems.
Yet, there are some significant negative aspects of military rule. 
A major problem with military rule has to do with the fact that power is 
usually concentrated in the hands of a few members of the military 
junta. This situation does not allow for honest expressions of opinion. 
As Herbert Tingsten (1965, 86-87) wrote, "concentration of power of 
itself breeds a desire to satisfy those who control the power.... On 
the one hand, the desire to please— and the fear of displeasing— those 
who hold power become motivating forces that undermine independent 
formation of opinion."
Although this condition is not peculiar to military regimes, 
African military regimes have proven to be much more adept than civilian 
ones in suppressing opposing opinions. Consequently, the ability of
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ordinary citizens to express their views to their rulers is more 
severely constrained under military regimes. For example, some civilian 
commissioners in the former IJestern Nigerian military government of 
Brigadier Adebayo mentioned how "little people" were afraid to go and 
see military officers because they had to go past a series of soldiers 
with guns (Bienen 1978, 206). This results in a unidirectional flow of 
communication from the top down. Where the flow of information from the 
common person to the central policy-making body is poor or nonexistent, 
the capacity of government to address important issues is limited. This 
can have negative social and economic consequences. Such was the case 
in Nigeria, for example where the military’s ignorance of, and 
insensitivity to local demands regarding tax collection resulted in 
widespread rioting in 1968 (Bienen 1978, 209).
Another negative aspect of military rule is the fact that the 
military lacks leadership skills in bargaining and political 
communication that are required for sustained political leadership.
This limitation is a consequence of the absence of a tradition for 
dealing with people outside the military (Janowitz 1977, 109). The 
absence of regular contacts with persons outside the central policy­
making bodies means that there is little or no external input into the 
policy-making process. This lack of input or feedback from the 
population often results in the mismanagement of available resources. 
Because military rulers rarely have sufficient knowledge of the needs of 
the various sectors in the society, resources are often misappropriated. 
To be sure, there are other reasons why the resources of African states 
are often misappropriated, including the avariciousness of military and
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civilian leaders as well. Thus? the military’s ignorance of the needs 
of the various sector of society often tends to aggravate an already 
serious condition.
Under military regimes? there is an unhealthy tendency towards 
tyrannical action. Upon assuming power? the military immediately? and 
often successfully? eliminates those participatory mechanisms which are 
characteristics of representative government. They eliminate 
legislatures? political parties and other forms of organizations which 
might challenge their authority. The public hardships under military 
regimes are well known: liberty is suppressed; labor is regimented and
exploited; personal choice is severely restricted; and any opposition is 
often violently suppressed. Mass arrests? seizures of property and 
death by firing squad are standard procedures for destroying opposition? 
both real and imagined.
Military regimes are also associated with central planning? which 
often is also incompatible with political liberty. This means that the 
state makes most of the decisions regarding what shall be produced and 
consumed. The government also decides which areas are to have priority 
(manufacturing or agriculture? defense or education). Here again? lack 
of knowledge of what needs to be done can hinder the process of economic 
development. Although central planning may sometimes prove to be 
necessary to promote development in Africa? there is always the danger 
of too much control and overregulation. Too much control can inhibit 
creative initiatives which are also necessary to stimulate development.. 
Furthermore? the creation of regulatory agencies to oversee policy
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implementation not only increases the size of an already swollen African 
bureaucracy but also creates new opportunities for corruption.
Some Consequences of Regime Type on Public Policy
Africa is a vast continent. Considerable variation exists, for 
example, between East and West Africa (not to speak of North Africa). 
Consequently, any generalizations derived from a limited segment of the 
African experience will require further testing under different 
conditions. Thus, although a number of hypotheses will be advanced, the 
verification of these hypotheses is not the primary concern of this 
study. The hypotheses are essentially working hypotheses, to be used to 
set the parameters within which a comparison of military and civilian 
regime performance in Africa may be undertaken.
Policy Outputs
It is generally accepted that the countries of sub-Saharan Africa 
have chosen the goal of socioeconomic development. To this end, African 
regimes have adopted several strategies which are best manifested in 
their public policies. Given the different characteristics associated 
with African military and civilian regimes, some hypotheses regarding 
regime effect on public policy may be articulated.
In the less developed societies of sub-Saharan Africa, the ability 
of the state to fund every important project is very limited. 
Consequently, there must be budgetary "trade-offs" and, in the 
competition for scarce resources, there is a tendency for rulers to 
respond first to the needs of their primary constituency before 
allocating funds to other sectors. Thus it can be hypothesized that:
75
H ,: Defense expenditure should be higher in countries where
the military controls the policy-making institutions 
than in those where they do not.
Exceptionally high percentages of defense spending should 
precipitate low percentages of social and economic expenditure. 
Consequently it can also be hypothesized that.
Hg: Military rule will be negatively correlated with
variables indicating budgetary allocations to economic 
and social sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the 
opposite effect.
From the foregoing hypotheses a general hypothesis regarding 
regime effect on public policy may be articulated, as follows:
Hg; Within any given African country, changes in regime
type should be associated with shifts in the pattern of 
spending priorities exhibited by that country.
Although the notion of budgetary "trade-offs" is present in every 
society and under all regime types, in Africa, with its very limited 
resources, government budgetary decisions can often be a 1ife-and-death 
issue.
For example, as hundreds of thousands perished from the famine of 
1983-1985, the Ethiopian Dergue allocated few resources to the Relief 
and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) relative to the efforts they were 
putting into other concerns of the regime, such as the build-up of the 
largest army in Africa and the of training "vanguard cadres" in Marxism 
and Leninism (Legum 1986, 215). Furthermore, in September of 1984, at 
the height of the drought crisis, the same government spent about $45 
million for celebrations marking the occasion of the tenth anniversary 
of its revolution and the creation of the Ethiopian Workers' Party. All 
Ethiopian ministries also contributed one-tenth of their annual budgets
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toward the costs of preparing for the celebration (Shepherd 1905, 51- 
54) .
Although there are other forces at work, the spending priorities 
of a regime does have a significant impact on policy outcomes and the 
socioeconomic development of a country.
Policy Outcomes
Africa is faced with severe social and economic crisis. Among 
these, one has to include the crisis associated with dependency or 
"unequal interdependence,” such as the servicing of African debt. This 
has led to the preposterous situation in which financial outflows from 
Africa have been greater than its inflows. There is the additional 
problem of the increasing difficulties caused by low commodity prices 
for countries which are mainly suppliers of raw materials in the world 
market (Whiteman 1909, A0-A2). African societies also have the problems 
of droughts, food shortages, and population pressures. Often these 
problems are of such magnitude that even moderate rates of economic 
growth are not sufficient to satisfy the demands of the rapidly 
increasing population.
Over the years, different policies have been promulgated in 
efforts to solve such problems. African regimes have adopted a variety 
of policy measures in the hope of achieving the desired outcome: a
sustainable level of significant economic development. Given the 
differences in the qualities of African regime types already identified, 
what regime type is best qualified to improve the prospects for African 
development?
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Some theorists, using a rationalist model, have observed that all 
politicians seek to manage the economy so as to ensure their reelection. 
Citizens are also inclined to vote for the benefits of government 
spending programs, but they are opposed to the taxes necessary to 
support such programs. These and other premises have been used to 
explain why civilian regimes (democratic ones in particular) encourage 
bigger governments, higher deficits, and more inflation (Borcherding 
1977; Brittan 1979; Buchanan and Wagner 1977). Thus, it is sometimes 
suggested that civilian regimes tend to stifle economic development in 
the newly-emerging nations of Africa. On the other hand, military 
regimes seem well-qualified to initiate and enforce necessary but 
unpopular policies. According to Irving Horowitz (1975, 308), there is 
a strong "functional" correlation between the coercive mechanisms that a 
state can bring to bear on its citizenry and the ability to produce high 
economic development. Given this theoretical orientation, it seems 
reasonable to advance another general hypothesis.
H4: Socioeconomic development in the emerging nations of
sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to occur under 
military led regimes that are predisposed to 
modernization than under regimes headed by civilians 
who are similarly predisposed.
Data and Methods
In order to evaluate effectively the performance of the military 
as governors, it is necessary that their performance be compared to 
those of civilian administrators who have preceded and succeeded them. 
Thus, in the chapters that follow, the performance of civilian and 
military regimes in selected sub-Saharan African countries will be 
evaluated along a range of major policy dimensions.
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Two methodological ajpproaches will be used to evaluate these 
performances of the two regime types: quantitative and case studies.
Both methodologies will be employed because each makes a unique and 
valuable contribution in our effort to answer the question regarding the 
impact of regime type on public policy. For example, the case study 
approach often does not allow for generalizations but tends "to be very 
sensitive to human agency and social processes in general" (Ragin 1987, 
35-51, 70). On the other hand, by allowing researchers to study more 
than a handful of countries at a time, the quantitative approach allows 
for generalizations, but it does not reveal the underlying and 
particular factors which make for specific policy outputs and outcomes. 
Furthermore, the usefulness of the quantitative approach is heavily 
dependent upon the reliability of available data. And, as is well 
known, data collected in developing nations, especially African states, 
are often extremely unreliable. For this reason, the validity of some 
of the quantitative analyses on regime performance has been questioned. 
For example, the methodology used in large cross-national studies, 
including those by McKinlay and Cohan (1975) and Jackman (1976) has been 
criticized for failing to consider important variables, such as a 
nation's natural resources, infrastructure, size, or geographical 
location. Instead, these studies often depend almost exclusively on the 
overall economic and statistical indicators of the countries under 
investigation (Janowitz, 1977).
On the limitations of quantitative analysis of military regime 
performance in Africa, Bienen (1978, 15) writes:
There may be military characteristics, responses,
orientations, and patterns of decision making that do not
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show up in cross-national analyses- That is we may be able 
to capture some elements of military rule in Africa that are 
consequential? but we may not be able to see these elements 
in every case of African military rule? and we may not be 
able to see them via aggregate data such as growth rates?
GNP, rate of urbanization? and literacy.
Therefore? in order to overcome such shortcomings? both approaches will
be employed. It is expected that one approach should check the biases
of the other. As Bunce put it? "by combining these two approaches? we
can speak about processes? correlations? and causes? and be more
confident in drawing concrete conclusions about the role of succession
in generating policy innovation" (1981? 39). Yet it is also recognized
that using both methodologies raises the possibility that the results of
the two dissimilar approaches may be irreconcilable (Ragin 1987, 70).
To be sure? the present study has a number of limitations. One
shortcoming is the reliance upon only two African regime types. In
reality of course? there are several species of African military and
civilian regimes (Linz 1975; Nordlinger 1977; Bienen 1978). Another
possible objection to the approach being employed in this study is that
two regime types (and three categories of political systems) utilized
are too few to portray African political reality in a satisfactory
fashion. For example? within African civilian systems there has been a
great deal of variability in the influence of the military. There is
the low end of the scale in Gambia— illustrating civilian regimes where
the political influence of the military is negligible— to the upper end,
where military elites have played major roles in determining the
outcomes of political struggles (Kenya).
African military regimes also vary according to the degree of
civilian involvement in the making of public policy (Bienen 1978? 11).
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Thus to group together as civilian regimes multiparty systems, single 
party systems and monarchies on the one hand, and such military regimes 
as Idi Amin’s Uganda, Mobutu’s Zaire, Gowon’s Nigeria and Rawlings’ 
Ghana, on the other hand, distorts political reality. At the same time, 
if every possible form of African military and civilian regime were 
considered here, then the variables would become too numerous and 
confusing to deal with systematically.
Another problem inherent in this study is the use of data that, as 
has already been observed, in the African setting are sometimes 
extremely unreliable. Consequently, the validity of the findings 
produced by the quantitative section may be open to question.
Finally, like most studies of this genre, the present work cannot 
"prove" that specific policy outputs and outcomes are a direct 
consequences of a particular regime type. Too many other variables may 
intervene between regime decision-making and socioeconomic outcomes for 
this to be possible. For example, irrespective of regime type, the oil 
crisis of the mid-1970s influenced public policy-making and outcomes in 
Africa and other regions. Thus we cannot expect regime type alone to 
explain all of the variance in policy outputs and outcomes.
Nevertheless, by combining these two methodologies, this study 
will provide evidence that there is some causal relationship between 
regime type and public policy. Notwithstanding the shortcomings 
identified above, the study should also make a meaningful contribution 
to the literature of comparative regime performance and public policy.
At least, it should yield some useful insights into the political 
systems of sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, by ranking regime
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effectiveness, we should be able to discern if later military or 
civilian regimes have learned anything from their predecessors.
However, it may be that measures of regime expenditure priorities
and of gross domestic product are not the most useful indicators of
military and civilian regime differences. Analysis of aggregate data
may show that military and civilian regimes cannot be differentiated by 
their effects on socioeconomic variables (Mckinlay and Cohan 1975; 
Jackman 1976). Thus, Bienen (1978), suggests that it may be more 
fruitful to look for regime differences in the decision-making process. 
This would entail analyzing patterns of deliberation, representation, 
and pronouncement in civilian and military regimes. Looking at the 
decision-making process would also involve looking at how policies are 
implemented. As Bienen (1978) concluded, observing these processes 
"should differentiate between military regimes or between some military 
regimes and some civilian regimes" (Bienen 1978, 195-96). The case 
studies should provide for this by providing us with insights into the 
way political decisions are made and enabling us to discern the links 
between the rulers and the population.
Relevant Countries
By the late 1980s, more than one-half of the nations in 
sub-Saharan Africa were governed by military regimes. All of them have 
experienced both civilian and military leadership. For the purposes of 
this dissertation three sets of nations will be considered. Data for 
the quantitative section will be derived from the following two groups 
of 36 and 21 countries respectively:
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Group 1
Benin? Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, The Congo, Cote d ’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire,
Zambia and Zimbabwe
Group B
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic,
Chad, The Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Uganda.
The first group of countries encompasses the majority of sub-
Saharan African countries that have been independent for at least five
years. They include countries that have had only civilian regimes or
only military regimes or both. The second group includes only those
countries that have experienced significant periods of both civilian and
mi 1i tary rule.
For the case study approach, the focus will be centered on three 
nations: Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia. A primary reason for choosing 
these nations to provide more detailed information is because of the 
availability of relevant documentary material, including economic data. 
Another reason is that, like several other African states, they have all 
had durable civilian and military regimes. The durability of a regime 
is an important criterion for inclusion, because a regime in power for 
only a short time can do little to introduce lasting changes; at the 
very least, a short lived-regime is unable to put its own policies into 
effect. Consequently, only countries in which successive military and 
civilian regimes have lasted for at least four years (the same as the 
presidential term in the United States) were selected for case studies.
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The availability of relevant source materials, including economic data, 
also made these particular nations attractive subjects of .
This study will concentrate upon a comparison between regimes 
within the same countries rather than across countries. Thus, the 
pitfalls associated with neglecting important environmental variables 
will be avoided (e.g., population, and size).
However, this approach does risk some pitfalls of its own. For 
example, it suffers from a shortcoming common to a majority of aggregate 
research of this genre. It does not adequately account for the 
inclusion of military officers in civilian-led governments, or of 
civilians in military governments. Even when it does not formally hold 
the reins of power, for example, the military may have a great deal of 
influence upon policy formulation and implementation (as in the United 
States and the Soviet Union). On the other hand, in some Third World 
states, there are military regimes that do not have much influence 
outside the capital city and a few towns (Bienen 1983, 8).
Another limitation with the present study is that the quantitative 
section does not recognize civil wars and international conflicts 
experienced by the countries under examination. Civil wars and 
international conflicts obviously affect regime performance in a variety 
of ways. For example, civil wars in Nigeria, Chad and Ethiopia resulted 
in substantial increases in defense spending and a corresponding decline 
in the provision of social services in Chad and Ethiopia. Where 
applicable, the impact of environmental factors on public policy outputs 




Almost without exception* military coup leaders in Africa declare 
that their actions are necessitated by the need to "save" their nation 
from economic and social catastrophe. Different military-led regimes 
adopt different policy strategies in their efforts to reverse what they 
perceive as negative socioeconomic trends and to achieve a sustainable 
level of development. Leaders of sub-Saharan African countries often 
define their development goals primarily in economic terms. Specific 
goals frequently are: an increase in the gross national product,
greater exploitation of natural resources (increasing agricultural 
productivity, oil production, production of hydroelectric power, etc.). 
In the attempt to promote national development, social issues and needs, 
such as health and education, are sometimes likely to be subordinated to 
economic questions. Health and education are often viewed as 
concomitants of economic development, especially in countries that are 
plagued by endemic, disabling diseases or where there is a critical 
shortage of technical personnel. In response tD these socioeconomic 
problems, programs of public health and expanded educational effort are 
often initiated.
For the quantitative section of this study only policy instruments 
which can be compared across time and across nations will be utilized. 
One such instrument is the national budget. Budgetary priorities of 
alternating civilian and military regimes in each country will be 
analyzed in an effort to discern changes in policy outputs. The major 
justification for looking at budgets is that they are the major 
indicators of governments’ plans. As Boulding (1966) indicates, "The
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budget seems to be the prime expression of political decisions..."
(cited in Bunce 1981> 47). To determine regime performance in terms of 
the outcomes of the policies it proclaims, five separate areas will be 
analyzed. The first area is economic growth; the second is agricultural 
production; the third is industrial production; the fourth is defense 
expenditure; and the fifth is social welfare (education and health).
In the case study portion of this study, as already noted, three 
cases will be selected for evaluation. For each of the three countries, 
an in-depth case study focusing on a public policy issue of major 
significance for that country will be undertaken. In the case studies 
section, regime performance will be evaluated, in large part, in 
accordance with the goals and objectives adopted by the respective 
civilian and military rulers themselves. This approach will make 
possible the determination of regime effectiveness, initially in 
relation to the generalizable criteria (e.g., those that social 
scientists select as being intrinsically desirable— health, education 
and welfare), and finally in relation to the regime’s ability to achieve 
its own specified goals (Rothchild 1980, 459-79).
Policy issues to be examined will include those that successive 
administrations— civilian and military— in each country have had to 
address. For example, the issue of indigenous control of the Nigerian 
economy is one that successive Nigerian administrations have grappled 
with. Different administrations have held different views on how much 
foreign investment should be allowed, what sectors of the economy should 
be reserved for indigenous investors, whether or not to nationalize 
industry, and related questions. In pursuit of its goals, each
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administration has adopted special policy strategies. These policies 
and their outcomes will be the focus of the chapter on economic and 
industrial policy in Nigeria.
Agriculture is the principle sector of Ghana’s economy, accounting 
for over one-third of GDP and employing over 60 percent of the working 
population. Over the past two decades agricultural output in Ghana has 
steadily declined. In the 1980s, this decline was exacerbated by 
drought, bush fires and smuggling. Consequently, agriculture in time 
became a major focus of successive Ghanaian administrations since 
independence, through three military and three civilian regimes. 
Agriculture will, therefore, be the central concern of the chapter on 
Ghana.
The only country south of the Sahara not to have been colonized is 
Liberia. Since its establishment as a settlement for freed slaves 
Liberia has had very close relations with the United States. This 
relationship with the United States tends to be at the center of many of 
activities in which successive Liberian governments have been involved. 
Thus in the chapter on Liberia, government policies as they relate to 
foreign affairs will be examined and foreign trade patterns will be 
evaluated.
Regime Evaluation
"Does it make a difference for a country to be governed by 
civilians or military officers?" If it does "make a difference" what 
kind of difference does it make? "Which regime type will be most 
effective in dealing with the developmental problems of African 
countries?" The main criterion of "effectiveness" is the ability of
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leaders to identify issues of concern and to implement consistent and 
effective policies in response. Also of importance will be their 
ability to achieve those goals that they set for themselves at the 
outset of their stewardship. In addition to the above, measurable 
improvements or decline in the relevant economic and social indicators—  
GDP, agricultural and industrial outputs, education and health— will be 
analyzed to determine differences in regime performance.
Conclusion
In a recent book on comparative public policy research in Europe 
and America, Heidenheimer, Heclo and Adams (1983, 1-2) wrote:
These everyday comparisons of public policies have one 
important thing in common with more systematic, academic 
efforts at comparative policy analysis. Both informal and 
formal approaches seek a deeper understanding than could be 
gained by looking at only one thing at a time. By assessing 
one situation against another, we gain fuller perspective of 
both options and constraints.... While informal comparisons 
generally serve some personal end, the academic study of 
comparative public policy has a broader agenda. One aim of 
this agenda is to learn why some governments seem to fare 
better than others at coping with similar problems.
This is precisely the objective of this study. By employing both
quantitative and case study approaches it is hoped that we will not only
be able to identify the most effective regime type, but also gain, via
the case study approach, a deeper understanding of government
institutions and political processes in sub-Saharan Africa.
Endnotes
According to Nordlinger military regimes can be categorized 
according to the degree of the army’s involvement in politics. 
Military moderators intervene to settle disputes among civilian 
political leaders, and exercise a veto power over major public 
policy decisions, without taking actual control of government 
themselves. "They apply pressure on civilian incumbents with 
threats of a coup. When moderator actions fail to achieve the 
desired objectives, then military officers often take control 
themselves. When this happens, the military officers are said to 
be Praetorian Guardians. Military guardians are primarily 
concerned with correcting the malpractices and deficiencies of 
their civilian predecessors. They usually stay in power for a 
brief period. Praetorian Rulers represent a third category of 
military regimes. They take direct control of the government with 
the express intention of making far-reaching changes that will 
take a considerable amount of time. They are the most intolerant 
of opposition (Nordlinger 1977, 21-27).
The Guardian, 29 June 1989.
Chapter Three 
REGIME PERFORMANCE: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
In the comparative study of regime performance in sub-Saharan 
Africa? two different questions can be asked about the consequences of 
civilian and military rule. First what are the budgetary priorities of 
each regime type? Are there? for example? any significant differences 
between regimes in the way in which they allocate public funds to the 
various sectors of the society? Second? what are the socioeconomic 
consequences of the governance of each regime type? Does any regime 
type exhibit a superior capacity to provide effective leadership for 
African countries striving for rapid economic development? An attempt 
to answer these questions is the central task of this and the next three 
chapters.
The specific purpose of this chapter is to explore variations in 
the performance of military and civilian rulers in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Using generalizable standards of measurement? I will compare military 
and civilian regime performance as it relates to their effectiveness in 
attaining multiple goals at relatively low cost. The quantitative 
results relating to the impact of regime type on budgetary allocations 
and economic performance will be presented in terms of outcomes in six 
policy areas: economic growth? agricultural production? industrial
production? education? health? and defense expenditures. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the linkages involved.
Attention in this chapter will be focused on 36 sub-Saharan 
African countries (see Table 8.1). Wherever possible? an effort will be 
made to include information on as broad a range of countries as
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possible, while looking in much greater detail at a few selected 
countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan,
Tan2ania, Togo, Uganda and Zaire. The rationale for this selection is 
based on economic, political and historical factors. The geographic 
location of the countries and the availability of data were also very 
important determinants for their inclusion. With regard to policy 
outputs, particular attention will be paid to budgetary allocations for 
defense, education and health, and to policy outcomes as they relate to 
GDP, agriculture and manufacturing.
Methodological Considerations
The methods of analysis employed in this section have been 
determined by the comparative and longitudinal data available. However, 
as pointed out in the preceding chapter, although greatly improved over 
the past few years, available data on African systems still lack the 
reliability needed to permit the establishment of cause-and-effect 
relationships with great confidence.
With the caveat concerning the unreliability of available data, I 
will nevertheless attempt to evaluate regime performance in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Empirical evaluation of political and economic performance in 
African countries needs to be conducted by contemporary political 
scientists. If, for no other reason, such studies can serve as 
foundations upon which future research, using improved data, can be 
based. Furthermore, as Sarkensian (1978, 21-22) noted, "the available 
data are useful, if for no other purpose than to examine current 
tendencies and notions about African regimes." However, as noted above, 
the outcome of contemporary empirical research undertakings that employ
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these data, including this effort, should be interpreted with particular 
caution. With the proper caveats, studying these questions is better 
than not studying them at all!
Research Design
Almost all quantitative studies of comparative regime performance
in Africa have employed cross-national data (Nordlinger 1970; McKinlay
and Cohan 1975). Cross-national analysis can be very limiting and can
distort empirical findings, because it employs data from a variety of
countries and therefore examines different situations of regime
performance. Cross-national studies thus cannot accommodate important
economic, social, historical and geographical constraints unique to sub-
Saharan African countries. A useful quantitative study, therefore, must
include single-country data that capture trends over time.
The multiple interrupted time-series (HITS) design is an ideal way
to evaluate trends within a single country. This is a procedure
discussed and developed by Campbell (1969) and Campbell and Cook
(1979). It has been employed in comparative policy evaluations by
Lewis-Beck and Alford (1980), Bunce (1981), Garand (1985) and Cohen
(1985). This method of analysis is particularly useful for this study
because it features an alternating independent variable (regime type in
this instance) and a continuous dependent variable (budgetary
expenditure, and economic growth). Furthermore, as Caporaso (1973, 17-
18) observed, interrupted time series analysis:
is appropriate to data distributed over time...and where 
there is theoretical reason to believe that some event 
should cause a change in the behavior of the series. The 
key question involved in this design is whether the 
occurrence of the events in question had an effect or
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whether the behavior of the series after the events 
represents an undisturbed continuation of the series from 
its previous state.... Twd questions are involved. Did a 
non-random change occur in the vicinity of the experiment?
Is this change attributable to the occurrence of the 
experimental event? (quoted in Bunce 1981, 51).
While the interrupted time series design is an improvement over
the usual method of analyzing African regime performance, it is, not by
itself, sufficient to rule out any plausible rival hypothesis. The
refutation or confirmation of any hypothesis is more likely to be
expedited when all relevant and accessible data are employed. This
requires the introduction of a control group. According to Donald
Campbell and Laurence Ross (1970, 110-25), in a quasi-experimentation
(such as this), even a nonequivalent control group is helpful. The
control group "provides the only control for history (for those
extraneous change agents that would be expected to affect both the
experimental and control group), and assists in controlling maturation,
testing and instrumentation" (Campbell and Ross 1970, 110-25).
The key point is that changes in outputs associated with regime
change could be due to other factors not in the model. One can be more
confident in one’s findings if: (1) one includes control variables, and
the regime change coefficients continue to suggest the same effect; or
(2) one includes control nations that did not undergo a regime change.
Because control variables are not readily available, I have opted for
the second approach.
The control group in this study will be made up of nations which
did not undergo regime change. Individual nations from the control
group will be matched with individual nations from the experimental
group (i.e., nations that have experienced significant periods of
civilian and military rule), and using a "comparative" interrupted time 
series design, a determination will be made as to the impact of regime 
type on public policy. The comparative interrupted time series entails 
the same process as the single interrupted time series analysis, only 
that in this instance the interruption in a nation in the control group 
is simulated to resemble the actual interruption in its matching nation 
in the experimental group. The hypothesis of an impact of regime change 
on public policy would be supported if there is an effect in the 
experimental nation and no effect on the control nation.
However, due to the lack of sufficient longitudinal data for most 
of the nations under examination, this model can be used to evaluate 
regime performance in only a handful of the countries under study. In 
order to evaluate regime performance in all the countries, two 
additional methods of analysis will be employed. These are "simple 
country" analysis of differences of means and "pooled" analysis.
In the first instance (simple country analysis), the mean changes 
in the various indicators of policy outputs and outcomes for civilian 
and military regimes in individual sub-Saharan African countries (for 
which data is available) will be evaluated. This will be complimented 
with a pooled analysis, in which the mean changes in the various 
indicators of policy outputs and outcomes for the two regime types are 
compared across all sub-Saharan African countries grouped together. A 
MITS design will then be employed to evaluate regime performance in the 
six countries for which sufficient longitudinal data are available.
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Data and Operationalization of Concepts
Data for regime expenditure priorities are available from a 
variety of reliable sources. However, the public expenditure data for 
this study are derived from two major sources— UN Statistical Yearbook, 
and IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. The primary source of 
data for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). Data for agricultural and industrial 
production are derived from UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics.
As I have indicated, few nations in Africa have truly reliable 
data. There are cases were data are not available for several years at 
a time. A few nations are excluded from this study primarily because 
they lacked sufficient data to permit a satisfactory analysis of regime 
performance.
And, as I indicated in the preceding chapter, a slightly modified 
version of a typology of African political systems developed by Berg- 
Schlosser will be used to determine regime type (see Table 2.1). Stated 
briefly, military regimes will include all those political systems in 
which members of the armed forces occupy key government positions 
(including that of head of government), and openly dictate national 
policy. All those systems which are headed by nonmilitary officials and 
where military-dictated priorities do not dominate national policies 
will be classified as civilian regimes (included in this group are the 
dynastic regimes of Swaziland and Ethiopia).
95
Policy Outputs
In Chapter Two, it was stated that the examination of the national 
budget is one of the best ways of comparing quantitatively the policy 
priorities of different regime types. The budgetary priorities of a 
regime are effective indicators of how much importance the regime 
attaches to competing government programs.
One way of measuring a regime’s budgetary priorities would be to 
examine the levels of total budgetary expenditure as well as 
expenditure in each socioeconomic category (e.g., health and education) 
every year throughout the life of the regime. However, such a measure, 
although useful for some types of analyses, is not so useful in this 
case. As I indicated to in the preceding chapter, the process of 
budgetary allocations involves choices from among competing expenditure 
claimants as to which is to receive scarce public funds. The concept of 
priority assumes a rank ordering of alternative actions and the 
willingness of the decision-maker to select one alternative on the basis 
of that rank ordering. In a budgetary sense, this involves either 
shifting relative shares of the budgetary pie for alternative spending 
areas so that they coincide with the regime’s relative priorities. 
Consequently, this study measures a regime’s spending priorities in 
terms of the relative GDP shares (i.e., as a proportion of GDP at time 
t) for total spending and for spending on health and education. For 
example, education priorities are measured by dividing education 
expenditure by GDP. This method of measuring the budgetary priorities 
of the different regime types also helps to eliminate the impact of
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inflationary pressures on the actual dollar amount (or local currency) 
spent in the various budgetary categories.
Policy Outcomes
The most commonly used generalizable standard of measuring regime 
performance is economic productivity. For this study, total output, 
manufacturing output, and agricultural output are used to evaluate 
regime performance. In keeping with other studies which have employed 
interrupted time-series analyses in international political economy 
(Chase-Dunn, Pallas and Kenter 19B2, 391-56; Cohen 1985, 183-336), this 
study measures total economic productivity as total GDP at. constant 1980 
prices. Manufacturing output is measured as GDP accounted for by 
manufacturing activities, while agricultural productivity is measured as 
the GDP accounted for by agricultural enterprises.
Statistical Model: Multiple Interrupted Time Series (MITS)
HITS is conceptually equivalent to running separate regressions 
for each time period separated by the interventions and determining 
changes in the behavior of the time series caused by specific 
interventions from one time period to the next. In this instance it is 
suggested that regime alternations in control of government can be 
viewed as interventions in the process within which policy is 
determined. The impact of regime alternation on policy outputs over time 
(measured by budgetary outlays) can be evaluated by using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression to estimate the following equation for each of 
three areas of expenditure (education, health and defense)*:
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EXPSHAREl)6 = tfc + bj COUNTER + bg DUMMY xt + bg COUNTxt +
 + bn.j DUMMY xt + b nCOUNT);t + e t Cl]
where EXPSHARE^e = the share of total expenditure for spending area e 
at time t; COUNTER^ = a counter for each year t from 1960 to 1985, coded 
from 1 (1960) to 26 (1985); DUMMYŷ = a dummy variable for regime 
transition years, coded 0 for observations before intervention year x 
and 1 thereafter; C0UIMTxf= a counter variable for regime transition 
years, coded 0 for observations before intervention year x and 1, 2, 
3 , . . . for year x and after; bp = the intercept, or the level of the time 
series prior to the initial regime change; bj = the slope of the time 
series before the initial regime change; b^ b g». ..bn_j, and bn = the 
parameters to be estimated, representing respectively and alternatively 
the shift in the intercept and the slope of the series associated with 
regime alternation; e^ = a randomly distributed error term for each year 
t.
In order to evaluate the impact of regime alternation on the level 
and/or slope, the parameter estimates of each dummy variable (even- 
numbered coefficients) and counter variable (odd-numbered coefficients) 
respectively, will be examined. The value of the coefficients for the 
dummy variables indicates the difference between the observed intercept 
term for each post-transition period and the intercept expected given 
the previous (preshift) pattern of expenditure outlays. Coefficients 
for the counter variables indicate the change in the slope of the 
regression brought about by regime change. In order to determine the 
slope for the post transition period, the parameter estimate for the 
counter associated with the regime change is added to the sum of all
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previous coefficients. If the coefficients for the dummy and/or counter 
variables are statistically significant (e.g.? at the .05 or .10 
levels), it can be inferred that regime change does have a significant 
impact on the height and/or slope of the time series.
Model Estimation
The above model will be estimated separately for each output 
category, including spending priorities in total and in each spending 
area (education, health and defense). Using the same procedure, the 
above equation C13 will be estimated separately for each dependent 
outcome variable (i.e., industrial production, and agricultural 
production). For every dependent variable, each of the six countries 
for which sufficient data is available (at least 15 years) will be 
analyzed separately.
Using this procedure, if the series between 1960 and 1985 for 
Nigeria is analyzed and the slope (e.g., industrial production) after 
1966 is positive and the same slope after 1980 is negative it can be 
inferred that the military regimes <1966-1975 and 1975-1979) performed 
better than their civilian predecessor (1960-1966) and successor 
(1979-1983). However, making such an inference may not be entirely 
proper since both regime types were not operating under similar 
environmental conditions. Of particular significance is the 
international environment. It has been argued that contractions and 
expansions in the world market can and does influence the performance of 
a country’s domestic economy (Kaufman 1969, 828-53). If this is so, 
findings derived from comparisons between civilian and military regimes 
within a single country would be of questionable validity. More
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dependable findings would require the use the aforementioned comparative 
multiple interrupted time series design.
Candidates for this procedure in sub-Saharan Africa are very few. 
The best candidates in the region are: (1) Ethiopia and Kenya; (2)
Sudan and Zaire; (3) Togo and Malawi; and (4) Uganda and Tanzania.
During the period covered by this study, Kenya (civilian), Malawi 
(civilian), Tanzania (civilian) and Zaire (military) have been governed 
by one regime type, since there has been no alternation between civilian 
and military rulers. Thus, for the purpose of this analysis these four 
countries may be viewed as the "control group." The four pairs of 
countries provide a useful test for cross-national regime performance 
since they have relatively homogeneous socioeconomic characteristics 
but, have often been different in regime characteristics. To be sure, 
there are socioeconomic differences among these nations, but the 
differences are less than those of other groups of nations often used in 
comparative analysis, such as the nations along the west coast of 
Africa.
As indicated above, for those countries with inadequate data, the 
mean changes in expenditure patterns from one regime type to another 
will be evaluated. While the use of these three methods of analysis by 
no means eliminates the limitations imposed by unreliable data and 
inadequate controls for some intervening factors, it may encourage some 






GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDP80 Gross Domestic Product at constant 1980 prices
CGDP80 Percentage of change in GDP80
PSPEND Total budgetary expenditure as a proportion of GDP
PHEALTH Expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP
PEDUC Expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP
PDEFEN Expenditure on defense as a proportion of GDP
PMAN Percentage of contribution of manufacturing to GDP
PAGRIC Percentage contribution of agriculture to GDP
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Some Results from "Simple Country" and "Pooled" Analyses
Since the mid-1970s successive governments in many African 
countries have sought external assistance in their efforts to stimulate 
economic growth in their respective countries. In order to secure 
external loans* the governments of these countries have generally been 
required to adopt IMF and World Bank-recommended structural adjustment 
programs. A central feature of these programs is the requirement that 
public spending be severely curtailed. As was suggested in the 
preceding chapter, through the use of coercion, the military may be 
better able to execute the kind of austerity that is often demanded by 
IMF programs (The typical austerity budget often include the removal of 
subsidies on such important items as food, housing and transportation).
Although some military regimes have sought the support of the mass 
public to maintain their hold on power (Nasser in Egypt, Rawlings in 
Ghana and Sankara in Burkina Faso), the primary base of support for most 
military regimes is the armed forces. Consequently, a military regime 
may feel no obligation to make allowance in the budget for more than the 
barest economic essentials. Conversely, because the survival of 
civilian administrations requires the building of coalitions, and the 
pacification of various constituent groups, civilian governments, 
especially in multiparty states, are often reluctant to curb public 
spending. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that public spending will be 
above average when civilians are in power and below the average when 
soldiers are in power. However, a glance at Table 3.S shows that this 
argument cannot be sustained.
1 0 2
Table 3.2
Total Budgetary Expenditure as a Proportion of the
Gross Domestic Product (PSPEND)
COUNTRY MI LITARY(a ) Cl0ILIAN(a+b) t Si g .
Beni n 0.1563 -- -- --
Botswana -- 0.3741 -- --
Burkina Faso 0.1306 0.1438 1.0860 0.2893
Burundi 0.2222 0.2078 -1.7498 0.1236
Cameroon -- 0.1887 -- --
The Congo 0.3034*** 0.2153 -3.4111 0.0025
Cote d ’Ivoire -- 0.3055 -- --
Ethiopia 0.253/** 0.1317 -6.6501 0.0001
Gamb i a -- 0.2732 -- —
Ghana 0.165'/* 0.2140 2.2081 0.0370
Kenya -- 0.2240 -- --
Lesotho -- 0.3479 -- --
Liber i a 0.3686*** 0.2223 -5.4388 0.0001
Madagascar 0.2125 -- -- --
Maiawi -- 0.2591 -- --
Maur i tani a 0.3593 0.2452 -1.7825 0.1179
Mauri tius -- 0.2396 -- --
Ni ger 0.1547*** 0.1129 -4.4468 0.0004
Niger i a 0.3 625 0.1589 -0.1699 0.8667
Senegal -- 0.2107 -- --
Sierra Leone -- 0.2213 -- --
Rwanda o. 124:/** 0.0649 -7.8205 0.0001
Sudan 0.2006 0.2085 0.6131 0.5464
Swazi land -- 0.2479 -- --
Tanzania -- 0.2326 -- --
Togo 0.248/* 0.1217 -2.5038 0.0202
Uganda 0.1396 0.1667 1.3677 0.1852
Zai re 0.3604 -- -- --
Zambia -- 0.3280 -- --
Zimbabwe -- 0.3414 -- --
TOTAL 0.2175* 0.2320 1.7368 0.0830
(All Nations C301 n=524)
*.05<prob. < . 10 
*!oi <prob . < .05 
***prob.< .01
 Civilian or Military only
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Table 3.2 shows the mean public expenditure as a proportion of GDP 
(PSPEND) under military and civilian regimes in those countries (n=13) 
for which sufficient data are available. As can been seen from this 
table, there was no consistent pattern for PSPEND under either regime 
types. Only in seven of the countries were differences in the total 
spending of regime types statistically significant. In six of the seven 
countries (Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda and Togo), PSPEND 
under military administrations is significantly higher than it was under
civilian ones. Only in Ghana was civilian rule associated with a 
significantly higher PSPEND than it was under the military. However, 
although not statistically significant, PSPEND was also higher for 
civilian regimes in Burkina Faso, Sudan and Uganda. Furthermore, when 
PSPEND under each regime type from all sub-Saharan African countries 
(with sufficient data n=30), are pooled together, the results cast more 
doubts on the argument that public expenditure is influenced by regime 
type.
While the results for the simple country analysis appear to 
suggest that public spending will tend to be higher under military 
regimes, results of the pooled analysis suggests the opposite to be the 
case. As can be seen from Table 3.2 total PSPEND was approximately 22 
percent under military regimes and S3 percent under civilian ones. This
difference is statistically significant at the .10 level.
As I suggested in Chapter Two, the notion of budgetary "trade­
offs" can be especially significant in sub-Saharan African countries 
where resources are very limited. In these countries, exceptionally
104
high percentages of defense spending should precipitate low percentages
of social and economic expenditure. Consequently, I hypothesized that:
Military rule will be negatively correlated with variables 
indicating budgetary allocations to economic and social 
sectors, whereas civilian rule will have the opposite 
effect.
The results reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are mixed. For 
example, in the area of education and health services, only in three 
countries (Ethiopia, Liberia, and Rwanda), were there any significant 
differences between the budgetary priorities of the regime types. In 
each case, the proportion of GDP allocated to education (PEDUC) and 
health (PHEALTH) was significantly more under military rule than it was 
under civilian rule. PEDUC was also significantly higher for military 
regimes in Niger and Togo. Can we then conclude that military rule 
facilitates higher public expenditure on education and health? The 
results does not allow one to reach such a conclusion. The results show 
that PEDUC in three countries (Ghana, Sudan and Uganda), and PHEALTH in 
seven countries (Table 3.3), were higher under civilian rule than they 
were under military rule. To be sure, the results were not 
statistically significant.
It is also noteworthy that those countries in which the military 
spent greater proportions of GDP on health and education, were also the 
same countries in which military rulers allocated substantially higher 
proportions of the GDP to public spending. Thus the increases in 
PHEALTH and PEDUC may simply be the outgrowth of the increases in the 
overall public expenditure. However, the results of the pooled analysis 
provided some support for the aforementioned hypothesis. The results 
show that civilian regimes allocated more of the GDP to health and
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Table 3.3
Expenditure on Health as a Proportion of the
Gross Domestic Product (PHEALTH)
COUNTRY MIL ITARY(a ) CIVILIAN(a+b> t Si g .
Benin 0.0147 0.0156 0.3626 0.7223
Botswana ------- 0.0203 ------- -------
Burkina Faso 0.0092 0.0079 -1.6634 0.1135
Burundi 0.0100 0.0136 2.1236 0.1238
Cameroon ------- 0.0080 ------- -------
The Congo 0.0229 ------- -- -------
Cote d ’Ivoire -- 0.0123 -- --
Ethiopi a 0.0090*** 0.0075 -5.5025 0.0001
Gamb i a ------- 0.0194 ------- -------
Ghana 0.0116 0.0133 1.0100 0.3226
Kenya ------- 0.0156 ------- -------
Lesotho ------- 0.0235 ------- -------
Liberia 0.0361*** 0.0167 -5.9238 0.0001
Madagascar 0.0152 ------- ------- -------
Mai awi ------- 0.0149 ------- -------
Mauri tania 0.0111 0.0106 -0.3022 0.7823
Maur i tius ------- 0.0219 ------- -------
Niger 0.0075 0.0075 0.1591 0.8771
Niger ia 0.0069 0.0078 0.8103 0.4268
Rwanda 0.0066*** 0.0046 -5.7754 0.0001
Senegal ------- 0.0123 ------- -------
Sierra Leone ------- 0.0130 ------- -------
Sudan 0.0071 0.0103 1.6135 0.1216
Swaz iland ------- 0.0172 ------- -------
Tanzani a ------- 0.0144 ------- -------
Togo 0.0132 0.0107 -1.1026 0.2821
Uganda 0.0095 0.0120 1.0359 0.3115
Zaire 0.0168 -- ------- -------
Zambia ------- 0.0223 ------- -------






*.05<prob. < . 10
*toi<prob.<.05 #11prob.< .01 
 Civilian or Military only
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Table 3.4
Expenditure on Education as a Proportion of the
Gross Domestic Product (PEDUC)
COUNTRY MIL ITARY(a) CIVILIAN* a+b) 4- Si g .
Benin 0.0367 0.0299 -3.5951 0.1330
Botswana -- 0.0687 -- --
Burkina Faso 0.0224 0.0218 -0.2724 0 .783^
Burundi 0.0442 0.0420 -0.2289 0.8337
Cameroon -- 0.0242 -- --
The Congo 0.0678 -- -- --
Cote d ’Ivoire -- 0.0597 -- --
Eth i opi a 0.025^** 0.0177 -4.6689 0.0008
Gambia -- 0.0297 -- --
Ghana 0.0328 0.0361 0.8013 0.4308
Kenya -- 0.0379 -- --
Lesotho -- 0.0640 -- --
Li ber i a 0.0559” * 0.0299 -5.7095 0 .0001
Madagascar 0.0330 -- -- —
Mai awi -- 0.0331 -- —
Maur i tania 0.0412 0.0370 -0.4055 0.7123
Maur i t i us -- 0.0375 -- --
Niger 0.0249*** 0.0133 -3.6868 0.0050
Niger ia 0.0226 0.0215 -0.3401 0.7372
Rwanda 0.0261*** 0.0160 -4.2727 0.0007
Senegal -- 0.0381 -- --
Sierra Leone -- 0.0330 -- --
Sudan 0.0148 0.0174 1.2211 0.2356
Swaz i1 and -- 0.0496 -- --
Tanzania -- 0.0317 -- --
Togo 0.0358** 0.0186 -2.2990 0.0314
Uganda 0.0230 0.0241 0.3229 0.7498
Zai re 0.535 -- -- --
Zamb i a -- 0.0478 -- --






*.05<prob. < . 10 
**01<prob.<.05 
***prob.< .01
 Civilian or Military only
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education than military regimes did, and the difference in both cases 
are significant.
It has been argued persuasively (Nordlinger 1977, 64-67; Hiking 
1883; Liebenow 1986, 240-50), and demonstrated practically (in Ghana, 
Uganda and Liberia), that reductions in defense spending under civilian 
regimes is a major cause of military intervention. Consequently, with 
regard to spending priorities, one would expect the greatest difference 
between military and civilian regimes to be in the area of defense 
appropriations. The results reported in Table 3.5 provide moderate 
support for the hypothesis that defense expenditure should be higher in 
countries where the military controls the policy-making institutions 
than in those where they do not. In six of the ten countries in Table 
3.7 (Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo and Uganda), military 
regimes spent significantly higher proportions of their GDP on defense 
(PDEFEN) than their civilian counterparts did. The mean difference in 
budgetary allocations to the defense sector were particularly pronounced 
in Ethiopia, Liberia, and Nigeria where PDEFEN was more than twice as 
much for military regimes as they were for civilian ones.
The results of the pooled analysis showed the impact of regime 
type on PDEFEN to be significant, with all Sub-Saharan African military 
regimes combined spending an average of 2.7 percent of GDP on defense, 
while their civilian counterparts combined were spending only 1.9 
percent of GDP (see the last row in Table 3.5).
With regard to policy outcomes, no consistent pattern is observed 
for the sensitivity of all measures of policy outcomes (GDP, 
manufacturing and agricultural productivity) to regime type. For
loa
Table 3.5
Expenditure on Defense as a Proportion of the
Gross Domestic Product (PDEFEN)
COUNTRY MIL ITARY(a ) CIVILIANt a+b) t Sig.
Benin 0.016B -- -- --
Botswana -- 0.0278 -- --
Burkina Faso 0.0221 0.0291 1.3760 0.1904
Burundi 0.0241 0.0243 0.0431 0.9684
Cameroon -- 0.0158 -- --
The Congo -- 0.0354 -- --
Cote d ’Ivoire -- 0.0120 -- --
Ethiopia 0.0696*** 0.0238 -6.6415 0.0001
Ghana 0.0132 0.0164 1.1282 0.2704
Kenya -- 0.0200 -- --
Lesotho -- 0.0414 -- --
Liberia 0.0349*** 0.0101 -7.6943 0.0001
Madagascar 0.0186 -- -- --
Maiawi -- 0.0154 -- --
Mauritania 0.1164 0.0634 -0.8583 0.4538
Mauri t ius -- 0.0056 -- --
Niger 0.0072 -- -- --
Ni ger i a 0.0357*** 0.0121 -4.5103 0.0002
Rwanda 0.0179** 0.0139 -2.5248 0.0233
Senegal -- 0.0227 -- --
Sierra Leone -- 0.0093 -- --
Sudan 0.0276 0.0323 0.8586 0.4004
Swaz i1 and -- 0.0193 -- --
Tanzania -- 0.0364 -- --
Togo 0.021 Ef 0.0097 -1.8289 0.0810
Uganda 0.0250* 0.0173 -1.9272 0.0670
Zaire 0.0330 -- -- --
Zambia -- 0.0133 -- --
Zimbabwe —- 0.0639 -- --
TOTAL 0.0275*** 0.0199 -4.2658 0.0001
(All Nations C303 n=396)
*.05<prob.<.10 
**.01 <prob. < .05 
***prob.< -01
 Civilian or Military only
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example, in thirteen of the sixteen countries in Table 3.6, PMAN (i.e., 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP) is higher under 
military regimes than under civilian ones. However, the differences are 
significant in only six of the countries. The difference in PMAN is 
also significant in Uganda, where the manufacturing sector contributes 
nearly twice as much to GDP under civilian rule (10 percent) than under 
military rule (6.6 percent). In the agricultural sector, the 
contribution of agriculture to GDP (PA6RIC) is higher during periods of 
military rule in only six of the same sixteen countries (see Table 3.7). 
The results of the pooled analysis show that PMAN is higher under 
civilian rule, whereas PAGRIC is higher under military rule.
Results of the Time Series Analysis 
The results of the MITS are reported in Tables 3.8 to 3.13. Like 
the "simple country" and "pooled" analysis they show no clear pattern of 
the effect of regime type on public policy. Beginning with PSPEND, the 
results show that the proportion of GDP going to spending prior to 
initial intervention ranged from approximately 10 percent for Liberia 
(see Table 3.8) to 18 percent for Uganda (see Table 3.13). For Sudan, 
the only country with a military regime at the beginning of the initial 
time series, the figure was 16.3 percent. There was approximately a 0.8 
percent shift per year in the rate of change over the initial time 
period for the spending trend for the Sudan. With the inauguration of a 
civilian regime in the Sudan (see Table 3.11) in 1965 the DUMMY66 
(intercept) coefficient was 0.0317 reflecting a short-term increase of 
about three percent in the overall levels of time series after regime 
change. The coefficient of -0.0S07 associated with the slope shift in
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Table 3.6
Percentage of Contribution of Manufacturing
to Gross Domestic Product (PMAN)
COUNTRY MILITARY(a ) CIVILIAN* a+b) t Sig.
Beni n 0.0745 0.0677 -0.7948 0.4371
Botswana -- 0.0886 -- --
Burkina Faso 0.1081 0.1048 -0.3813 0.7517
Burundi 0.0779 0.0754 -0.4808 0.6405
Cameroon -- 0.1808 -- --
The Congo 0.0711 -- -- --
Cote d ’Ivoire -- 0.1074 -- --
Equatorial Guinea -- 0.0477 -- --
Ethiopia 0.0951*** 0.0778 -3.6804 0.0018
Gamb i a -- 0.0576 -- --
Ghana 0.0989 0.0894 -0.5361 0.5993
Guinea-Bissau 0.0109 0.0106 -0.3778 0.7190
Kenya -- 0.1175 -- --
Lesotho -- 0.0417 -- --
Liberia 0.075^** 0.0507 -3.0071 0.0070
Madagascar 0.1681*** 0.0985 -6.7078 0.0001
Malawi -- 0.1006 -- --
Mauritania 0.0605*** 0.0503 -3.3499 0.0085
Maur i tius -- 0.1486 -- --
Niger 0.0535 0.0606 0.9439 0.3655
Nigeria 0.0569 0.0583 -1.1630 0.8573
Rwanda 0.1430*** 0.0654 -4.8884 0.0008
Senegal -- 0.1883 -- --
Sierra Leone 0.0553 0.0766 1.5155 0.1461
Sudan 0.0874 0.0846 -0.1930 0.8489
Swazi land -- 0.1911 -- --
Tanzania -- 0.0876 -- --
Togo 0.079E? 0.0594 -1.8178 0.0869
Uganda 0.0659*** 0.1001 4.5680 0.0005
Zaire 0.1086 -- -- --
Zambia -- 0.1517 -- --
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Table 3.7
Percentage of Contribution of Agriculture
to Gross Domestic Product (PAGRIC)
COUNTRY MI LITARY(a ) CIVILIAN(a+b) t Sig.
Benin -- 0.4365 2.4277 0.0253
Botswana -- 0.2691 -- --
Burkina Faso 0.4036 0.3976 -0.3125 0.7583
Burundi 0.533</** 0.6123 3.7699 0.0031
Cameroon -- 0.3532 -- --
The Congo 0.1155 -- -- --
Cote d ’Ivoire -- 0.3022 -- --
Equatorial Guinea -- 0.5299 -- --
Ethiopia 0.45B8*** 0.5433 4.1645 0.0005
Gamb i a -- 0.3771 -- --
Ghana 0.5146 0.5054 -0.2618 0.7968
Guinea-Bissau 0.5815 0.5990 1.5425 0.1739
Kenya -- 0.3125 -- --
Lesotho -- 0.3275 -- --
Liberia 0.1559* 0.2016 1.7323 0.0986
Madagascar 0.3900*** 0.3234 -5.2336 0.0001
Malawi -- 0.4756 -- --
Maur i tani a 0.3509*** 0.2641 -3.B479 0.0039
Maur itius -- 0.1939 -- --
Niger 0.4841*** 0.5654 3.2122 0.0083
Nigeria 0.3396 0.4278 1.3385 0.1944
Rwanda 0.4504** 0.4020 -2.1905 0.0447
Senegal -- 0.2344 -- --
Sierra Leone 0.3197 0.3467 0.5428 0.5936
Sudan 0.4635* 0.3982 -1.9428 0.0662
Swaz i1 and -- 0.2393 -- --
Tanzania -- 0.4034 -- --
Togo 0.3171*** 0.4813 4.1497 0.0007
Uganda 0.5794 0.6061 0.5150 0.6152
Zaire 0.1979 -- -- --
Zambia -- 0.1303 -- --
Zimbabwe -- 0.1174 -- --
TOTAL 0.3864*** 0.3463 -3.0829 0.0022




 Civilian or Military only
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1966 (C0UNT66) suggest a 1.3 percent (i.e., 0.0077 - 0.0207) decline per 
year in the proportion of GDP going to public spending (PSPFND) during 
the life of the civilian regime. When the military intervened again in 
1969 the overall level of the series increased by 3.5 percent (DUMMY?© = 
+0.0352). However, PSPEND under military rule declined at an annual 
average rate of -0.3 percent (-0.0207 + 0.0077 + 0.0105). In the case
of Liberia, the rate of change for the initial period was 0.9 percent.
Military intervention in 1980 resulted in a 10 percent increase in the 
level of the time series. With a coefficient of -0.0170 for C0UNT81 
indicates an annual decline in PSPFND of about 0.8 percent (i.e., 0.009^ 
- 0.0170).
The results of the MITS for PSPEND showed that, with the notable 
exception of Togo where military intervention resulted in an immediate 
downward shift in the level of the time series, regime change in all the 
selected countries was associated with short-term increases in the 
levels of spending. It did not matter whether the change was from
civilian to military rule (Sudan 1969, Nigeria 1966, Liberia 1980 and
Ethiopia 1975), or from military to civilian rule (Sudan 1965, Nigeria 
1979 and Uganda 1981).
Furthermore, there was no observable consistency in the trend of 
the slopes following the initial shifts in the level of the time series. 
The sensitivity of long-term trends in PSPEND to regime type is 
significant on only two occasions after military intervention and in 
another two following the restoration of civilian rule. Following 
military intervention in Uganda in 1971, a -0.0166 coefficient 
associated with the counter (slope) variable suggests a negative -1.5
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percent (0.0013 - 0.0166) shift per year in the rate of change over time 
series for public expenditure (see Table 3.13). However, military 
intervention in Ethiopia in 1975 corresponded with a significant 
positive shift in the slope of the trend line for the period of military 
rule. Positive and negative coefficients for PSPEND in Uganda (C0UNT8E 
= 0.0E96) and Nigeria (C0UNT80 = -0.0369) reflect the presence of 
similar inconsistencies in the long-term shifts in the trend lines for 
PSPEND following the restoration of civilian rule.
When the time series for PSPEND in Ethiopia, Sudan, Togo and 
Uganda are compared with that for their country pairs in the "control 
group," no consistent pattern is observable. For example, there was a 
positive change in the level and slope of the series for PSPEND in 
Ethiopia after change in regime. However only the change in the slope 
(CDUNT76) was significant. The changes in the level and slope of the 
simulated series for PSPEND in Kenya (Ethiopia’s country pair) were 
similar to those in Ethiopian series, suggesting that the changes in the 
Ethiopian series may not have been totally related to change in regime. 
Similar patterns were observable for the other country pairs. However, 
changes in the level and slope of the series for the country pair of 
Uganda and Tanzania are not always in the same direction.
Whereas there is a positive shift in the level of the series after 
the military intervened in Uganda (DUMMY71), a simulated intervention in 
Tanzania (DUMMY71) is associated with a negative shift in the level of 
the series. Although, the changes in the slope (C0UNT7E) and level 
(DUMMY8E) for PSPEND in Uganda and Tanzania are identical, the changes 
in Uganda are highly significant while those in Tanzania are not. The
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changes in the slopes (C0UNT8E) for the two series are significant at 
the .01 level, but while the change in Uganda is positive, the change in 
Tanzania is negative. The complete MITS results for the selected pairs 
of countries are reported in Tables 3.10 to 3.13.
Health (PHEALTH) and Education <PEDUC)
The tables also demonstrate that the sensitivity of spending 
trends for health and education to regime change is not consistent in 
any discernible direction. For example, Table 3.11 shows that in the 
Sudan, at the beginning of the time series, 1.2 percent and 1.5 percent 
of GDP went to health (PHEALTH) and education (PEDUC) respectively. The 
initial time trend indicated a -0.04 percent and -0.01 percent shift per 
year in the average rate of change for both PHFALTH and PEDUC. The 
coefficients of 0.0009 and 0.0097 associated with the 1965 return to 
civilian rule < DUMIVIY66) suggest short-term increases of 0.1 percent and 
1.0 percent in the overall level of the series for PHEALTH and PEDUC 
respectively. The annual rate of change over the time series is -0.02 
percent (-0.0004 + 0.0002) and -0.26 percent (-0.0001 - 0.0025) for 
PHEALTH and PEDUC respectively. The coefficients of 0.0014 and 0.0054 
associated with the military intervention in 1969 (DUMMY70) reflect 
short-term increases of 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent in the overall level 
of the series for PHEALTH and PEDUC respectively. The coefficients of 
-0.0006 and 0.0020 associated with the shift in slope after 1970 
indicate a -0.04 percent and a -0.05 percent annual rate of change in 
PHEALTH and PEDUC for the time series.
This example shows that the time series for the Sudan begins with 
a negative slope (indicating a trend toward declining public expenditure
on health and education) from 1960 to 1965 and then undergoes a positive 
shift in both intercept and slope, although the overall slope for the 
period from 1960 to 1985 remains negative. However, only the short-term 
shift in the overall level of the trend line for PEDUC (DlIMMY66)) is 
significant. Although the direction of the shifts in the intercepts and 
slopes of the time series are sometimes different, the results of the 
MITS analysis for PHEALTH and PEDUC in other countries are not 
noticeably different from the Sudanese results. In Liberia, the 1980 
military coup is associated with positive shifts in the time series for 
PHEALTH and PEDUC (as manifested in significant intercept shifts), but 
the slope trends for the period of military rule (1980-1985) are not 
significantly different from the slope for the preceding period (see 
Table 3.8). However, Liberia is the only country in which military 
intervention appeared to have had a significant positive effect on the 
time series for PHEALTH and PEDUC. The only other case of a significant 
positive intercept shift is in Nigeria where return to civilian rule 
(DUMMYBO) seems to have occasioned an increase in the proportion of GDP 
allocated to the health sector (see Table 3.9). On the other hand, 
military interventions in Ethiopia and Togo are associated with 
significant negative intercept shifts for PEDUC.
When the results of the MITS analysis for the countries in the 
"control group" are compared with their pairs, no clear pattern is 
discernable. For example, there is a negative but insignificant shift 
in the level of the PHEALTH series following military intervention in 
Uganda, but a simulated intervention in Tanzania is associated with a 
positive and significant shift. However, while military intervention in
116
Table 3.S

































Intercept 0.1033*** A; 579 0.000A
counter 0.0015*** 9.272 0.0001





Intercept 0.0091*** A. 287 0.0005
counter 0.0001 0.659 0.5188
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Table 3.9










































































































































Intercept 0.688A” * 18.677 0.0001
counter -0.017B* -1.766 0.0953
dummy67 0.0171 0.376 0.7116










Togo was associated with an insignificant negative shift in the level of 
the PHEALTH series and a significant positive shift in the slope, the 
simulated intervention in Malawi effected negative and significant 
shifts in the level and slope of the series.
Defense Spend i ng (PDEFEN)
As expected, there are distinctive differences in the time series 
for both regime types in the area of defense spending. The advent of 
military rule in Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda is associated with 
significant short-term increases in the overall level of the time series 
for PDEFEN. However, the slopes of the trend lines during military rule 
are not significantly different from those for preceding or succeeding 
periods of civilian rule. However, the results for Ethiopia (see Table 
3.10), show that the time series after military intervention underwent a 
significant positive shift in both the intercept and the slope.
In Ethiopia for example, at the beginning of the time series, the 
proportion of GDP allocated to defense (PDEFEN) is 3.5 percent. There 
was an average annual shift of -0.1 percent in the slope of the time 
series. Following military intervention there is a short-term increase 
of 3.1 percent in the overall level of the time series. The period of 
military rule witnesses a significant positive annual shift of 0.6 
percent in the slope of the time series.
Ethiopia’s uniqueness as manifested by the significant shift of 
0.53 percent per year in the rate of change in PDEFEN over the period of 
military rule (1976-1985), is perhaps due to the fact that since it 
assumed office Ethiopia’s military government has been engaged in a 
costly military campaign against Eritrean and Somali separatist
Table 3.10
MITS Results for Ethiopia and Kenya
ETHIOPIA (11) 



































































































































































































*.05<prob. < . 10
*toi <prob. < .05
***prob.< .01
1 E l
movements (Wubneh and Abate 1988, 68-74). Although the Eritrean 
struggle for independence from Ethiopia was in its fifteenth year in 
1975 (when the military assumed power), it was not until after the 
military intervened that the Ethiopian government made a concerted (as 
yet unsuccessful) effort to' overwhelm the liberation movements. Thus 
the armed forces which numbered 50,800 in 1975 were increased to 829,500 
by 1980. Further increases in defense expenditure was also encouraged 
by the presence of thousands of Cuban soldiers and Warsaw Pact 
technicians and advisers who served in the Ethiopian forces and operated 
aircraft and heavy equipment (Legum 1977, BE01? 1981, B167-16R).
The significant effect of regime type on defense expenditure is 
confirmed by the results of the time series for Kenya (the "control1' 
country for Ethiopia). The results (see Table 3.10) show that a 
simulated intervention in 1975 is associated with a significant shift in 
the overall level of the Kenyan time series (DUMMY76). However, whereas 
DUMMY76 in Ethiopia was significant at the .01 level, DUMMY76 for Kenya 
was significant at the less impressive .05 level. A more significant 
difference is manifested in the slope of the trend lines. Whereas there 
is a very significant positive shift in the long-term trend of the 
series for Ethiopia, the long-term trend for Kenya is negative.
There was at least one instance in which military intervention is 
not associated with positive changes in the time series for PDEFEN. In 
the case of Togo (see Table 3.IE) for example, the proportion of GDP 
allocated to defense (PDEFEN), over the initial time period is 0.10 
percent. Average yearly change in PDEFEN over the initial time series 
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0.629^** 0.3409*Intercept 15.773 0.0001 2.617 0.0792
counter -0.0354 -3.451 0.0033 6.9064 -- --
dummy66 -0.0923 -1.513 0.1497 0 --- --
count66 0.067^** 3.093 0.0070 -0.0373 -1.039 0.3752
dummy70 0.0189 0.424 0.6770 -0.0516 inm.—! 1 0.2682
count70 -0.036$ -1.885 
R^O.6653
















Intercept(C) 0.1858 1 .476 0.1568 0.1887*** 5.99] 0.0001
counter(C ) -0.0018 -0.188 0.8994 0.0065 1.076 0.8938
dummy6B(M ) -0.0178 -0.344 0.7343 -0.0105 -0.331 0.7434
count68(M ) 0.0198 „ 1.803 0.8439 -0.0019 -0.300 0.7666
R = 0 ,8685 FtO.4657
PHEALTH (1st) (OLS)
Intercept 0.0145* 4.809 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.083 0.9881
counter -0.0009 -1.780 0.1016 0.0019*** 8.940 0.0084
dummy68 -0.0080 -0.909 0.3747 -0.0045** -8.454 0.0?40
count6B 0.001^** o3.145 0.0053 -0.0013* -8.084 0.0509
R^O. 8490 Ft0.7593
PEDUC (OLS) (1st)
Intercept o .o b o^** 3.698 0.0014 ***0.0885 3.840 0.0010
counter -0.0004 -0.419 0.6796 0.0014 1.359 0.1885
dummy6B -o.oiod* -8.164 0.0487 0.0014 0.891 0.7739
count68 0.003^** „3.585 0.0081 -0.0016 -1.305 0.8061
R£=0.9ise Fto.4591
PDEFEN (1st) (1st)
Intercept 0.0010 0.057 0.9550 0.0081 0.088 0.9307
counter 0.0017 0.560 0.5880 0.0006 0.166 0.8700
dummy68 -0.0019 0.150 0.8883 -0.0007 -0.104 0.9383
count68 -0.0006 -0.180 0.8588 0.0005 „0.144 0.8869
R^=0.4598 Ft0.7783
PMAN (OLS) (OLS)
Intercept —0.0366 min1 0.1001 0.0838** 8.816 0.0468
counter 0.0174*** 5.180 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.089 0.9304
dummy6B 0.0030 0.894 0.7789 -0.0040 -0.897 0.7714
count6B -0.080=?** -6.046 0.0001 0.0054 o0.980 0.3755
R^O.7870 R^O.7374
PAGRIC (1st) (OLS)
Intercept 0.6396*** 7.865 0.0001 0.5845*** 4.957 0.0003
counter -0.088S?* -8.890 0.0381 -0.0086 -0.147 0.8856
dummy68 0.0069 0.191 0.8518 0.0058 0.185 0.9083
count68 0.0155 1 .109 0.8861 -0.0164 r0.901 0.3051
R^O.9138 ftO.B345




short-term decrease of 0.19 percent, and the long-term trend showed a 
0.11 percent (i.e., 0.0017 - 0.000b) average yearly shifts in PDEFEN.
To be sure, Togo is the only clear case in which military intervention 
is associated with a decrease in PDEFEN. However, the changes in the 
time series are not statistically significant.
Manufacturing (PMAN) and Agriculture (PAGRIC)
As can be discerned from the MITS tables (Tables 3.8 to 3.13), the 
performance of the two major sectors of the economies of all the six
countries does not seem to have been overly sensitive to regime
alternation in any consistent fashion. For example, the tables show
that military interventions in Ethiopia (Table 3.10) and Liberia (Table
3.8), are associated with short-term decreases in the overall level of 
the respective time series for PMAN. Tables 3.9 and 3.11 show the 
reverse to be the case in Nigeria and the Sudan. However, in all four 
countries, irrespective of the direction of the initial shift in the 
intercept, the overall slope for the periods of military rule are 
negative. Furthermore, in the Sudan, when military rulers are succeeded 
by civilians, the trends are reversed. The reinstatement Df a civilian 
administration seems to effect a significant positive shift in the 
overall level of the time series for PMAN in the Sudan (DUMMY66). 
Although civilian succession of the military in Nigeria is associated 
with a positive shift in the intercept for PMAN, the shift is not 
statistically significant. However, in both countries the slope of the 
trend lines during periods of civilian rule are not significantly 
different from the slopes of the preceding periods of military rule.
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Table 3.13







Intercept(C) 0.1784*** 13.851 0.0001 0.0676*** 3.301 0.0049
counter(C) 0.0013 0.735 0.4710 0.0137*** 5.596 0.0001
dummy72(M) 0.0118 0.648 0.5246 -0.0102 -0.571 0.5761
count72(M ) -0.0166*** -5.752 0.0001 -0.0046 -1.539 0.1446
dummy82(C) 0.06991** 2.460 0.0231 0.0224 0.658 0.5207
count.82(C) 0.0296*” „3.067 0.0061 -0.0393*** -3.393 0.0040
Fb=0.8345 R=0.8964
PHEALTH <OLS) (OLS)
Intercept 0.017^** 9.463 0.0001 0.0057** 2.530 0.0216
counter -0.0001 -0.218 0.8296 0.0006** 2.172 0.0443
dummy72 -0.0042 -1.594 0.1266 0.0041** 2.146 0.0466
count72 -O.OOO'f -2.064 0.0523 -0.0004 -1.105 0.2845
dummy82 0.0021 0.515 0.6119 -0.0005 -0.176 0.8624
countB2 0.0008 .605 .5521 -0.0018* -1.919 0.0719
FT=0.8049 F£0.8049
PEDUC (01 S) (2nd)
Intercept 0.0304*** 12.062 0.0001 0.0183*** 8.169 0.0001
counter 0.0000 0.011 0.9915 0.0010*** 3.782 0.0018
dummy72 0.0042 1.161 0.2593 0.0030 1 .540 0.1444
count72 -0.002EP* -4.894 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.995 0.3357
dummy82 0.0069 1.236 0.2308 0.0072* 2.000 0.0640
count82 0.004^* „ 2.537 0.0196 -0.0076*** -6.035 0.0001
R^=0.8136 $=0.9183
PDEFEN (OLS) (OLS)
Intercept -0.0012 -0.326 0.7479 0.0225* 1.886 0.0836
counter 0.002cf** 3.902 0.0009 -2.4286 -- --
dummy72 0.0141** 2.599 0.0172 0 -- --
count72 -0.004:#** -5.042 0.0001 0.0026 1 .354 0.2055
dummy82 0.0053 0.622 0.5409 -0.0069 -0.274 0.7896
count82 0.0045 . 1.581 0.1295 -0.0052 -0.647 0.5321
R"=0.7305 F^O. 1639
*.05<prob.<.10 




Similar inconsistencies are noticeable in the very important 
agricultural sector. For example, the return to civilian rule is 
associated with a short-term decrease in the overall level of the time 
series for PAGRIC in Nigeria (DUHHY80) and the Sudan (DUMHY66), whereas 
military intervention in both countries (DUMMY67 and DUMHY70) is 
associated with the opposite trend. However, military intervention in 
Liberia (DUNNY81) is associated with a decrease in the overall time 
series for PAGRIC. Although all the shifts in the overall level of the 
time series for PAGRIC are not significant, there are significant 
positive shifts in the slope of the trend lines in Ethiopia (C0UNT76), 
Liberia (C0UNT81), Sudan (C0UNT66) and Nigeria (C0UNT80). Whereas the 
positive trends in Ethiopia and Liberia are associated with military 
rule, similar trends in Nigeria and the Sudan are associated with 
civilian rule. A significant negative shift in the slope of the trend 
line is also associated with military rule in the Sudan (C0UNT70).
Since no clear evidence of policy sensitivity to regime type is 
present, it is not necessary to analy2e the results of the HITS analysis 
for the countries in the "control group."
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Perhaps the most important indicator of economic performance is 
the gross domestic product (GDP). Table 3.1A shows the annual 
percentage change in GDP (1960-1985) for twelve selected countries and 
Table 3.15 shows the average annual percentage increase in GDP under 
military and civilian rule. As can been clearly discerned from these 
tables, the effect of public' policy on GDP is not consistent within 
regime types. The tables show that gains in GDP are registered under
Table 3.14
Annual Percentage Change in Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1980 Prices, 1960-1985*
YEAR BOTSWANA ETHIOPIA GHANA KENYA LIBERIA MALAWI NIGER NIGERIA RWANDA TANZANIA ZAIRE ZAMBIA
1960 _ . - _ . _ - _ . _ . .
1961 7.1 1.7 6.1 - - 4.9 4.1 3.3 -2.0 - 5.4 -2.1
1962 7.0 0.6 4.8 - - 1.5 11.6 5.7 1.3 - 4.3 1.4
1963 4.8 2.7 3.5 - - 2.1 4.3 8.4 -1.1 - 4.9 2.2
1964 13.6 4.9 2.6 - - 11.8 -5.9 6.1 -5.1 - 3.9 17.8
1965 -5.4 5.9 1.4 -0.3 1.7 2.1 6.7 2.6 8.9 - 3.4 18.4
1966 6.5 3.9 0.1 10.9 19.0 9.9 23.3 -2.0 0.4 12.8 12.1 13.4
1967 7.0 4.5 -2.3 1.2 -0.7 5.6 -3.4 -20.7 9.5 4.0 2.3 12.8
1968 1.9 3.0 6.4 8.6 4.8 -0.2 -7.8 12.6 9.3 5.2 4.3 7.5
1969 15.1 6.0 5.8 5.5 7.3 6.4 -1.6 26.8 11.0 1.8 9.1 18.7
1970 14.9 3.6 6.7 7.4 6.5 1.5 9.3 29.8 11.0 5.8 9.6 -13.7
1971 17.2 4.5 5.6 6.9 5.0 14.4 -3.4 18.4 1.2 4.2 6.0 0.1
1972 29.8 4.8 -2.5 16.1 3.8 0.2 -7.6 7.3 0.2 6.7 0.1 9.8
1973 24.8 2.7 15.3 -2.3 -2.5 1.6 -10.9 -5.0 3.4 3.1 8.1 -1.0
1974 24.2 1.4 3.4 10.8 7.4 7.4 6.2 12.1 0.7 2.5 3.1 6.7
1975 -1.3 0.1 -12.9 0.8 -15.1 5.5 20.5 -3.0 2.0 5.7 -5.0 -2.4
1976 16.5 2.3 -3.5 3.9 4.0 6.2 15.3 10.9 1.8 20.7 -5.2 4.3
1977 2.3 0.6 2.3 9.4 -0.8 4.3 2.8 8.1 5.1 2.8 0.8 -4.3
1978 18.3 -1.1 8.5 7.2 3.9 8.3 9.8 -7.3 9.8 2.9 -5.3 0.6
1979 12.1 5.3 -3.2 3.9 4.4 3.3 3.8 2.5 9.4 1.2 0.3 -3.1
1980 14.0 5.5 0.0 4.8 -4.7 -0.4 2.1 5.3 -3.6 0.8 2.4 3.1
1981 8.7 6.2 -1.8 3.9 -4.4 -5.2 -6.3 -8.4 2.5 -1.1 2.9 6.2
1982 -2.3 1.9 -7.2 1.7 -2.1 2.8 - -3.2 4.1 1.3 -3.0 -2.8
1983 24.0 4.3 0.7 3.7 -3.3 3.5 - -6.3 - -0.4 1.3 -2.0
1984 20.1 - - 0.4 -3.0 4.5 - -5.2 - 2.5 2.7 -1.3
1985 8.0 - - 3.9 -0.9 4.1 - 5.2 - -0.2 2.5 4.4
*Bold type indicates military governmental periods
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civilian as well as under military rule. Similarly declines in GDP 
occur under both regime types. The results in Table 3.15 show that the 
only statistically significant difference in regime performance occurred 
in t iberia where the GDP increased by a yearly average of 3.24 percent 
under civilian rule and decreased by a yearly average of 3.08 percent 
under the military.
Summary and Conclusion
The picture that emerges from this analysis suggests that most 
military and civilian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are 
indistinguishable in terms of economic policy outputs and outcomes. 
However, there is one category of public expenditure in which there 
appears to be a clear distinction between the two regime types. It is 
clearly evident from the various statistical techniques employed in this 
study that military regimes in most of the African countries included in 
this study spent significantly more on defense than their nonmilitary 
predecessors and successors. But, the results also show that there are 
a few countries in which the reverse is the case with civilian rulers 
spending more than their military counterparts on defense. However, in 
these few exceptional cases PDEFEN under military and civilian 
administrations are not significantly different.
The results of the MITS analysis also seem to suggest that the 
difference between military and civilian rulers in the area of defense 
spending is directly related to the budgetary priorities of each regime 
type immediately following regime change. The results show that the 
budgetary allocation to defense tends to undergo a significant increase 
immediately following a successful military coup. But upon achieving a
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Table 3.15
Percentage of Change in Gross Domestic Product 
at Constant 19B0 Prices (CGDP80)
COUNTRY MILITARY(a ) CIVILIAN(a+b) t Siq.
Beni n 0.0591 0.0595 0.0065 0.9999
Burkina Faso 0.0877 -0.0167 -1.0769 0.3013
Burundi 0.0909 0.0367 -0.3 110 0.9333
Ethiopia 0.0878 0.0359 0.9115 0.3709
Ghana 0.0073 0.0317 0.9788 0.3391
Liber ia* -0.0308 0.0389 8.1316 0.0963
Madagascar -0.0088 -0.0077 -0.1188 0.9070
Niger 0.0677 -0.0569 -1.8099 0.8909
Ni ger i a 0.0566 0.0158 -0.8996 0.3803
Rwanda 0.0359 0.091B 0.8909 0.7797
Sierra Leone 0.0900 0.0958 0.1891 0.9086
Uganda -0.0061 0.0089 0.5605 0.5839
TOTAL
(All Nat ions n=85)
0.0851 0.0378 1.9931 0.1997




new and higher level of spending for defense, the average yearly 
percentage changes in defense spending under military rule are not 
evidently dissimilar from average yearly percentage changes under 
civilian rule. This finding is consistent with Valerie Bunce’s (1979, 
1980, 1981) contention that changes in political leadership has 
significant short-run impact on budgetary changes but very little long- 
run impact. However the results for Ethiopia (see Table 3.10) also show 
that the time series after military intervention underwent a significant 
positive shift in both the intercept and the slope.
In Chapter One, three contrasting views on the effect of military 
rule on economic development were presented. The first of these views 
suggested that military rulers were progressive forces promoting 
economic growth and the modernization of the economic and social 
structures of Third World countries (Pye 1968; Daadler 1963; Cohen 1985; 
Sloan and Tedin 1987), while the second view saw military rulers as 
conservative or even reactionary forces (Nordlinger 1970; Feit 1973; 
Welch and Smith 1974; Berg-Schlosser 1984). Although the regression 
results for PDEFEN appear to lend some credence to views espoused by 
Nordlinger (1970) and Welch and Smith (1974), that military rule focuses 
primarily on policies that serve the narrow interests of the armed 
forces, the overall results show that African military rulers and their 
civilian counterparts cannot be distinguished by their budgetary 
priorities or by the economic outcomes of their policy initiatives.
By most measures of economic performance, the results clearly fail 
to show that the performance of one regime type is superior to the
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other. The use of GDP in determining a country’s economic efficiency 
remains a standard) albeit imperfect) measure. As demonstrated in 
Tables 3.1^ and 3.15? measures of GDP <at constant 1980 prices)) fails 
to distinguish between the two regime types. Trying to reduce some of 
the problems associated with using a single indicator of economic 
performance <GDP) by adding measures of industrial and agricultural 
production served only to emphasize the suggestion that regime type is 
not associated with policy outcomes.
Although results from some of the simple country studies seem to 
suggest otherwise) there is no consistency in the pattern of the 
association between regime type and policy outcomes. It seems safe 
therefore) to conclude that the results of the foregoing analysis 
support the more recent views (McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Jackman 1976), 
which suggests that public policy is not sensitive to changes in regime 
type. The results suggest that it may be risky to presume) as some 
studies seem to have done? that either military or civilian regimes act 
as monolithic bodies whose policy priorities and effect on economic 
performance can be clearly differentiated from one another. The MITS 
results for the selected pairs of countries reported in Tables 3.10 to 
3.13) lend further credence to this conclusion.
But where do we go from here? An obvious next step is to attempt 
to find out why there appears to be so little difference between two 
distinctly dissimilar African regime types. This) as I have already 
noted) is not a task which easily lends itself to the quantitative 
method. A more critical analysis of the policy implications of regime 
type will require an in-depth study of some countries which have had
experience with both military and civilian regimes. It is expected that 
these case studies will yield a better understanding of the variations 
in the policy process that are missed by aggregate-data studies.
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Endnotes
1. OLS estimates were used for those equations where there were no
autocorrelated errors. However, time series regression models 
often suffer from the problem of autocorrelated error terms, which 
renders OLS regression inappropriate. Where this problem was 
evident, each equation was re-estimated to control for
autocorrelation of the error variable.
In order to obtain reliable estimated parameter values for the 
models used in this analysis, a two-step process was undertaken. 
First, I examined the plots of the autocorrelation function (ACF) 
and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) for each model 
tested. From these plots it was possible— using the criteria 
suggested by Cook and Campbell (1979) and Hibbs (1974)— to detect 
the existence of autocorrelation as well as to make an estimate of
the order of the autoregressive process.
In those cases in which there was a significant autocorrelation 
problem, the model parameter values had to be re-estimated using a 
standard Cochrane-Orcott procedure found in SAS AUTOREG program. 
The result is a set of improved parameter estimates that are
consistent and undisturbed by autocorrelation. See Hibbs (1974), 
Ostrom (1978), Cook and Campbell (1979), McDowell, et al. (1981) 
and Garand (1985).
8. Shifts in the level of the time series reflect the immediated
short-term impact of an intervention (in this instance the 
installation of a new regime). Shifts in the slope of the time 
series reflect the long-term impact of the intervention.
Chapter Four
REGIME TYPE AND THE ECONOMY: AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN GHANA
The situations under which African states have been governed have 
been s d  varied that the continent provides one of the best settings 
within which to test the assumption that regime type is correlated with 
public policy. Of all the countries on the African continent, perhaps 
none is more suitable to test this assumption than Ghana.
Ghana is ideal for investigating the relationship between regime 
type and public policy because it is one of only seven nations in sub- 
Saharan Africa to have experienced all three of the systems of 
government identified in Chapter Two (competitive, one-party, and 
military). Furthermore, of these seven countries (Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda), Ghana, 
is the only one for which fairly reliable data are available.
In later pages, the Ghanaian experience since independence in 1957 
will be laid out in an effort to answer the two questions posed at the 
beginning of the last chapter about the consequences of civilian and 
military rule— what are the budgetary priorities of each regime type and 
what are the socioeconomic consequences of the governance of each regime 
type?
Historical Background 
Ghana was formed by a merger of the Gold Coast, a former British 
colony, and the British-administered part of Togoland, a United Nation 
Trust Territory. The country attained independence on 6 March, 1957, 
under the premiership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. In the initial years of
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independence Ghana maintained its pre-independence political 
institutions, (Westminster-type parliamentary system that had been 
instituted a few years before independence). Nkrumah had first become 
Prime Minister in 1952, after his Convention People’s Party (CPP) won 
the British-administered general elections of 1951. Nkrumah continued 
in power after the CPP won 71 seats in the 104-seat legislative assembly 
in another British supervised general election in 1956.
Soon after Ghana became independent, Nkrumah began to take steps 
to consolidate his power. The CPP government introduced laws which 
effectively banned opposition political parties (Boahen 1975, 194).
Those individuals who continued to be critical of the Nkrumah 
administration were detained under provisions of the Preventive 
Detention Act (Boahen 1975, 194; Woronoff 1972, 65-66).1 Consequently, 
by 1960 the parliamentary Opposition had become a negligible force.
The CPP consolidated its control over unions, farmers, business, 
the press, youth and women’s organizations. Civil servants were also 
pressured into becoming members of the CPP. The party reached into 
every village and directed every aspect of social and political life in 
the country (Kraus 1971, 59)/
On July 1, 1960, Ghana was declared a Republic. The new 
Constitution provided for an executive President who was elected for 
life and specified by name: Kwame Nkrumah. The cabinet was responsible
to the President who appointed and could dismiss ministers. The 
Constitution provided for a parliament with powers to debate issues and 
reject government proposals with which it is dissatisfied. In practice 
this provision was pointless since the Constitution also empowered the
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President to enact legislation by decree in the "national interest"
(Woronoff 1972, 67). By the end of 1960, multipartism was, for all
intents and purposes, nonexistent in Ghana. However, it was not until
February 1964, following a referendum which was widely reported to have
been manipulated by the government, that Ghana officially became a one-
party state (Fellow and Chazan 1986, 46; Woronoff 1972, 67).
In the early 1960s, a decline in the world cocoa price— cocoa is
the mainstay of Ghana’s economy— hampered Ghana’s economic development.
Budget deficits became the norm as increases in expenditures rapidly
outpaced revenues. The government introduced an austerity budget in
1961 and borrowed extensively both locally and abroad (Pel low and Chazan
1986, 44, Kraus 1971, 54; Baynham 1988, 206). By the beginning of 1966,
the declining state of the economy and Nkrumah’s authoritarian rule had
coalesced to generate grievances in many sectors of Ghanaian society.
The state of the economy was also cause for concern within the
armed forces. Because of declining revenue, the Nkrumah regime was
forced to reduce spending on defense. Army officers blamed Nkrumah for
Ghana’s economic woes and its negative impact on the military. For
example, Brigadier A.A. Afrifa noted that:
because of bad planning, economic mismanagement, and 
political interference, this army was rendered incapable, 
ill equipped, and had virtually been reduced to a rabble.
By Christmas 1965 a number of our troops were without 
equipment and clothing, things essential for the pride, 
morale, and efficiency of the soldier. There was an acute 
accommodation problem due to a rash military expansion 
scheme that Kwame Nkrumah had launched. It was shameful to 
see a Ghanaian soldier in a tattered and ragged uniform, and 
sometimes without boots during his training period (Afrifa 
1966, 104).
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By the end of 1965* it was clear that Nkrumah and the CPP had lost 
the confidence of the Bhanaian people, including the army and police. 
Thus, on February 24, 1966, a group of army officers, led by Colonel 
E.K. Kotoka, Police Commissioner J.W.K. Harlley, and A.A. Afrifa, 
overthrew the Nkrumah regime while Nkrumah was on a visit to China.
The coup was greeted with overwhelming and spontaneous jubilation 
by Ghanaians. Support for the coup came from all social sectors, and 
the CPP which had ruled Ghana for fifteen years virtually disintegrated 
overnight (Baynham 1988, 205). The coup makers established a National 
Liberation Council <NLC) to administer the affairs of the country. It 
was headed by General Joseph Ankrah, who had previously been forced into 
retirement by Nkrumah. The new military leaders suspended the 1960 
Constitution and announced their intention to "govern by decrees which 
shall have the force of law until a new constitution is promulgated." 
Parliament was dissolved; the CPP was declared illegal; all political 
parties were banned; and some 900 political prisoners were released 
<Baynham 1988, 218; Pinkney 1972, 97).
The Ghanaian military in 1966 was clearly ill-equipped to govern. 
Not only was the officer corps small, but, as a result of rapid 
expansion and Africani2ation of the army, virtually all command and 
staff posts were occupied by officers who were, on the whole, younger, 
less well-educated and less experienced than should ordinarily have been 
the case (Baynham 1988, 220). Shortages of appropriately trained 
personnel made it impossible for the military to govern alone. 
Consequently, the NLC had to rely heavily upon top civil servants, 
former opposition politicians, and university lecturers (Kraus 1971, 65).
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The popularity of the new military regime was greatly enhanced by 
an official early announcement that its stay in power would be brief.
The NLC promised to hand over power to a democratically-elected 
government within the shortest possible time. This promise was backed 
up by the establishment (in September of 1966) of a commission to draft 
a new constitution. The regime also tried to improve its popular 
standing by deploying army units for community projects? such as 
"Operation Yellow Pod" which involved carting hundreds of bags of cocoa 
from remote rural areas. Another undertaking was "Exercise Abongo-Omo," 
in which army units performed useful tasks, such as road repairs 
(Baynham 1988, 219).
In spite of its popularity at home, and massive infusion of 
economic assistance from the West, the NLC was unable, however, to make 
any significant improvements in the economy. Unemployment rose as 
government spending in the productive sectors of the economy, such as 
industries and agriculture, was drastically reduced (Price 1971b, 370). 
After three and one-half years of NLC rule, the problems which beset the 
country at the time of Nkrumah’s ouster continued to exist. For 
example, corruption and economic mismanagement became worse. Early in 
1969, having been accused of corruption NLC chairman, General Ankrah, 
was removed from office and replaced by Brigadier A.A. Afrifa (Kraus 
1971, 70; Price 1971b, 377).
A new constitution was promulgated in mid-1969. It established a 
political system based upon the concept of separation of powers. It 
provided for a President, elected by an electoral college, and a Prime 
Minister appointed by the President from the majority party in the
140
Assembly. On May 1, the ban on political parties was lifted and soon 
thereafter many political parties were formed. The major parties were: 
the Progressive Party (PP), headed by Professor Kofi Busia; the National 
Alliance of Liberals INAL), led by Komla Gbedemah, the United 
Nationalist Party (UNP), led by Joe Appiah; and the All People’s 
Republican Party, led by P.K.K. Quaidoo. Then, in the general elections 
held in August 1969, Busia’s Progressive Party won 59 percent of the
votes, taking 105 of the 140 National Assembly seats.
The first priority of the new civilian regime was to clean up the 
economic mess left by the NLC military government. In pursuit of this 
objective, the Busia administration took a variety of steps. Initially,
in order to combat the problem of rising unemployment it enacted the
Aliens Compliance Order, which called for the expulsion of all 
foreigners from Ghana. This was followed by the Ghanaian Business Bill, 
which prohibited foreign ownership of small retail companies. However, 
these measures did little to protect Ghana’s economy from foreign 
domination (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 54).
There was also a campaign to eliminate bribery and corruption.
The Center for Civic Education was established to instruct Ghanaians 
about their rights and obligations as citizens. During the anti­
corruption campaign, in what has been described as a politically 
motivated purge, the Busia government summarily dismissed over 500 civil 
servants (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 55).
Under the PP government, Ghana’s economy, in spite of higher world 
cocoa prices, remained stagnant. After only two years in office, the PP 
government accumulated debts equal to those compiled by Nkrumah’s CPP in
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nine years (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 56). The fall in world cocoa prices 
in late 1971 forced the government to devalue the cedi (the Ghanaian 
unit of currency), and make cuts in public spending, including military 
spending.
In January 1972, in the wake of increasing economic and political 
difficulties, the army again seized power. Busia was in London 
undergoing medical treatment when his government was toppled. The 
constitution and all political institutions were abolished and replaced 
by a National Redemption Council (NRC) under the chairmanship of Lt.
Col. (later General) Ignatius Acheampong.
The policy objective of the NRC, as presented in the National 
Redemption Charter, was to bring about, "a complete and systematic 
transformation of our peoples into a self-reliant nation, unique in its 
economic, social, cultural, political, technological and all-round 
development, a united nation with a spirit of its own" (The Charter of 
the NRC 1973, cited in Pellow and Chazan 1986, 56-57; Rothchild 1980, 
467).
In 1975, major governmental changes took place, and ultimate 
legislative and administrative authority was transferred from the NRC to 
a Supreme Military Council (SMC), also led by Gen. Acheampong. In 1978, 
after six years in office, the initiatives of Acheampong’s government 
had failed to produce any significant economic gains for Ghana. To be 
sure, by its corruption and mismanagement, Acheampong’s military regime 
had created an economic crisis— with severe shortages in foreign 
exchange and consumer goods, and high inflation rates (Pellow and Chazan 
1986, 58). The consequence was massive civilian protest and a palace
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coup which removed Acheampong from office, in July of 1978. Acheampong 
was succeeded by his deputy, Lt. Gen. Frederick Akuffo, who immediately 
upon assuming office, declared that the return to a popularly-elected 
government would take place in July of 1979.
Akuffo adopted stringent economic measures as demanded by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example, increases in public 
expenditure were curtailed and the Ghanaian currency was devalued 58.2 
percent (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 59). Yet these measures did not bring 
about the anticipated improvements in Ghana’s economy. Economic decline 
continued, with inflation reaching 300 percent by October of 1978.
As one of the steps toward the return to civilian rule, local 
elections were held in November of 1978, and in December, a Constituent 
Assembly was set up to draw up a new constitution. The six-year ban on 
party politics was lifted in January of 1979. On June 4, only two weeks 
before the elections were due to take place, the Akuffo government was 
toppled in a coup staged by junior officers of the armed forces led by 
Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) headed by Rawlings, was established as the new government. 
Rawlings announced that the purpose of the AFRC was limited to "house 
cleaning," to bringing to justice those former rulers who were 
responsible for Ghana’s socioeconomic woes, and to restoring the 
reputation of the armed forces (Legum 1981, B496).
Upon assuming power, the AFRC had announced that the elections 
would be held as scheduled on the 18th of June, but that civilian rule 
would be delayed by at least three months. Eleven presidential 
candidates participated in the campaign leading up to the elections.
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Seven of the candidates were sponsored by political parties. The 
People's National Party (PNP), an Nkrumahist party, won 71 of 140 seats 
in the parliamentary elections held on the 18th of June. On the 9th of 
July, in a run-off election for the presidency, the PNP candidate, Dr. 
Hilla Limann, defeated the Popular Front Party’s Victor Owusu. Dr. 
Limann assumed office on September 24, 1979.
The Third Republic fell victim to criticism from the start. The 
mere transition to civilian rule could not reverse Ghana’s desperate 
economic plight. Ghanaians continued to suffer great hardships. 
Inflation remained high, and the shortage in foreign exchange caused 
shortages in almost everything including consumer items such as milk, 
soap, toilet paper, and spare parts for cars and trucks (Legum 1981,
B486).
In addition to economic problems, Limann had to cope with the 
conflict between the ideologues (or "Nkrumahists") and the pragmatists 
within the PNP. The President assumed a centrist position, and at the 
annual party congress in Kumasi in 1980, told the delegates that it was 
possible to be an Nkrumahist without being an ideologue: "Our present
duty is to lay firm foundations for the drive towards full attainment of 
the goals for which the Osagyefo lived, worked and died in agonizing 
exile" (Legum 1981, B489).
His appeal for party unity went unanswered, and when Alhaji Imorti 
Egala, "Father" of the PNP died suddenly of a heart attack, an 
unpleasant struggle for party leadership ensued. While this was going 
on, the PNP administration’s credibility was severely damaged by a 
scandal in which serious allegations of financial mismanagement were
made against people close to the President. By the end of 1981, 
therefore the PNP was fragmented; and with cocoa production at their 
lowest levels since independence, the economy was on the verge of total 
collapse. These events did not help the cause of democracy in Ghana.
Assisted by the military, Jerry Rawlings, now retired from the 
armed forces, seized power for a second time on December* 31, 1981. He 
cited corruption and the continuing economic decline as the reason for 
his intervention. After the coup, the constitution was abolished, 
parliament dissolved, and political parties were banned. Widespread 
pro-Rawlings demonstrations early in January of 1988, indicated the 
popularity of Rawlings and the coup. A Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC), comprising four military personnel and three civilians, 
was established to manage the affairs of the country. Rawlings assumed 
the chairmanship of the PNDC.
At the start the new regime was characterized by radical rhetoric, 
calling for the creation of a new Ghanaian society based on egalitarian 
values. People’s socialism was to be the vehicle for the establishment 
of this new society. In an effort to get the people involved in the 
decision-making process several national and local committees were 
established (Pellow and Chazan 1986, 79).^
The PNDC adopted a series of measures that would help improve the 
economy and eradicate corruption. These measures proved to be 
ineffective and by May of 1983, university students, initially 
supporters of the PNDC were demonstrating their resentment against many 
of the government’s policies. As Ghana’s economic decline persisted, 
the PNDC was forced to abandon radical and ideologically based
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approaches in favor of more cautious and conventional approaches to 
economic management. Thus Ghana had to reach agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and in 1983 it embarked on a 
conventional IMF adjustment program. Among other changes, the PNDC 
agreed to maintain budgetary restrictions and to devalue the country’s 
currency. Consequently, in October of 1983, the cedi was devalued by 
almost 100 percent (Bienen 1987, 54).
Towards the end of 1985, there were signs that Ghana’s economy was 
recovering. The growth in the country’s average GDP for 1984-1985 was 
nearly twice as high as the year before and there was a significant 
decline in inflation. Despite these improvements, Ghana’s fundamental 
economic problems persisted, with major difficulties in the coordination 
of developmental plans. As 1985 drew to a close, it was not yet clear 
whether the PNDC would succeed in bringing to an end over a quarter 
century of economic decline in Ghana.
The forgoing discussion clearly shows that, irrespective of regime 
type, successive Ghanaian administrations have had no success in dealing 
with the socioeconomic problems which has plagued Ghana since 
independence. However, in order to discern clearly the impact of regime 
type in Ghana, the performance of successive regimes as it relates to a 
major sector of the country’s economy must be evaluated. Agriculture 
has always been the principal sector of Ghana’s economy, accounting for 
over one-third of GDP and employing almost two-thirds of the working 
population. Consequently, in the remainder of this chapter, 
agricultural policy under alternating civilian and military regimes from 
Nkrumah (1957-1966) to Rawlings <1981 — ) will be evaluated (the first
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Rawlings administration lasted only a few months and will, therefore, 
receive only brief mention).
Agricultural Policy 
Agriculture Under Colonial Rule
For the most part, the policies of British trading companies and 
the British colonial government were responsible for making agriculture 
the dominant sector of Ghana’s economy. The major trading companies 
including the United Africa Company (UAC), Cadburys and Holts along with 
the colonial administration greatly stimulated agricultural activities 
in Ghana, by setting up agricultural colleges, introducing new and 
improved varieties of crops and providing the necessary infrastructure 
of railways, roads and ports. Local branches of British commercial 
banks were established to supply farmers with credit and agencies were 
set up to deal with the purchase, grading and shipment of crops (Jones 
1976, 233). The emphasis during the colonial era was on cash crop 
production to meet the European demands for tropical agricultural 
products.
The success of the efforts of the colonial government and the 
trading companies was reflected in the record production and export of 
Ghana’s major cash crop, cocoa. Cocoa was first introduced into Ghana 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, but it was only after the 
First World War that the country’s export trade really became 
significant. The volume of cocoa exports rose from 80 pounds in 1881 to 
two million pounds in 1901 and to 88.9 million pounds in 1911. This 
made Ghana the world’s leading producer of cocoa. The export of cocoa
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continued to rise until it reached the record figure of 305j000 tons in 
1936 (Boahen, Ade-Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 128).
In 1948, the colonial administration established the Cocoa 
Marketing Board (CMB) as Ghana’s sole buyer, grader, seller and exporter 
of cocoa. The ostensible purpose was to protect the Ghanaian cocoa 
farmer from the fluctuations of the world commodities market. The CMB 
bought all Ghanaian produced cocoa at a controlled and stable price and 
resold it on the world market at the then current world market price.
By setting the domestic price lower than the world price, the colonial 
administrators hoped to build a reserve fund which could be used to 
develop the country’s economy and to pay local farmers in the event of a 
shortfall in world prices (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966, 40).
Despite the fact that the greater portion of the CMB reserves were 
diverted to Britain, for use in rebuilding her shattered postwar 
economy, Ghanaian agriculture was still able to make some impressive 
contributions to Ghana’s economy. For example, CMB reserves were used 
to build roads, dispensaries, clinics, wells, watei— catchment devices, 
maternity and community centers, and schools (Pedler 1979, 90). At the 
time of independence in 1957, Nkrumah and his CPP government were able 
to inherit a buoyant economy, with a per capita national income higher 
than any in Africa outside of South Africa (Omari 1970, 100). The 
colonial government also handed down to the CPP government foreign 
reserves amounting to about 200 million pounds and a foreign debt of 
only 20 million pounds (Boahen 1975, 192). Nkrumah and the CPP had 
every reason to be optimistic about the future.
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Agricultural Policy Under the Nkrumah Administration (1957-1966)
From his writings and speeches, Nkrumah made it abundantly clear 
that he was a Marxist who was determined to push through a socialist 
program of political and economic development (Nkrumah 1957; 196S). In 
his autobiography published in 1957, Nkrumah had stated that capitalism 
was too complicated a system for a newly independent nation to adopt 
(Nkrumah 1957). Moreover, less than a month before independence, on 
February E5, 1957, Nkrumah told the CPP’s National Delegates’ Conference 
that he would construct in Ghana a "socialist pattern of society"
(Boahen 1975, 197).
In view of Nkrumah’s avowed commitment to socialism, observers 
were expecting some really revolutionary measures in the economic field. 
However, contrary to all expectations, Nkrumah’s CPP government did not 
take any decisive step towards adopting a socialist pattern of 
development. In spite of pressure exerted on the government by the more 
radical members of the CPP, including C.K.K. Baah, W.A. Wiafe, and 3.R. 
Asiedu, who advocated the indigenization of retail trade and the 
introduction of restrictions on import-export trade, the CPP government 
refrained from taking any actions that might curb the dominant position 
of foreign companies in these fields.
It was only in two fields, the purchasing of cocoa and banking, 
that any real changes occurred. The Ghana Farmers’ Marketing 
Cooperative established in May of 1957 and the Ghana Cooperative 
Marketing Association, using licensed indigenous buying agents, soon 
became the major purchasers of Ghanaian cocoa. This partial 
indigenization of cocoa purchasing, was welcomed by most of the foreign
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companies involved in the cocoa trade. In time, these companies 
including the UTC, UAC, GBO» SAT, and CFAO, voluntarily withdrew from 
the domestic cocoa purchasing business (Boahen 1975, 19B).
Apart from the fields of cocoa purchasing and banking (the Ghana 
Bank was established in 1957 as the central bank) the other economic 
sectors experienced no change whatsoever. Nkrumah continued on the 
economic path laid down by the former colonial administration. Thus,
although Nkrumah desired to institute a program for the rapid 
industrialization of Ghana and the diversification of the one-crop 
(cocoa) economy, his government exercised restraint, being guided by 
pragmatic, as opposed to ideological, considerations.
In the first three years of independence, the economic policies of 
the CPP government produced some significant gains for the country. Its 
open door policy attracted some foreign capital for the construction of 
new industries. During this period, Ghanaians experienced an 
unprecedented increase in their standard of living (Omari 1972, 100; 
Boahen 1975, 200). However, the repatriation of profits by foreign 
cooperations, together with the decline in world cocoa prices, placed a 
tremendous burden on the country’s foreign reserves. To arrest this 
adverse trend, new policy measures were initiated.
The new policy measures were consistent with Nkrumah’s Marxist 
rhetoric. A socialist type, mixed economy replaced the free market- 
dominated, mixed economy of the immediate post-independence years. E.N. 
Omaboe, Chairman of the National Economic Committee has suggested that 
this change was prompted by Nkrumah’s desire to emulate the impressive
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economic achievements of the communist countries which he had visited in 
1961 (Omari 1972, 102-103).
The new policy priorities of the CPP were included in the Third 
Development Plan (the Seven-Year Development Plan, 1963-1970) and in the 
Program of the Convention People’s Party for Work and Happiness, which 
was a comprehensive, detailed document for economic, educational, 
health, and social development. The new plans laid considerable stress 
on industrial expansion and the productivity of agriculture. The plan 
included heavy emphasis on centralized planning and the establishment of 
state-owned industries and joint ventures between the state and large 
foreign firms (Pellow and Chazan 1986, A3; Woronoff 1972, 176-91).
In implementing its new, noncapitalist, development policies the 
Nkrumah government placed its real hopes for Ghana’s economic 
advancement on industrialization. Table A.l shows the government’s 
priority for industry and mining. Of the total investment of 25 percent 
allocated to industry and mining, fully 23 percent, the highest ever, 
was public investment (Woronoff 1972, 178). Only 1A percent of total 
public expenditure was allocated to the agricultural sector.
One of the major objectives of the new policy in agriculture was 
to reduce the dependence on cocoa by diversifying production. Another 
objective was to raise productivity through improved techniques, the use 
of irrigation and modern machinery. The CPP government decided that 
these goals would be best realized through the creation of cooperatives, 
state farms and Workers’ Brigade farms.
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Table 4.1
Selected Plan Data: Seven-Year Development Plan* 1963-1970




Unallocated private 75.£ 7.4
Directly Productive 499.9 49.8
Transport equipment 6£ .9 6.£
Other physical infrastructure 109.4 10.7




Social services £3.4 £.3
Human and Social Infrastructure 101.3 19.B
Administration ££.8 £.£
Renewal of Fixed Assets 104.£ 13.8
TOTAL 1,015.0 100.0
SOURCE: Seven Year Development Plan, 1963-1964 to 1969-1970 (Accra,
Ghana, 1964).
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The Workers’ Brigade and state farms were intended as an 
instrument to alleviate urban unemployment and rural underdevelopment 
(Jones 1976) 228-29). In its efforts to promote diversification) 
government plans directed that these farms should produce palm 
oil) rubber) sugar cane5 cotton and meat (Woronoff 1972, 186). The 
Soviet government and some East European countries agreed to help manage 
the state farms. They also supplied machinery) tools) construction 
materials) fertilizers and chemicals (Smertin 1987) 112).
These farms were supposed to help increase Ghana’s cash crop 
production and produce enough food to satisfy the country’s domestic 
needs. More importantly) they were to become not only financially self- 
sufficient) but also be able to generate sufficient profits to help 
facilitate the development of other sectors of the economy. To get them 
going> the Plan provided a fair share of the agricultural budget) $26 
million for state farms and $13 million for the Workers’ Brigade farms 
(Woronoff 1972, 186).
The creation of state and Workers’ Brigade farms progressed very 
rapidly beginning with 26 such farms in 1962, and by 1966, when the CPP 
government was toppled, there were well over 100 state farms and 3^ 
Workers’ Brigade farms (Woronoff 1972, 186; Smertin 1987, 112).
The private farmers did not receive as much government support as 
their numbers and productive capacity would suggest. While the whole 
farm population may have benefitted from the million of dollars spent 
for research and for irrigation, a disproportionately larger share of 
total government expenditure went to the state farms sector.
Furthermore, in addition to reducing the prices paid to the farmers by
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the CMB, the CPP government discontinued several significant forms of 
assistance: the subsidies on insecticides and spraying machines, the
grants for replanting areas where diseased cocoa trees had been cut out, 
the traditional, end-of-season bonus to each farmer, and the practice of 
providing off-season advances without interest (Esseks 1971, 17; Berg 
1971, 209). Furthermore, the Agricultural Development Corporation 
originally established to provide assistance to private farmers was 
dissolved (Olajide 1976, 79).
The new institutions, including the United Ghana Farmers’ Council 
(UGFC— that replaced the independent National Farmers Council, which had 
been opposed to many of the government’s agricultural policies), took 
over the responsibilities of purchasing, grading, storage and 
transportation of cocoa from the farmers to the dockside (Jones 1976, 
232-37). The UGFC, which was also responsible for providing assistance 
(financial and material) to private farmers, tended to discriminate 
against those who did not belong to the cooperative movement (Berg 1971, 
209; Amonoo 1981, 128-29). The cooperative movement, like the UGFC, the 
Workers’ Brigade and many other government sponsored groups were all 
auxiliaries of the CPP.
The CPP government’s socialist-oriented agricultural policy failed 
to improve Ghana’s economic performance. Most of the state farms failed 
completely and the Workers Brigades could not even produce enough food 
to feed themselves, let alone the nation (Boahen 1975, 216). Although 
the state farming sector got most of the money, it produced very little 
in the way of output. More than 98 percent of total agricultural output
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was produced by the private sector (Smertin 1987, 1 IS—13; Berg 1971,
196).
The CMB, which the colonial administration had established in the 
1940s, gave the CPP government easy access to the savings of the 
country’s cocoa producers. The CPP not only maintained the CMB, but 
also extended its area of operation to include other crops, such as palm 
oil, coconuts, groundnuts, and bananas. The CMB reserves that were 
intended to be used to stabilize the price that farmers got for their 
produce and to promote the development of the country’s economy, were 
diverted into the coffers of the CPP (Munger 1959, iii-56; Jones 1976, 
234).
After 1961, things became worse for the farmer when the UGFC 
intervened between the him and the CMB, and ever greater proportions of 
the profits were withheld from the farmer. This fact, coupled with the 
general restrictions on consumer imports, encouraged farmers to smuggle 
cocoa and other agricultural output to neighboring countries where they 
fetched higher prices. Between ten and thirty thousand tons of cocoa 
each year are said to have been smuggled out of Ghana during the period 
1960-1965 (Berg 1971, 199).
The ideological motivated relations between the Nkrumah regime and 
the Soviet-bloc countries caused considerable harm to Ghana’s 
agricultural productivity. Agricultural machinery and other equipments 
supplied by East European countries were often not suitable for Ghana. 
For example, one East European country supplied Ghana with several 
hundred ’agricultural’ tractors which turned out to be snowplows (Omari 
1972, 108). Even when the proper type of machinery was delivered, spare
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parts were often not available, and thus servicing was seriously 
impaired.
The failure of the state farm sector, the unfavorable treatment of 
private farmers, and the lack of adequate farm machinery and spare parts 
all coalesced to bring about a decline in agricultural productivity. 
There were food shortages and food queues became a common sight in the 
major towns all across the country (Jones 1976, 25A, 258; Woronoff 1972, 
188; Boahen 1975, 216).
Perhaps the most unfavorable consequence of the CPP government’s 
agricultural policies was the slump in the cocoa industry. The 
activities of the CMB and the UGFC did only encourage smuggling of cocoa 
out of the country, but also led to a decline in the planting of cocoa 
trees. Furthermore, in order to save funds, the campaign against 
swollen shoot disease, the cocoa tree’s worst enemy, was interrupted and 
the disease returned. All of these culminated in a decline in cocoa 
production at a time when the price for cocoa on the world market was 
also falling. By the time Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, cocoa 
production which only two years earlier had reached the record level of 
580 tons per year had declined to about 380 tons per year (see Table 
A.2).
The Nkrumah years saw the gradual disappearance of the substantial 
reserve fund, which at the time of independence had amounted to some 200 
million pounds, and its replacement with a national debt of 3A9.2 
million pounds— more than seventeen times the size of the debt at the 
time of independence (West Africa 1965, 1123).
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Table 4.2
Production of F;ajor Crops (000 tons)





1948-56* 23 168 482 600 — 253.3
1957 — — — — — — n —
1958 30 183 — 1092 — 4/8 259.6
1959 — — — — — 5/3 254.2
1960 — — — — — — /3 307.7
1961 30 — — — — — /2 416.0
1962 31 — — 788 57 — /8 428.4
1963 33 183 — 1194 61 25/6 427.7
1964 43 173 1153 122 61 26/10 580.9
1965 33 209 1055 1171 61 37/22 415.7
1966 30 358 748 1171 61 44/22 381.0
1967 52 363 1134 1577 39 56/22 423.5
1968 65 301 1351 1446 62 54/25 327.0
1969 61 304 1305 1320 61 55/34 414.3
1970 69 442 1617 1596 60 60/37 396.2
1971 55 384 909 2388 102 60/37 470.0
1972 47 389 660 2813 89 61/38 415.7
1973 62 438 686 2865 122 61/38 343.0
1974 73 486 — 1770 148 23/33 382.0
1975 71 343 — 1800 110 24/34 396.0
1976 — — — 1800 60 30/32 320.0
1977 58 309 — 1800 90 15/30 271.0
1978 60 340 — 2100 80 21/30 265.0
1979 55 380 — 2200 90 21/30 290.0
1980 62 390 — 2250 92 21/30 255.0
1981 79 378 — 1650 100 21/30 247.0
1982 70 285 — 1976 110 23/30 203.0
1983 70 172 — 1729 70 25/30 160.0
1984 66 575 — 4083 90 30/30 173.0
1985 90 411 — 3076 128 42/30 212.0
*average
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United
Nations, 1961-1987.
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Agricultural Policy Under the NLC (1966-1969)
Whereas the CPP government’s economic and social policies were
based on detailed plans, the NLC assumed office with no detailed plans
for governing the country. As Brigadier A.A. Afrifa (member and later
chairman of the NLC), later remarked:
We knew we would form some kind of revolutionary council. 
Originally we had planned to set up a small high-powered 
group of civilians. We were aware that as soldiers we were 
not cut out to do politics...we thought we could stand in
briefly and put things right as quickly as possible. The
emphasis was on speed (Legon Observer, quoted in Bebler 
1973, 38; Baynham 1988, 880).
However, the NLC did recogni2e that the economy demanded immediate 
attention. Thus, on the day of the coup, an economic council, 
consisting of top civil servants, was formed to advise the new military 
government. The initial position of the new government was to reverse 
the economic policies instituted by the Nkrumah regime.
Guided by the recommendations made to the CPP government by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1965, the NLC adopted a policy of 
austerity. Thus, Nkrumah’s ambitious Seven-Year Development Plan was 
abandoned and work on several prestige projects such as Accra-Tema 
concrete motorway was stopped (Boahen 1975, 888-89; Chazan 1983, 158- 
59).
In the agricultural sector, the NLC instituted several changes.
The state monopoly on the domestic marketing of cocoa was terminated and 
Ghanaian private companies and cooperatives were invited to re-enter the 
field (Esseks 1971, 84). The UGFC was dissolved and its functions were 
transferred to the Purchasing Department of the CMB (Milburn 1977, 108).
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The NLC’s Two-Year Development Plan (1968-1970), which dealt with 
agriculture, fisheries, mining and roads, allocated substantial funds 
for the construction of agricultural feeder roads. The NLC government 
also resumed subsidies on insecticides and spraying machines, and 
reinstated the end-of-season bonuses. In response to farmers’ 
complaints about the price they received for their crops, the price paid 
to cocoa producers was revised upward. Beginning in 1966, cocoa farmers 
benefitted from four increases in the producers’ price, and in March of 
1969 were receiving twice as much for their crops as they did when the 
NLC first came to power (Esseks 1971, 24; Boahen 1975, 829). The NLC’s 
"Operation Yellow Pod" provided further assistance to the private farmer 
by deploying army units to help in the transportation of cocoa from 
remote rural areas.
The new head of state, General Ankrah indicated the NLC’s 
preference for private, rather than public, enterprise. Guided by the 
IMF recommendations, he tried to limit the number of state enterprises. 
State involvement was limited to "certain basic key projects especially 
where private capital might not be available" (Olajide 1976, 85). In 
pursuit of this new policy, the government cut down the number of state 
enterprises from 58 to 19; and of the more than 180 state-owned farms, 
only 39 were retained by the State Farms Corporation and 80 by the Young 
Farmers League (Bebler 1973, 41-42; Olajide 1976, 85). The rest were 
sold to private concerns, while others which were not viable were 
abandoned.
The NLC’s efforts to improve agricultural productivity led to 
increased emphasis on a more traditional, labor-intensive approach to
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agriculture. To facilitate the transportation of crops from the rural 
areas to the ports and inner city markets, over 450 miles of feeder 
roads were constructed between 1967 to 1969 (Rothchild 1980, 467-68). 
Despite the overall commitment to agricultural improvement, there was no 
mistaking the NLC’s priorities where public spending was concerned.
There were substantial increases in current and capital expenditures on 
the armed forces and the police.
These increases went to finance improvements in pay and 
conditions, and the purchase of new equipment for both services. 
Justifying the increases, Commissioner of Finance Brigadier A.A. Afrifa 
argued that "owing to the neglect suffered by our armed forces in the 
past, it has become imperative to re-equip the entire army to make it 
justify its existence" (Omari 1972, 164; Bayham 1988, 229). Whereas 
government spending in the non-productive defense sector was greatly 
increased, budgetary allocations to other sectors, particularly in such 
productive sectors as industry and agriculture experienced substantial 
reductions.
Despite higher world prices for cocoa, the Ghanaian economy under 
the NLC did not achieve the level of agricultural production of the pre­
coup period. During the three and one-half years of NLC rule, cocoa 
production further declined reaching a nadir of 414 tons in 1969 (Chazan 
1983, 159). Although the rising prices did permit the NLC to raise the 
purchasing price paid to farmers, it failed to halt the smuggling of the 
crop to neighboring countries. According to Robert Dowse <1969, 242), 
anything up to 20,000 tons was being smuggled to Togo and the Ivory 
Coast. Furthermore, although NLC policies led to some decline in the
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rate of inflation, there was no discernable change in the cost of 
locally produced goods, since the cost of basic foodstuffs such as 
plantain and yams remained high (Boahen 1975, 234). At the same time, 
the country actually got further into debt; there was high unemployment; 
and the median per capita income declined by an average of twenty 
dollars in the three years of the military government's tenure in office 
(Dowse 1969, 243; Chazan 1983, 159).
Agricultural Policy Under the Busia Administration (1969-1971)
Dr. Kofi Busia’s Progressive Party (PP) government assumed power
with no clearly defined economic policy. Like the NLC before it, the PP
affirmed its "support for and confidence in private enterprise" and
placed considerable stress on giving Ghanaians a "greater stake in the
economy of their own country" (Progressive Party Manifesto 1966, 5-7).
There was also, a renewed emphasis on agriculture and rural development.
In his first budget speech, J.H. Mensah, the Minister of Finance and
Economic Planning, summed up the importance of agriculture to the
nation’s economy, as follows:
Agriculture remains by far the biggest preoccupation of the 
government. Once we can be assured of adequate food 
production, of maintaining our place in the world cocoa 
market and of a reasonable supply of agricultural raw 
materials, the economy can be considered to be established 
on secure foundations. Until then we will continue to live 
insecurely, at the mercy not only of the weather at home but 
also of the evei— rising costs and vagaries of outside 
sources of supply, for the most basic requirements to 
sustain our lives (cited in Legum 1971, B354-55).
Soon after assuming power, the PP passed the Aliens Expulsion
Order, which effected the expulsion from Ghana of some tens of thousands
of people from other West African countries who did not possess valid
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residence permits. The order was ostensibly motivated by severe
unemployment in Ghana* by underemployment in the cocoa growing regions*
and by a growing resentment of alien intrusions into the field of petty
trading (Chazan 1983, 159; Killick 1978, 312). Although not
specifically an agricultural policy initiative, this first major act of
the Busia government had a significant impact on the agricultural
sector. Naomi Chazan (1983, 160) observed that "the immediate effects
of this policy were to somewhat ease the unemployment problem and to
create serious resentment among Ghana’s neighbors." More importantly
however, N.O. Addo <1972, 39), found that the expulsion worsened an
already existing shortage of agricultural labor (particularly in the
much needed seasonal agricultural sector).
Reconfirming the Busia administration’s commitment to agricultural
development, J.H. Mensah, in 1970, declared:
We aim to intensify our support to the agricultural sector 
and generally to the rural population. This policy should 
aid our search for greater self-sufficiency in food 
supplies. It should contribute to our quest for a more even 
development as between different parts of the country 
(Rothchild 1980, 468).
In line with this aim, a series of policy initiatives were put 
into effect. The new agricultural program provided incentives to 
producers, upgraded rural services, and sought to improve infrastructure 
in the countryside. Budgetary allocations for rural development and 
agriculture rose substantially as the government expanded subsidies to 
such agricultural inputs as fertilizers, seeds and implements.
Funds were also made available to cocoa farmers for use in 
seasonal advances. Furthermore, payments to cocoa producers rose to a 
new record in 1969-1970 and were sustained throughout the life of the
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Second Republic. Payments to cocoa farmers were slightly above CISOm 
(or 120 million Ghanaian cedis), in two years of the Busia government, 
as compared with an average of CB^m in the three preceding years 
(Killick 197B, 307, 324n). Apart from cocoa, the Busia administration 
made significant efforts to promote the cultivation of other crops. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the cultivation of rice and maize. To 
encourage farmers in this area, the government provided the Grains 
Development Board with a substantial budget to assist growers and 
guarantee them competitive prices for their produce (Legum 1971, B356- 
58).
To compensate for the increases in public expenditures in rural 
development and agriculture, significant cuts were made in other areas. 
For example, while the budgetary allocations for agriculture rose from 
CEO.3m, in 1968-1969 to C27.4m in 1970-1971, those for defense declined 
from C50.2m to hC*t2.7m in the same years (Rothchild 1980, 468). The 
increases were also made possible by the fact that during the first year 
of the Busia government cocoa fetched a record price on the world
l
market. Whereas in the eight preceding fiscal year government revenue 
from cocoa export duty had brought an annual average of C39.5m, in 1969- 
1970 the average was C133.7m (Killick 1978, 3E^n). When the increases 
in total government revenue from cocoa is taken into account, then the 
increases in budgetary allocations to the agricultural sector becomes 
less impressive than they at first appear.
The two years of the Busia administration was perhaps not enough 
time to assess its agricultural policies, although it did seem that the 
stress on rural development was beginning show some dividends. To carry
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out its rural development program, the Busia government established the 
Rural Development Fund in 1970 (Pellow and Chazan 1906» 55). The 
administration also instituted a National Development levy of up to 5 
percent of all incomes above C3A per month to finance the development of 
the rural areas. The administration’s achievements in this area, 
included the provision of water, electricity, feeder roads and rural 
health facilities and education. Progress was also being recorded in 
the production of rice (Killick 1978, 311; Chazan 1983, 160-68).
The most important economic measure for which the PP government is 
perhaps best remembered was its 88 percent devaluation of the cedi in 
December of 1971. The devaluation was prompted by the fall in world 
cocoa prices, a commodity which still accounted for about 65 percent of 
Ghana’s foreign exchange earnings. By the time of the military 
intervention on January 13, 1978, the Busia regime had accumulated debts 
equal to those compiled by Nkrumah’s CPP government in nine years 
(Pel low and Chazan 1986, 56).
Agricultural Policy Under the NRC/SMC (1978-1979)
Unlike the NLC and PP governments, the new military government 
under General Acheampong had definite views about the economy and on how 
it intended to tackle Ghana’s economic problems. Thus, immediately 
following the coup, Acheampong’s NRC moved swiftly to implement some 
short term remedies to the country's problems. The cedi was revalued by 
over AO percent, and a number of medium term debts, contracted during 
the Nkrumah era, were repudiated (Austin 1980, A33).
The long-term policy objectives of the NRC was presented in their 
January, 1973 Charter of Redemption. According to the charter, the
16A
NRC’s policy objectives were aimed toward "a complete and systematic 
transformation of our peoples into a self-reliant nation, unique in its 
economic, social, cultural, political, technological and all-round 
development, a united nation with a spirit of its own" (The Charter of 
the National Redemption Council 1973; Pellow and Chazan 1986, 57).
A practical step to promote self-reliance was manifested by the 
launching of Operation Feed Yourself (OFY), a plan for the development 
of food self-sufficiency. The OFY program sought to increase the 
production of foodstuffs (rice, maize, cassava, yams, groundnuts, 
plantain, and millet) for the domestic market. It was hoped that 
increasing the domestic production of foodstuffs will ensure the 
availability of Ghana’s basic food requirements at reasonable prices and 
arrest the country’s excessive dependence on imports. OFN demonstrated 
the NRC’s commitment to self-reliance by means of agricultural 
expansion. The new government’s commitment to improving agricultural 
productivity was further demonstrated when it designated the 1972-197A 
period as "agricultural years" (Rothchild 1980, 468). A related policy 
measure, Operation Feed Your Industries (OFYI), was designed to produce 
raw materials (e.g., cotton, tobacco, oil palm, and sugarcane) for use 
by Ghanaian industries.
Public expenditure on agriculture rose steadily throughout the 
NRC’s tenure in office. Whereas budgetary allocations to agriculture 
was C29.2m in the 1971-1972 financial year, it rose to C37m in 1975- 
1976, C53m in 1976-1977, and C65m in 1977-1978. In addition, 
significant investments were made in the agricultural sector by both 
public and private lending agencies. Government loans, at very generous
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terms, were extended to farmers. The two major development banksj the 
Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the National Investment Bank 
(NIB), expanded their activities in the agricultural sector during the 
Acheampong period. The link between heightened ADB lending and the 
NRC’s OFY program is made clearly apparent by the increase in bank 
lending from C8,622,441 in 1971 to an unprecedented C2B,468.713 in 1972. 
The NRC years also witnessed increased foreign investment activities in 
the agricultural sector (Rothchild 1980, 469). The government also 
subsidized the cost of seeds, seedlings, fertilizers, cutlasses, 
insecticides and expert agricultural advice. Customs duties on 
agricultural machinery and spare parts were waived, tax exemptions were 
placed on income from cocoa and taxes on incomes from farming 
enterprises in their first five years of operation were abolished 
(Rothchild 1980, 470-71; Oquaye 1980, 13).
OFY and other associated NRC policies of self-reliance were, at 
least in the short term, a modest success. The OFY program had acted as 
an incentive to agricultural production at many levels. Even urban 
dwellers began to engage in backyard gardening, growing some basic food 
items and vegetables. For about the first three years of the Acheampong 
military government, Ghana produced a large proportion of its food 
requirements and by 1975 there was hardly any food importation into the 
country (McCaskie 1985, 410).
Within three years of its inception, the enthusiasm for OFY fell 
noticeably. OFY’s declining impetus was reflected in Ghana’s poor 
agricultural performance after 1975. After registering impressive 
growth rates between 1972 and 1974, agricultural production started on a
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downward trend in the mid 1970s. The production of important crops such 
as cassava» maize, rice, palm oil and palm kernels fell noticeably 
during this period (see Table 4.2).
Quite obviously declining rainfall in the northern regions of 
Ghana during the mid 1970s contributed to OFY’s declining impetus. Yet 
in part, at least, it also resulted from government mismanagement and 
ineffective planning. Moreover, as Rothchild (1980, 471), noted, 
"government policies, as measured in terms of planned and actual 
expenditures, did not match the rhetoric of military rulers." For 
example between 1972 and 1975, public expenditures in agriculture 
declined from 6 to 5 percent, while those for defense rose from 8 to 9 
percent (Rothchild 1980, 472).
Nowhere was government mismanagement more apparent than in the 
area of rice production. According to the Governor of the Bank of 
Ghana, by 1975, the country was no longer importing rice (Legum 1976, 
B586). However, by 1976, the government’s reluctance to assist rice 
growers by providing them with much needed farm equipment resulted in a 
decline in production. Unavailability of machines to harvest their rice 
on time was a problem for many farmers. Thousands of acres of rice went 
up in flames from bush fires as a result of undue delay in harvesting. 
Furthermore, the refusal of the Acheampong administration to pay farmers 
a favorable price for their produce encouraged some farmers to hoard 
their produce and others to smuggle quantities across the borders to 
neighboring countries where they fetched higher prices (Oquaye 1980, 15- 
16).
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The performance of the dominant cocoa sector during the Acheampong 
era was particularly unimpressive. Although the government created a 
Ministry of Cocoa Affairs in 1975, cocoa production steadily declined in 
the mid 1970s until by the 1978 season, production had fallen to 865 
tons, the lowest level in nearly twenty years (see Table 4.8). This 
meant that Ghana was unable to take advantage high cocoa price prevalent 
then on the world market. Government’s efforts to encourage farmers to 
produce more by increasing the producer price paid to farmers was of 
little consequence. New producer price increases were always made 
meaningless by the soaring inflation rate. Furthermore, because of low 
producer prices, cocoa farmers were forced to smuggle their produce to 
neighboring countries where they fetched much more generous prices 
(Oquaye 1980, 50).
By July of 1978, the deteriorating economic condition was such 
that the army, anxious to protect its reputation, ousted Acheampong in a 
palace coup led by his chief of Defense Staff, Lt. Gen. F.W.K. Akuffo. 
Upon assuming power, the SMC under Akuffo introduced a series of medium- 
term policy measures aimed at easing Ghana’s economic problems. The 
cedi was devalued by 58.S percent and the new administration introduced 
an austerity budget.
The 1978-1979 budget, declaring the agricultural sector to be the 
government’s top priority, increased the budgetary allocation to the 
sector from C65 million to C76.8 million. Because of devaluation, 
however, this, in, fact represented a significant decline (51 percent) 
in allocation to agriculture (Legum 1979, B633). Despite increasing the 
producer price of cocoa, only a small increase in production (9 percent)
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was recorded* while the smuggling of cocoa to neighboring countries 
persisted as farmers tried to get competitive price for their produce. 
This was due to the fact that increases in producer prices were negated 
by high inflation rates (Rimmer 1980, 442).
The policies of the Akuffo administration did not result in any 
significant improvements in the agricultural sector or in the economy as 
a whole. The rate of inflation remained high and consumer goods, 
particularly local foodstuffs, remained scarce (Rothchild 1980a, A141). 
As the situation continued to deteriorate, Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings and 
his colleagues toppled the Akuffo regime. The Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council AFRC) and its chairman, Jerry Rawlings, were in 
office for only three months before they handed over power to a civilian 
government. However, in those three months, the AFRC temporarily 
dissolved the CMB and the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs which had been 
created by Acheampong. They also increased the producer prices on cocoa 
and other cash crops. The AFRC was in power for too brief a period for 
its policies to have had any significant impact on Ghana’s agricultural 
sector.
Despite encouraging rhetoric, the various policies of the military 
regimes from 1972 to 1979 did not produce a significant increases in 
agricultural productivity; Ghana was still not self-sufficient in food 
production. During this period, the growth of agriculture (as part of 
GDP) was -0.1 percent, and in terms of per capita income, -3.1 percent 
(Pellow and Chazan 1986, 136). Indeed, the last year of military rule 
witnessed significant declines in the productivity of all the major 
crops (see Table 4.2). More importantly, Ghana, which at the beginning
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of 1972 when the NRC first assumed power, was the world's leading 
producer of cocoa (accounting for over 25 percent of total world 
production), had by 1979 lost it preeminent position, accounting for 
only 18 percent of world output (see Table 4.2).
Agricultural Policy Under the Limann Administration (1979-1981)
With production in the agricultural and industrial sectors at low 
levels, consumer goods in short supply, and inflation at over 100 
percent, President Hi 11a Limann’s PNP administration assumed office in 
September 1979 under the most inauspicious of circumstances.
Considering the economic crisis confronting Ghana, the new 
administration wisely eschewed ideology and concentrated instead on what 
Limann described as realistic solutions to the country’s problems 
(Rothchild 1980a, A142). The first budget of the PNP government called 
for cuts in government spending and increases in the prices of such 
items as beer, cigarettes and petroleum products, as well as in a 
variety of taxes on self-employed persons (Rothchild 1980a, 142).
Since agriculture still accounted for over 40 percent of Ghana’s 
GDP and 70 percent of total export earnings, increasing the productivity 
of this sector was a major preoccupation of the PNP government.
Speaking about his administration’s emphasis on agriculture, Limann 
declared that "agriculture shall be our first priority now, and for the 
foreseeable future. It is unacceptable that a country which abounds in 
arable land should import food or else go hungry" (Rothchild 1980a,
A142).
Announcing a two-year crash program for agriculture, code-named 
the "New-Deal," Limann said that his administration was determined to
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make Ghana self-sufficient in food production. The government’s plan 
involved efforts to bring down food costs by encouraging the peasant 
farmer to increase productivity. This was to be achieved by means of 
price incentives and by the provision of subsidized inputs such as hoes? 
cutlasses? fertilizers? improved seeds and insecticides. In order that 
quick results may be attained? the administration placed emphasis on the 
production of quick-yielding food crops such as plantain? yam? maize? 
rice? guinea corn? millet? groundnuts? and soya beans (West Africa 1981? 
1039; Legum 1981, B493).
The PNP government also affirmed its support for intensive 
production of important foreign exchange earners such as cocoa and palm 
oil. The government’s plan also envisaged a significant increase in the 
total area of arable land devoted to agricultural production (West 
Africa 1981? 1039). To carry out its program? the PNP government? in 
its 1980 budget? allocated C14B million to the agricultural sector.
This was 74 percent more than the budgetary allocation to this sector in 
the previous year (Legum 1981? B493).
As can be seen from Table 4.E, the agricultural programs of the 
Limann administration did not result in the expected increases in 
agricultural productivity. Although there were some modest increases in 
the production of some crops (rice and maize)? production of other crops 
actually declined during the two years of the Limann administration.
More significantly? cocoa production declined still further from 290 
tons in 1979 to 255 tons in 1980 and 247 tons in 1981? the lowest since 
the early 1950s (see Table 4.2). The effects of the decline in 
agricultural productivity was manifested in the negative trends in major
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economic indicators. For example, by the end of 1981 the inflation rate 
which had dropped to 50 percent in 1980, rose again to 116.5 percent. 
Furthermore, real GDP declined at an average annual rate of 6 percent 
during the tenure of the Limann administration (World Bank 1984, 2;
Kraus 1985, 165).
Agricultural Policy Under the PNDC
When Rawlings seized power again in late December of 1981, his 
administration focused attention on two major areas: imposing a new 
system of justice and restoring the economy. During the first year of 
PNDC rule, leftist intellectuals and activists were its key supporters 
and leaders. During this period Ghana's economic policy directions were 
phrased in radical and catchy rhetoric, most of which alluded to 
breaking out of dependency relationships with the "imperialist West"
(Pellow and Chazan 1986, 81). The first year of PNDC rule witnessed an 
increase in direct state participation in economic affairs. Harking 
back to the days of Nkrumah, the PNDC’s Programme for Reconstruction and 
Development, unveiled in December of 1982, mandated state control of the 
economy.
In the agricultural sphere, where transportation and storage of 
crops were major problems, a campaign was launched to evacuate the cocoa 
crop, and pool food production, primarily by using student task forces. 
To facilitate the transportation of harvested crops, volunteer work 
groups were deployed to repair roads. Furthermore, in an effort to curb 
smuggling, black-marketeering, and currency trafficking, the PNDC 
government, in September of 1982, closed all of Ghana’s borders.
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However, the borders were reopened in January of 19B3, to allow for the 
re-entry of over a million Ghanaians who had been expelled from Nigeria.
As 1982 came to end it was abundantly clear that the PNDC’s 
policies were not producing the desired improvements in Ghana’s economy. 
Shortages of almost everything grew more severe, manufacturing was 
almost at a standstill; inflation continued at over 100 percent and 
cocoa production dropped to 203 thousand metric tons. Conditions were 
further aggravated by persistent drought condition during the 1982-1983 
and 1983-198^ planting seasons. Fires which broke out as a result of 
the drought destroyed 300,000 acres of cocoa farms and hundred of acres 
of plantain, yam and cassava crops (Legum 1985, B440).
In March, 1983, the PNDC government launched an Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP) which included a number of major reform measures 
designed to improve the country’s economy. These included policies to 
reduce the huge price distortions, restore exports, reduce inflationary 
budget deficits, increase prices to cocoa farmers, raise interest rates, 
and rehabilitate key productive sectors. As Jon Kraus <1987, 206), 
wrote, "these measures were necessary to obtain promised large infusions 
of capital from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and Western donors, without which recovery could not occur."
One of the first, and a major corrective action taken by the 
Rawlings administration under the ERP was the devaluation of the 
overvalued Ghanaian currency, the cedi. The cedi was devalued five 
times between March of 1983 and January of 1986, culminating in a total 
devaluation of 3,172 percent. The March, 1983 devaluation, along with 
budget proposals that imposed a severe austerity regimen, was a
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precondition for the extension of a $300 million loan from the IMF 
(Pel low and Chazan 1986, 83). These measures were immediately effective 
in attracting foreign assistance.
In the agricultural sector, the PNDC government was making efforts 
to improve productivity. Cocoa) still the mainstay of the economy 
received special attention. Following the drought and bush fires of 
198E-1983 and 19B3-1984, the government embarked on a national cocoa 
replanting program aimed at replanting all burnt farms. Cocoa seedlings 
were distributed and compensation of C350 per acre was paid to farmers 
who replanted burnt farms. The program was enthusiastically embraced 
only by farmers near the borders) where farms were maintained mostly 
because of the ease of smuggling their produce to the more lucrative 
markets in the Ivory Coast and Togo (Legum 19B75 B43).
The producer prices paid to cocoa farmers were increased by 67 
percent in April of 1983s and by a further 50 percent in May of 1984 
(Kraus 1985) 168). However) given the soaring inflation rates) 
increases in producer prices were often inadequate to encourage cocoa 
farmers to increase productivity. Furthermore) difficulties in cashing 
government checks paid to cocoa farmers for their crops) was reported to 
be encouraging a changeover from cocoa to food farming) from which an 
income was more certain (Africa South of the Sahara 1986, 489). 
Consequently) cocoa production fell to 160,000 tons in 1983, although it 
improved to 173>000 tons in 1984 and 812)000 tons in 1985 (see Table 
4.8).
Planting of staple crops was high in 1984> and favorable weather 
conditions, combined with new price incentives, helped to facilitate
m
bumper food harvests in 1984 and 1985. Although rice production fell 
from 70s000 tons in 1983 to 66j000 tons in 1984, it increased to an all 
time high of 90)000 tons in 1985. Maize production rose to 575)000 tons 
in 1984) although it declined to 411)000 tons in 1985. As can been seen 
from Table 4.2, cassava output more than doubled between 1983 and 1984) 
while yams) groundnuts and palm oil showed noticeable improvements in 
1984 and 1985. However) the rise in food production was not sufficient 
to meet the country’s food requirements.
As 1985 came to a close5 to ensure the continuity of food supplies 
throughout the year, the PNDC administration was making plans to improve 
the storage facilities to facilitate the storage of surplus produce. A 
price-support structure) to combat fluctuating producer prices was 
introduced in 1985) and moves were under way to sell some of the 
remaining state farms (Africa South of the Sahara 1986) 490). Impressed 
by the commitment of the Rawlings government to the Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP), foreign donors were eager to invest in agricultural 
improvement projects. For example) the state-owned Food Distribution 
Corporation (FDC) was able to build a number of silos with financial 
assistance from Britain and the World Bank. Similarly) the 
International Development Association <IDA)5 provided a credit of $40m, 
to allow the importation of farm inputs, such as fertilizers) spare 
parts for farm machinery and vehicles (Africa South of the Sahara 1986) 
490; Legum 1987, B43).
In spite of the gains made in agricultural productivity in 1984 
and 1985, the fear is that this trend may not continue. For as Seung 
Choi, the World Bank’s Accra representative admitted:
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Table 4.3
Ghana’s Share of World Cocoa Production for Selected Years
YEAR 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1988 1985
000 tons 
Ghana E60 416 581 484 396 343 380 890 803 818
Africa 565 830 1190 978 1066 941 890 1011 979 1070
Wor Id 980 1140 1530 1366 1461 1354 1387 1681 1711 1963
Percentaaes 
Africa 46.0 50.1 48.8 43.4 37.8 36.5 36.0 88.7 80.7 19.8
Wor Id 88.3 36.5 38.0 31.0 87.1 85.3 83.1 17.9 11.9 10.8
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations? United
Nations? 1961-1987.
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The sort of reforms Ghana is undertaking will 
succeed only if they can be sustained over time.
But there is always a time lag concerning the 
benefits, which raises the question of the 
social and political acceptability of this sort 
of program. Some governments get stuck on some 
issues and the reforms may not Continue (Novicki 
1987, 50-51).
The ERP, which was responsible for most of the gains made in the 
agricultural sector, demanded a considerable amount of sacrifice from 
Ghanaian citizens. As the period covered by this study came to an end, 
the trade unions were beginning to clamor for an increase in minimum 
wage and students were protesting the removal of meal and housing 
subsidies. Should the Rawlings administration acquiesce to demands to 
relax the stringent austerity measures dictated by the ERP, the modest 
gains made in the various sectors of the economy will quickly disappear.
Conclusion
The results of the quantitative analysis in Chapter Three (see 
results in Tables 3.3 to 3.16), indicate that there was no clear and 
consistent difference between military and civilian regimes, according 
to selected generalizable standards of measurements. The results as 
they relate to Ghana are reproduced in Table 4.A below. They show that 
civilian rulers in Ghana allotted a greater proportion of GDP to overall 
public expenditure (PSPEND) than did their military counterparts. 
Although the difference between the two regime types was significant in 
this regard, the results also indicate that there was no significant 
difference between Ghanaian regimes in the way in which they allocated 
public funds to the major sectors of the society or in the outcomes of 
their policy initiatives, as measured by productivity in the
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Table 4.4
Results of Siatple Country Analysis for Ghana, 1960-1985
VARIABLE MILITARY*a) CIVILIAN(a+b) t Sig.
PSPEND 0.0165?* 0.2140 2.2081 0.0370
PHEALTH 0.0116 0.0133 1.0100 0.3226
PEDUC 0.0328 0.0361 0.8013 0.4308
PDEFEN 0.0132 0.0164 1.1282 0.2704
PMAN 0.0989 0.0894 -0.5361 0.5993





manufacturing and agricultural sectors. These findings are consistent 
with the general pattern of regime performance demonstrated in this 
chapter. This examination showed that, in the formulation of public 
policy, there were no discernable homogeneous differences between 
military and civilian regimes in Ghana.
The case study of Ghana has shown that policies of both regime 
types were guided at various times by capitalist principles and, at 
other times, by socialist ones. For example, the policies of civilian- 
led CPP government (from 1963 to 1966) and those the military-led PNDC 
(from 1981-1983), were based on socialist economic doctrines; by 
contrast, the economic policies of three of Ghana’s military regimes 
(NLC, NRC/SMC I and SMC II) and those of its civilian successors (PP and 
PNP) were based on capitalist principles.
Irrespective of their guiding ideology, alternating civilian and 
military regimes in Ghana acknowledged that agriculture was the mainstay 
of the economy. Consequently, in their attempts to master the country’s 
tottering economy, agriculture was made the centerpiece of their 
respective economic policy initiatives. Measured by their objective 
achievements, their efforts since independence, and especially between 
1962 and 1983, were clearly unsuccessful. The performance of Ghana’s 
agricultural sector has been poor since the early 1960s and has 
deteriorated sharply since the mid-1970s (see Table 4.2).
Although it is still too soon to determine the outcomes of the 
policies of the Rawlings administration, this study clearly shows that 
no regime type has been able to develop and sustain an effective 
economic policy. Furthermore, the study illustrates that although
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control of the policy-making process alternated between civilian and 
military regimes) "the fact remains that the economic outcomes remained 
by and large persistent) negative) and somewhat mysteriously 
predictable" (Chazan 19835 178). The problems which beset the economy 
at the time of the fall of one regime continued to exist) and some even 
became worse by the time of the fall of its successor. The decline in 
agricultural productivity is a case in point.
The ability of respective Ghanaian regimes to bring about 
sustainable growth in the agricultural sector has been undermined by a 
variety of factors. As Rothchild (1980) 471) observed) the failure of 
the NRC’s OFY program was a reflection "of a variety of constraints that 
had long affected Ghanaian agriculture adversely: lack of investment
capital) inadequate foreign exchange) mounting domestic and 
international inflation) poor transportation facilities) smuggling) a 
shortage of farm laborers) over-centralization5 and ineffective 
planning." Similar constraints could be blamed for the ineffectiveness 
of the agricultural policies of the other Ghanaian regimes.
Among all the foregoing) factors perhaps the most pertinent 
constraint was the inability of Ghana’s rulers to develop effective 
plans for the implementation their respective agricultural policy. Had 
the immediate post-independent governments (CPP & NLC)5 been able to 
follow the system of priorities outlined in their respective development 
plans) there probably would have been no problems with lack of 
investment capital) inadequate foreign exchange) smuggling) or shortage 
of farm laborers.
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The "Second Development Plan" of the Nkrumah administration 
provides many indications of the lack of consistency between policy and 
implementation. For example* the "Plan" allotted almost SO percent of 
total planned public investment during the period 1963-1969, to the 
agricultural sector. However, what actually happened was that the state 
agricultural sector during the first two years of the plan spent at rate 
far exceeding its allocation in the plan, and development expenditure in 
activities affecting private small holders was far below plan 
allocations (Berg 1971, 196, S08). The failure of government to spend 
on the private sector its allotted share <50 percent) of total planned 
agricultural investment had a negative impact on productivity. It 
encouraged the reallocation of farm labor to the inefficient state 
farms, which paid better than the traditional farming sector. 
Consequently, reducing the availability of labor to the more productive 
private sector.
The series of military and civilian regimes which came after 
Nkrumah were similarly unable to follow established plans. The tendency 
to misallocate funds to unproductive sectors of the economy was a major 
characteristic of all of Ghana’s governments since independence (Boahen 
1975; Jones 1976; Oquaye 1980; Chazan 1983; Kraus 1982; 1983; Pel low and 
Chazan 1986). Both military and civilian governments were equally 
unable to exercise budgetary discipline or impose strong control on 
public expenditure.
Yet it would be unfair to conclude on a totally negative note. 
Since Ghana attained independence, there has been a considerable 
enhancement of the physical infrastructure and of the social amenities.
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New roads and buildings* factories and airports* schools and hospitals, 
and the Volta and Kainji Darns, stand out as substantial accomplishments. 
Although most of these structures have not been well-maintained, post­
independence Ghana contrasts sharply with the colonial Gold Coast, where 
there was much uncultivated land and little infrastructural development.
Development, however, properly consists of more than tall office 
blocks and luxury hotels. Unfortunately for Ghana, in the sometimes 
mistaken urge to build big, and to industrialize at any cost, 
agriculture (despite such exhortations about "green revolution," 
"Operation Feed Yourself" campaigns, and the periodic rhetoric of its 
supposed primacy), has often been ignored.
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Chapter Five
REGIME TYPE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR IN LIBERIA, 1945-1985
Whether it makes a difference for a country to be governed by 
civilians or military officers cannot be conclusively determined by 
looking at regime performance in only one or two policy areas. Regime 
performance in a variety of policy domains needs to be investigated.
Any serious discussion of this issue will not be complete without at 
least a look at the foreign policy behavior of the different regime 
types. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether there 
is any correlation between regime type and foreign policy behavior. To 
this end, the following additional hypothesis will be tested: Regime
change is more likely to bring about variation in foreign policy than 
continuous leadership.
This hypothesis is derived from Rosenau’s (1971, 111-17), 
observation that a change in the incumbent leadership will bring about a 
change in foreign policy. The plausibility of the hypothesis is further 
enhanced by Sang-Seek Park’s (1980, 138-43) observation that a violent 
leadership change is more likely to install a new regime whose 
ideological position is different from that of the incumbent.
The external policy of an administration is reflected in a variety 
of foreign policy initiatives. For example, formal diplomatic and trade 
relations are two very important indicators of an administration’s 
foreign policy priority. Since most sub-Saharan African countries are 
not economically self-sufficient, attempts to secure foreign aid are 
often a major preoccupation of these national governments.
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Consequently, the type of aid sought and received, and the source of 
aid, are also very important indicators of the foreign policy direction 
of an administration.
This chapter will focus exclusively on the relationship between 
changes in regime type and foreign policy behavior in Liberia. Liberia 
has been chosen as the focus of attention for several reasons. Its long 
membership in the United Nations (Liberia is one of only two African 
countries that were original members of the UN), its unique relationship 
with the United States, and the availability of data make Liberia a good 
subject for this case study.
Since its creation as an African settlement for freed slaves, the 
nation of Liberia has had a "special relationship" with the United 
States. The United States has been the major source of economic and 
military aid, as well as the major international trading partner of 
Liberia. A comparison of the status of the relationship between Liberia 
and the United States, the status of the relation between Liberia and 
the rest of Africa, and Liberia’s trade relations under both civilian 
and military administrations in Liberia, should provide a useful 
yardstick for determining whether it makes a difference for a country to 
be governed by a civilian or military leaders.
Historical Background: Important Domestic Developments
Modern Liberia’s history dates from the early nineteenth century 
when the American Colonization Society was founded in the United States 
to provide for the welfare of some 200,000 freed slaves. It was decided 
that the most promising plan was to repatriate the freed slaves to 
Africa (Strong 1930, 32). Having purchased land from the African
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inhabitants of the "Malagueta" or "Brain Coast" the American 
Colonization Society, with the tacit approval and economic support of 
the United States government, started shipping freed slaves to Africa. 
The first settlers landed at the site of present-day Monrovia in 1BE2.
On July £6, 1847, the settlement was proclaimed the independent 
republic of Liberia, the first independent republic in Africa.
Monrovia, named after President James Monroe, who had been instrumental 
in convincing Congress to appropriate funds for the new settlement, was 
chosen as the capital of the new republic (Sisay 1985, 13).
The constitution of the newly independent country was modeled 
after the constitution of the United States. It contained a declaration 
of rights, defined legislative and executive powers, and outlined the 
organization of a judicial branch much in the same fashion as the U.S. 
Constitution. This 1847 constitution remained, with few amendments, the 
law of the country until 1980, when the civilian administration of 
President William Tolbert was overthrown by members of the Liberian 
mi 1itary.
No discussion of the Liberian state can get very far without 
discussing the relationship between the Americo-Liberians (as the freed 
slaves who founded Liberia called themselves), and the indigenous 
population. Although Liberia is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa 
that was never a colony, the relationship between the Americo-Liberians 
and the indigenous tribal groups bore a close resemblance to colonialism 
(Brown 1941, 117, 137; Wrubel 1971, 189-204).
Americo-Liberians were Christian zealots. They spoke the English 
language and regarded the non-English speaking, non-Christian natives as
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"uncivilized." The native people were encouraged to remain in their 
homelands in the hinterland.* Exceptions were made, however, when 
inexpensive labor was needed on the large estates established by 
Americo-Liberians (Nelson 1985, xxiv). The two groups remained distinct 
societies at practically all levels.
The territorial distinction between Americo-Liberians and the 
native Africans was disrupted when the "scramble for Africa" began at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, forcing the Liberian government 
to confront the colonialist ambitions of the European powers. In its 
efforts to demonstrate effective control of its hinterland, Liberia 
gradually became an active participant in the scramble for Africa’s 
interior, and was at times, even prepared to accept the "rules of the 
game" as laid down by the Berlin conference. In 1906, for example, 
President Arthur Barclay noted "...that several Liberian expeditions 
have been sent to that section of country, that the Liberian flag has 
been raised, that Liberian patrols have been stationed there, and that 
the territory is now occupied in the same manner that interior territory 
is occupied by European Power" (Gershoni 1985, 33-36).
Subsequently, the hinterland population was brought under the 
direct control of the central government when citizenship status was 
extended to "all peoples of Negro descent" in Liberia. The hinterland 
regions were divided into three provinces, and these were divided into 
tribes, each of which was governed by clan chiefs, responsible to a 
district commissioner appointed by the president. None of the provinces 
was directly represented in government, in contrast to the five coastal 
counties which were controlled by Americo-Liberians, and whose elected
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representatives made up the legislature (Wrubel 1971, 191). This system 
of indirect rule was copied from neighboring British-ruled Sierra Leone.
This colonial pattern of rule continued until 1943 when William 
Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman was elected president of Liberia. In his 
inaugural address on January 3, 1944, the new president declared that 
his administration ’shall engage in and strive at the assimilation and 
unification of our various populations composing the body politic. 
Liberia must be a place for all Liberians to live alike, all to stand 
equally privileged, responsible and protected by like administration of 
the law" (Boley 1983, 64). Tubman’s inaugural declaration later became 
known as the “National Unification Policy."
The National Unification Policy resulted in the initiation of 
several steps aimed at bringing the indigenous population into the 
country’s political and economic processes. For example, reforms were 
introduced that brought about universal adult suffrage and extended the 
principle of direct legislative representation to the hinterland 
regions. Notwithstanding this and other changes initiated by Tubman, 
Americo-Liberians remained the dominant force in Liberia. For example, 
voting rights granted to the indigenous population did not translate 
into any real political power as Americo-Liberians continued to be over­
represented in the legislature (Dunn and Tarr 198B, 62). Furthermore, 
the True Whig Party (TWP) remained the only political party and the 
leadership of the party remained concentrated in the hands of a few 
Americo-Liberian families (Liebenow 1987, 107).
In the economic sphere, the Tubman administration adopted the 
"Open Door Policy" which had been recommended in 1930 by an
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International Commission of Inquiry (Boley 1983, 6**). The Open Door
Policy was intended "to encourage the investment of foreign capital in
the development of the country (Clapham 1989, 591). These policies
opened the hinterland to foreign investors searching for mineral
resources (including iron ore, diamonds and manganese). Consequently in
the early years of Tubman’s rule, Liberia witnessed a tremendous growth
in its economy. This growth was fueled primarily by foreign investment
in mining and agriculture (Clower, et al. 1966; Wilson 1971, 200).
The last years of the Tubman era were marked by economic recession
and the government had to implement austerity measures. Ihis, in turn,
created discontent among Liberians and increasing, though clandestine
opposition political activity. In July of 1971, Tubman’s twenty-seven-
year rule ended suddenly with his death at an eye clinic in London.
Having served for two decades as vice president to Tubman, William
Richard Tolbert became the nineteenth president of Liberia on July 23,
1971. In his first inaugural address, Tolbert asserted that the primary
objective of his administration was to make Liberia what he called a
"wholesome functioning society." Tolbert declared:
We seek a wholesome functioning society where merit, not 
favoritism; productivity not influence and connection; 
selflessness, not selfish individualism, form the criteria 
for real distinction.... Especially devoted to discipline 
and order under the law, the wholesome functioning society 
must express concrete concern for the poor and 
underprivileged, and must ensure security and protection tor 
its citizens, and their freedom from fear and intimidation.
It must guarantee opportunities for all, with the 
corresponding responsibility that all must be equally 
dedicated, as a prerequisite, to enjoyment of the benefits 
to be derived therefrom...(Boley 1983, 80).
Tolbert’s inaugural address raised the hopes of many Liberians.
Indigenous Liberians were particularly gratified by Tolbert’s promise to
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resurrect and expand lubman’s unification program, which had been 
neglected in the last years of the Tubman era.
Tolbert emphasized the need for self-reliance, decreased 
dependence on foreign aid, and the Liberianization of the economy. He 
proposed the organization of a national fund-raising rally for the 
purpose of raising funds to implement national development objectives 
(Boley 1983, 88-83; Liebenow 1987, 184).
By the end of his first term in office Tolbert had become the 
dominant a political figure in Liberia. Despite the call by Former 
Attorney General Abayomi Cassell for the formation of a second party, no 
opposition group registered and Tolbert ran unopposed in the October 
1975 elections. However, soon after his election victory opposition 
began to develop. Among the opposition were groups such as the Movement 
for Justice in Africa (MOJA), formed by professors and students at the 
University of Liberia; and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) 
formed by Liberian students in the United States (Boley 1983, 97; 
Liebenow 1987, 174-78; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 75).
In the late 1970s, in the face of rising energy costs and a 
decline in the world price of iron ore (Liberia’s principal export), the 
Tolbert administration was forced to introduce austerity measures. In 
April of 1979, the government’s announcement of a 50 percent increase in 
the price of Liberia’s staple food, rice, led to mass public 
demonstrations. Police attempts to restore order resulted in the deaths 
of many demonstrators. Alarmed by the intensity of the confrontation, 
Tolbert called upon President Sekou Toure of Guinea to dispatch Guinean 
troops to restore order (Liebenow 1987, 178).
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On April IS, 1980, almost a year to the date of the "rice riots," 
as the events of April, 1979 have been labeled, the Tolbert government 
was toppled in a violent coup, led by an indigenous Liberian, Master 
Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe. Tolbert and twenty-six other occupants of 
the Executive Mansion were killed during the coup.
The coup makers established the People’s Redemption Council (PRC) 
to administer the affairs of the country. The PRC was headed by Samuel 
Doe. As Chairman of the PRC, Doe became the twenty-first Head of State 
of Liberia. Thus, after 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule, the 
indigenous Africans, who constituted the vast majority of Liberia’s 
population, finally took power.
Among the first acts of the new military leaders was the 
suspension of the 1847 Constitution, and the banning of the TWP.
Several leaders of the TWP were arrested and charged with various crimes 
against the Liberian people. After being tried and found guilty by a 
military tribunal, thirteen of them were executed and the rest sentenced 
to long prison terms. Although they aroused widespread condemnation 
abroad, the executions, like the coup itself, were popular in Liberia 
(Liebenow 1987, 186, Dunn and Tarr 1988, 93).
In his first policy statement after the coup, Doe assured
Liberians that the military will initiate "real change" and direct the
"building of a new society" in which the injustices endured by the 
masses will be alleviated (Holloway 1981, 161; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 94).
But the objectives of the PRC represented an enormous task for a
military government composed of young soldiers lacking in administrative 
experience and formal education beyond high school level. Candid
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recognition of these limitations resulted in the appointment of a 
cabinet in which key portfolios were given to civilians (Nelson 1985j 
xxvi i).
The Liberian economy was on the verge of collapse at the time of 
the coup and the Doe regime was obliged to accept an IMF economic 
stabilization plan, under which the PRC was required to adopt an 
austerity program. In compliance with the program, a $9 million subsidy 
on rice prices was lifted, gasoline and income taxes were raised.2 
However, defense spending was not affected by the PRC's austerity 
program. Consequently the overall spending on national security 
(defense and cost classified as "public order and safety") more than 
doubled during the first year of the Doe regime (Dunn and Tarr 1988,
96).
In the political sphere the PRC made preparations for a return to 
civilian rule by its promulgation of a new constitution in 1984. The 
constitution bore a strong resemblance to the one that had been in force 
before the coup. Changes from the old constitution included the 
abolition of property qualifications for voters and the reduction of the 
initial presidential term from eight to four years. The ban on 
political activities was lifted in July of 1984.
Among the many parties that tried to register to participate in 
the forthcoming elections, only four were allowed to register. They 
included the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) led by Samuel 
Doe, the Unity Party (UP) led by Dr. Edward Kesselly, the Liberian 
Action Party (LAP) led by Jackson Doe (a former TWP politician and no 
relation to Samuel Doe), and the Liberian Unification Party (LUP) led by
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Gabriel Kpollahj a teacher. More serious opponents to Doe’s candidacy 
were not allowed to contest the election (James 1986, 33).
By the time of the election, opposition to Doe’s reqime was 
widespread. Opposition groups were harassed and Doe had some of their 
leaders detained. The election which was held on the 15th of October 
1985, was widely believed to have been fraudulent. After a two week 
delay it was announced that Doe had eked out a 50.9 percent victory in a 
four-way race for the presidency (Clapham 1987, 593; Liebenow 1987, 293- 
96). President Doe was formerly inaugurated as the first president of 
the Second Republic on January 6, 1986.
During Doe’s five and one half years as head of the PRC Liberia 
had struggled with a steadily worsening economy, and by the time of his 
inauguration the economy was far less viable than it was in 1980.
Liberian Foreign Policy
Historical Background (1847-1944)
In 1848, Great Britain became the first country to recognize the 
new independent Republic of Liberia. Despite continued economic and 
military support, it was not until 1862 that the U.S. extended official 
recognition to the Republic. Despite official recognition, however, 
American relationship with Liberia remained ambiguous. At a time when 
Liberia was trying to ward off both European and native African 
challenges to its territorial claims, the U.S. government remained vague 
in its expression of support for Liberian cause (Sisay 1985, 15-16).
Uncertain of U.S. commitments to protecting Liberia’s sovereignty, 
the Monrovia government appealed to Britain for security and financial
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support. Subsequently) the British government agreed to aid Liberia in 
reforming its monetary and judicial systems and in establishing a 
Liberian "frontier force" (LFF) (Gershoni 19B5) 92-93). British- 
Liberian ties were also manifested in the areas of trade and education. 
Britain became the primary source of Liberia’s imports and the British 
pound became and remained Liberia’s official currency until 1993) when 
it was replaced by the U.S. dollar.
Although Liberia’s foreign relations during the early part of the 
twentieth century were European-oriented) the American connection 
remained strong. For example) when British involvement in Liberian 
affairs culminated in a situation in which Britain attempted to 
transform Liberia into a British colony) Liberia guaranteed its 
independence by securing United States assistance (Boley 1989) 36-37; 
Gershoni 1985) 99-95; Liebenow 1987) 17). Army officers from the United 
States assumed the responsibility for the command and training of the 
LFF. Their efforts succeeded in providing Monrovia with the means to 
impose its control over the hinterland population.
In May of 1922) Britain announced the "Stevenson Plan" by which 
rubber exports from British producing areas will be regulated so as to 
facilitate an increase in the price of rubber. During this period) 
Britain effectively controlled 80 percent of the world’s production of 
rubber> while the United States consumed about 70 percent of total 
production (Boley 1963) 38). In an effort to offset the detrimental 
impact of the Stevenson Plan on the U.S.-based Firestone Tire Company) 
its president) Harvey S. Firestone) Jr.) decided to establish a rubber 
plantation in Liberia. Subsequently) a concession agreement was
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concluded between Firestone and the Liberian government (Lowenkopf 1976, 
38-39).
With the coming of Firestone, the "European period" of Liberia’s
foreign relations ended. The Firestone plantations quickly became the
largest employer, importer, exporter and trainer of human skills in
Liberia. Firestone’s dominance of the Liberian economy was such that
the country became colloquially known as the "Firestone colony" (van der
Kraaij 1983, xv).
Rapid changes in Liberia’s foreign relations began with World War
II. When Japanese activities in southeast Asia began to affect the
sources of raw materials to the U.S. and her allies, Liberia’s
significance to the allies was greatly enhanced (Sisay 1985, 135).
Liberia became the principal source of rubber for the allies— a source
that needed to be safeguarded. Consequently, in March of 19A2,
President Roosevelt declared that the defense of Liberia was vital to
the defense of the United States. He then proceeded to send a "Special
Representative" to Liberia to negotiate the use of Liberian facilities
in the war effort. This resulted in the signing, in March of 19A2, of a
defense agreement between the United States and Liberia. According to
the agreement, the Government of Liberia granted to the United States
for the duration of the war:
the right to construct, control, operate and defend at the 
sole cost and expense of the latter and without charge to 
the Republic of Liberia, such military and commercial 
airports in the Republic as in consultation with the 
government of the Republic of Liberia may mutually be 
considered necessary; and the right also to assist in the 
protection and defense of any part of the Republic which 
might be liable to attack during the present war, said grant 
to include the right to construct access roads from Monrovia 
to the airport at Roberts Field on the Farmington River and
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the seaplane facilities at Fisherman Lake in the county of 
Grand Cape Mount (Dept, of State Bulletin, VII p. 979, cited 
in Goodrich and Carroll 1944, 600-604).
In July of 1940, in implementing of the agreement, U.S. forces were
stationed in Liberia. The United States also agreed to train and equip
the Liberian army (Lowenkopf 1976, 40).
Germany protested the U.S.-Liberian agreement, calling it a
violation of Liberian neutrality; and Berlin threatened to hold Liberia
answerable for every disadvantage and damage suffered by German citizens
as a result of the Republic’s agreements with the United States (Sisay
1985, 136). Having been assured U.S. protection, Liberia ignored the
German protest and, subsequently, ordered the German Consul and his
staff to leave Liberia (Goodrich and Carroll 1944, 601). In January ot
1943, the U.S. signed a lend-lease agreement with Liberia.
Foreign Policy During the Tubman Era, 1944-1971
The election of Tubman as Liberia’s new president in 1943, led to 
the introduction of policies which effected at least two important 
changes in Liberia’s international relations. The first of Tubman’s 
programs to alter Liberian international posture was the "Open Door 
Policy," which invited virtually unrestricted foreign investment into 
Liberia and changed the economic landscape of the country forever. 
Another change occasioned by Tubman’s election was the establishment of 
Liberia as an important actor in Pan-African politics. Despite these 
two important changes, the focus of Liberia’s external relations 
remained dominated by its "special relationship" with the United States- 
-a relationship which intensified under the Tubman administration.
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Liberian-U.S. Relations During the Tubman Era
On January £7, 19AA, three weeks after Tubman’s inauguration, 
Liberia declared war against Germany and Japan. Having thus forcefully 
demonstrated its commitment to the allied cause and to the United States 
in particular, in a further display of its affinity with the U.S., 
Liberia converted its currency from the British pound to the U.S. 
dollar.
Liberia was subsequently a founding member of the United Nations 
and its specialized agencies. In 1960, it became the first African 
state to be selected to seat on the Security Council. As a member of 
the UN during the Tubman era, Liberia seldom deviated from the American 
position when important international issues were discussed. For 
example, Tubman as well as his successor, Tolbert, provided diplomatic 
support for the American position with respect to the war in Vietnam. 
Liberia’s commitment to the Western position in general and the U.S. 
position in particular were so strong that it occasionally led to 
Liberian equivocations on the major issues in postwar African politics 
(Dunn 1979). For example, despite Liberia’s support for the OAU’s 
advocacy of nonalignment in the cold war, the country remained 
vigorously anti-communist during the Tubman era.
Throughout the Tubman period Liberia also had no diplomatic 
relations with a communist country (although diplomatic relations with 
the USSR were formally established in 196^, they were not actually 
initiated until 197S when a Soviet embassy was opened in Monrovia). 
Although Liberia regularly extended invitations to communist states to 
attend Tubman’s many inaugurations, when these communist states would
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reciprocate by inviting Tubman to visit their countries, excuses would 
be offered for Tubman’s inability to accept the invitation. Liberia’s 
negative responses to these invitations were no doubt, influenced by the 
United States. For example, in 1956, the Liberian ambassador in 
Washington was told by an official of U.S. State Department to decline a 
Soviet invitation to Tubman because to accept it "would unfavorably 
reflect on the prestige of the U.S. government, especially so due to its 
close ties with the Liberian government" (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 191).
Liberia’s international stance during this period was consistent 
with Tubman’s declared policy objective of cultivating "the closest 
possible friendly relations" with the West and supporting "their general 
national and international aims" (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 172). It was 
during the Tubman presidency that an Agreement of Cooperation between 
Liberia and the United States was signed. The 1959 agreement made 
Liberia the first— and thus far the only— African state to conclude a 
mutual defense pact with the United States (Liebenow 1987, 136).
In terms of economic assistance, Article II of the 1959 Agreement 
stipulated that the United States "will continue to furnish the 
Government of Liberia such assistance as may be mutually agreed upon 
between the Government of the United States and the Government of 
Liberia in the effective promotion of its economic development and in 
the preservation of its national independence and integrity" (Zimmer 
1960, 429-30). Thereafter, the U.S. substantially increased its 
financial and technical assistance to Liberia. In addition tD emergency 
measures, such as the sale of rice in 1966 at low cost under the Food 
for Peace program, the U.S. provided technical assistance in the fields
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of road construction, agriculture, forestry, fish production, public 
administration and veterinary science. The greatest technical 
assistance, however, was in the field of education, especially in the 
form of the Peace Corps volunteers sent to Liberia. Since 1962, two 
hundred Peace Corps volunteers have served in Liberia each year on two- 
year contracts (Liebenow 1987, 136).
During the period 19A6-1972, U.S. official development assistance 
to Liberia totaled $195 million ($119 million in grants and $76 million 
in loans). Among the major projects completed with U.S. grants and 
loans were: the Free Port of Monrovia, Roberts International Airport,
major segments of the interior road systems, a hydroelectric dam at Mt. 
Coffee near Monrovia, elementary and secondary schools, and the National 
Medical Center in Monrovia which included the 271-bed John F. Kennedy 
Hospital and Training Center (U.S. Dept, of State 1973, 3). Additional 
support for Liberia’s development efforts were provided by American 
business, missionary, and educational organizations, which were very 
active in the country.
Liberia and the Rest of Africa During the Tubman Era
Until the late 1950s, Liberia’s international affairs were limited 
to relations with the United States and the European colonial powers.
The surge toward independence among African states in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, however, brought about a pronounced reordering of Liberia’s 
foreign policy priorities. The independence of Ghana in 1957 and of 
Guinea in 1958 encouraged Liberia to become a more active participant in 
African affairs. Tubman was concerned about the ideological disposition 
of the leaders of the two newly independent African states, and their
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effect on Africa in general and Liberia in particular. The Monrovia
government was especially concerned about the socialist regime of Sekou
Toure in Guinea, Liberia’s neighbor to the north. Liberia’s
apprehension regarding its own well-being in an independent Africa was
expressed by the Secretary of Defense in his Annual Report for 1960:
With the attainment of independence of our sister African 
brothers [sic] contiguous to our borderline? problems which 
we never thought of are arising and have to be grappled with 
[with] every degree of efficiency and alertness. Not only 
are the problems of the crossing into out territories of 
citizens of other states involved but also the question of 
national ideologies, some of which are divergent to ours and 
destined to threaten and uproot the very foundation upon 
which our democratic institution was founded. To ensure 
that the situation just referred to will be averted and not 
permitted to take a foothold in Liberia we have to 
strengthen and increase our border control units and give 
more attention to border problems as they arise from day to 
day (cited in Liebenow 1987, 143).
Dreading isolation on the continent, Liberia aligned itself with 
the cause of decolonization and self-rule for all of Africa. Tubman 
became an active champion of Pan-Africanism. However, he was reluctant 
to go as far as Ghana’s Nkrumah who envisaged a political union of all 
independent African states (Nkrumah 1957; 1963). Tubman was also 
disturbed by Nkrumah’s ambition to assume the leadership role in 
independent Africa.
In furtherance of his ambition, in April of 1958, Nkrumah had 
taken the initiative in inviting to Accra the first conference of 
independent African states. The conference was attended by all of the 
eight independent African states (Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia,
Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia). However, other than Nkrumah, Tubman 
was the only head of state and government present. Apparently, the 
leaders of Arab north African states were not ready to accept Nkrumah’s
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leadership. Nkrumah was not discouraged, however, and as soon as Guinea 
attained its independence, Nkrumah began making overtures to its leader, 
Sekou Toure. Soon after, the two leaders declared that their two 
countries had united to form the Union of West African States. Other 
African countries were invited to join.
Although the Ghana-Guinea union amounted to nothing more than a 
paper union, it was sufficient to cause some concern among Liberian 
leaders. Tubman was probably disturbed over the possibility of 
Nkrumah’s having access to Liberia’s border by way of Guinea. In an 
effort to contain Nkrumah’s radical version of Pan-Africanism, Tubman 
invited both Nkrumah and Toure to a meeting. The meeting took place in 
Liberia’s remote interior at Sanniquellie in 1959. At the meeting, 
Tubman put forth an alternative Nkrumah’s political union idea. He 
suggested a loose political federation that would agree in areas of 
mutual economic and political interests. Tubman succeeded in convincing 
Toure that his idea of functional cooperation was more practical for the 
time being. The resulting Sanniquellie Declaration was a victory for 
Tubman (Holloway 1981, 35-36).
In May of 1961, a conference of Heads of African and Malagasy 
States took place in Monrovia. This conference signaled the deepening 
cleavage between the radical socialist-oriented states (called the 
Casablanca Group) and the more moderate or conservative states (which 
came to be called the Brazzaville and later the Monrovia Group). The 
Monrovia conference endorsed Tubman’s approach of functional cooperation 
in such areas as trade, communications, transportation, and the like,
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rather than the political union favored by the Casablanca Group (which 
included Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Algeria).
At the Monrovia meeting, African leaders agreed to hold another 
summit meeting in Lagos, Nigeria in 1962, in order to develop technical 
and cultural cooperation and carry forward the "unity of aspirations and 
actions" of African states. In preparation for the African summit, the 
Tubman administration prepared a draft charter for a future African 
organization, as well as a detailed proposal for non-political 
cooperation. Upon presenting the draft to those present at the Lagos 
Summit, Tubman pointed out that it "represented the thinking of the 
Liberian government on the organizational mechanics of African and 
Malagasy cooperation," intended by no means to be definitive. "It may 
be accepted, amended, revised or completely rejected", he added (Dunn 
and Tarr 1988, 185-86). The Liberian draft proposal, after some 
revisions was accepted and subsequently became on May E5, 1963, the 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Tubman’s moderate 
imprint on the Charter was clear.
The trend in post-1963 Africa toward economic cooperation 
represented a significant victory for Tubman’s African policy, which had 
resisted Nkrumahs’ bid to lead Africa into some kind of political union. 
Under Tubman, Liberia collaborated with other African countries to forge 
functional associations. A 1960 Liberian proposal for West African 
economic cooperation was the beginning of a collaboration which 
culminated in the establishment of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in 1975.
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Throughout the Tubman era, relations between Liberia and other 
African countries (with the notable exception of Ghana)9 were very 
cordial. Only after Nkrumah’s ouster in 1966 did the two countries 
resume normal relations. Despite widely divergent ideological outlooks, 
relations between Tubman and Toure and their two countries were very 
friendly. Tubman’s remarkable political and diplomatic skills enabled 
him to assume a vigorous stance on southern Africa, while the domestic 
situation in his own country still bore some resemblance to apartheid. 
Even more significant was the fact that Tubman vehemently opposed South 
Africa’s apartheid system at a time when Liberia’s constitution 
specified that only "persons of Negro descent" could become citizens, 
vote or own land thus excluding thousands of Lebanese entrepreneurs long 
established in Monrovia solely on racial grounds (Adelman 1979, 9-12). 
Tubman’s skills also enabled him to support the OAU’s policies on 
southern African liberation, anti-colonialism, and even nonalignment in 
the cold war, while maintaining Liberia’s "special relationship" with 
the U.S. To be sure, Liberia’s forceful anti-communist stance during the 
Tubman era compensated for any of Liberia’s OAU motivated policies which 
may have been incompatible with U.S. positions.
Foreign Trade and Economic Policies During the Tubman Era
Before the end of World War II, the only important foreign 
investor in Liberia was Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, which, in 
1926, had obtained a huge concession agreement from the Liberian 
government. Firestone’s contribution to the Liberian treasury (made up 
of yearly rent payments, rubber export tax, consular fees, and port and 
harbor dues), represented a major proportion of total government
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revenue. After the introduction of the income tax system in 1951) 
Firestone’s income tax payment represented almost half of the total 
government revenue in that year (van der Kraaij 1983) 60-6^).
Firestone contributions to the Liberian economy convinced Tubman 
that a policy that encouraged more foreign investment would be 
beneficial to Liberia. Thus) in his first inaugural address in January 
of 19*t4) Tubman announced: "We shall encourage the investment of
foreign capital in the development of the resources of the country) 
preferably on a partnership basis) and we shall accord to investors the 
necessary protection and fairness of treatment." Subsequently) in 1945> 
the Tubman administration granted Col. Lansdell Christie) a former U.S. 
Army officer9 "exclusive exploration rights in an area of about three 
million acres and exclusive mining rights in respect of all minerals 
except gold) diamonds) and platinum" in an area not exceeding 25)000 
acres (to be chosen from the exploration area) (van der Kraaij 1983).
In 19^7) Tubman signed a statement of understanding with 
Stettinius Associates-Liberia5 Inc.) a company owned by former U.S. 
Secretary of State> Edward Stettinius) to establish the Liberian 
Company. Stettinius’ company was granted an 88-year concession "to 
exploit any line of business) except activities already expressly 
granted to other concessionaires" (Dunn and Tarr 1988) 177).
It was in the same years 1947> that the Tubman administration used 
the term "Open Door Policy" for the first time. After the signing of 
the agreement with Stettinius) the government issued a press release 
expressing the hope that "people of all races and nations who have 
either skills or funds to employ in any specific projects for the
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development of Liberian resources will come in.... Liberians will 
always come first to the extent of their available contributions but the 
policy of the open door is to be fol lowed... (van der Kraaij 1983, ‘♦A). 
Nine years later? in his third inaugural address, President Tubman 
reaffirmed his Open Door Policy (Clower, et al. 1966, 118).
In accord with the Open Door Policy, foreign companies were 
granted tax-free holidays. There were also no restrictions on the 
repatriation of profits and dividends, and no expropriation of foreign 
investment. In furtherance of this policy, virtually unlimited control 
over large areas of land and freedom to exploit Liberia’s natural 
resources was extended to interested foreign companies.
Initially, the Open Door Policy was not very successful. The 
expected diversification in natural resource exploitation did not occur. 
Until well into the 1950s, Liberian economic growth was almost 
exclusively dependent upon export earnings from rubber. Indeed, as late
as 1957, rubber was responsible for as much as 77 percent of Liberia’s 
total export earnings (Liebenow 1987, 60). Furthermore, Liberia's 
excessive dependence on the U.S. and U.S.-based companies remained 
virtually unchanged in the first few years following the introduction of
the Upen Door Policy. For example, until 1950, only two major
concessions (both U.S. based) were added to Firestone: the Liberian
Mining Company, founded by Col. Lansdell Christie and the Liberian 
Company, founded by Stettinius. Total trade in that year amounted to 
$38.2 million, and 90 percent of Liberian exports went to the U.S., 
which also provided 70 percent of the imports (Schulze 1982, 581).
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Beginninq in 1950, there was a tremendous influx of foreiqn 
investors into Liberia. By the end of the decade there were 15 major 
companies from six different countries (see Table 5.1). The arrival ot 
these companies led to a significant increase in government revenue.
The performance of the Liberian economy was so impressive that, in lVfal, 
Tubman unilaterally made further assurances to foreign investors. He 
asserted that nationalization "will never happen in Liberia" (Sisay 
1985, 155). By the time of Tubman’s death in 1971, there were more than 
one hundred foreign companies in Liberia. Although over fifty of these 
companies were from the U.S., Liberia’s dependence on revenues from 
U.S.-based companies had diminished considerably. For example, total 
trade in 1971 reached $386.1 million, but only 21.8 percent of Liberia’s 
exports went to the U.S., which now provided only 32 percent of 
Liberia’s imports (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). Some diversification of 
Liberia’s trading patterns had thus taken place. European countries, 
such as Germany, Sweden, Britain, Italy and the Netherlands not only 
became major sources of foreign investments, they also became important 
trading partners as well.
Along with the diversification in trading partners came an 
impressive decline in Liberia’s nearly exclusive dependence on one 
export commodity— rubber. Tubman’s Open Door Policy had resulted the 
signing of a number of concession agreements with foreign companies 
interested in mining operations. Subsequently, mining became a major 
industry in Liberia, and by 1961, iron ore had replaced rubber as 
Liberia’s principal export. In 1971, iron ore accounted for over 65 
percent of total exports thus replacing rubber to become Liberia’s new
Table 5.1
Major Concession Holders in Liberia as of 1960
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Concession Principal Year of Development Cost
Holder Product Agreement (in millions) Country
Firestone natural rubber 1925 $32.0 U.S.
Liberia Mining iron ore 1946 37.0 U.S.
Liberia Company rubber 1947 2.0 U.S.
African Fruit rubber 1952 4.5 Germany
Goodrich rubber 1954 4.3 U.S.
Delimco iron ore 1953 100.0 Germany
Lamco iron ore 1953 215.0 Sweden
Monrovia soft drinks, 1956 3.5 Switzerland
Breweries beer
National Iron Ore iron ore 1958 30.0 U.S.
Liberia Indepen­ lumber 1958 .4 Spain
dent Forest Co.
Limpex Palm Oil palm oil, 
pineapple
1958 .5 Germany
Munarriz Works bricks, soap 1952 .2 Spain
Le Tourneau lumber 1952 3.0 U.S.
of Liberia
Maryland Logging lumber 1960 .5 England
Providence diamonds 1960 .05 England
Mining
Source: Wilson, Charles M. 1971 Liberia: Black Africa in Microcosm,
p. 202.
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monoculture. A significant outqrowth of the decline of rubber as an 
export commodity was the drop in Firestone's contribution to the 
Liberian treasury from 35.9 percent of total treasury receipts in 1955 
to under 6 percent in 1971.
The Open Door policy also enabled the Liberian government to 
secure revenue from the registration of foreign ships. Liberia provided 
certificates of registration to the operators of convenience flag ships 
at lower fees than other countries. Thus within a short period of time 
Liberia had a large merchant fleet) comprised of ships owned by 
companies of many nations but registered in Monrovia (though few of the 
ships ever went there). By 1970) more ships were registered in Liberia 
than in any other country (Pedler 1979) 113). This soon became a very 
important source of revenue for the Liberian government.
The open door strategy proved to be Tubman’s most successful 
economic policy initiative. The influx of foreign investors into the 
country led to an exceptionally rapid increase in government revenues. 
For example) in 1944 when Tubman first assumed the presidency) total 
domestic revenue was only $1.6 million; but ten years later in 1954, it 
had risen to $12 million; and at the end of the Tubman era in 1971 it 
had reached the staggerinq sum of $69.5 million (van der Kraai.i 1983) 
307, 333).
Foreign Policy Under the Tolbert Administration
While maintaining close links with the West, Tolbert expanded 
Liberia's relations with the Communist bloc. However, the most 
significant feature of his foreign policy was the promotion of closer 
ties with Liberia’s neighbors in Africa.
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Liberia-U.S. Relations, 1971-1980
Liberia’s foreign policy, traditionally pro-Western, was not 
significantly affected by the change in leadership. However, in his 
first annual message to the Liberian legislature, President Tolbert 
observed that there was a need to explore additional sources of aid. 
Perhaps out of this need to diversify its sources of aid and trading 
partners or because of Tolbert’s wish to play a more significant 
leadership role in African affairs, Liberia began to display a 
relatively more independent international posture.
In the first few years of his presidency, some of Tolbert’s 
foreign policy initiatives appeared to be designed to help Liberia shed 
her image as "America’s little brother" (Adelman 1979, IE). For 
example, Liberia increasingly began to vote with the nonaligned 
(particularly the African) bloc in the UN. Furthermore, Liberia 
established diplomatic relations with all East-bloc countries, as well 
as China and Cuba. In December of 197E, a resident Soviet ambassador 
arrived in Monrovia. Trade agreements were also negotiated with a 
number of communist countries. The Liberian government sought and 
received an increasing number of scholarships for Liberians to study in 
Europe, Canada and even Soviet-bloc countries (Legum 1973, B647; 1975, 
B70E).
Another indication of Tolbert’s bid to move Liberia away from the 
U.S. and closer to the African position on foreign policy matters was 
provided when, in November of 1973, Liberia became the E5th African 
country to break off diplomatic relations with Israel. A few years 
later in 1976, Tolbert dismissed the Liberian delegate to the UN, Dr.
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T.O. Dusumo Johnson, for voting with Israel against a resolution 
condemning Israeli policy in occupied Arab territory (Legum 1974, B691; 
1976, B746).
This pattern of disengagement did not involve any significant
shift in Liberia’s guiding ideology. Thus, in response to a question on
Liberia’s relations with communist countries and with the United States,
Tolbert noted that:
In recent times, we have come to observe that political 
ideologies can be completely differentiated from economic 
cooperation on the international level. Thus, we have been 
seeking harmonious relations with all nations, regardless of 
ideological differences, once they are willing to respect 
our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to treat us as 
equals.... Liberia’s historical relationship with the United 
States stems originally from the fact that the country was 
founded by free blacks from the United States, thereby 
creating extraordinary links between Liberia and the United 
States. Because of this historical tie, both Americans and 
Liberians have always referred to their relationship as 
special and traditional, without any political domination or 
patronage. We share a similar system of government, our 
economies are based upon the free enterprise system, and our 
legal system draws substantially on the common laws system 
you have, coupled with our African customary laws.
Since the founding of Liberia, our ties with the 
United States have been kept vigorously alive through trade, 
contacts, religious interactions, and other areas and by 
virtue of similarities in our political systems. Our past 
relationship is therefore the outgrowth of this historical 
and cultural fact or phenomenon. In respect to our existing 
relationship with the United States, it can be described as 
having matured over the years and is fast evolving from mere 
historical and cultural ties to bilateral cooperation, in 
which there is increasing appreciation of our efforts to 
respond to the basic needs of our two peoples. Thus, our 
relationship with the United States is very friendly and 
will remain friendly.^
Despite promoting policies which helped to broaden the Liberian 
perspective beyond its traditional narrow focus upon the United States, 
Tolbert continued to stress the existence of a "special relationship"
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between the two countries. The primary benefit for Liberia from its 
special relationship with the U.S. was in the form of economic 
assistance. The Tolbert administration recognized the importance ot 
U.S. assistance to Liberia’s economic well being, and thus, even when it 
strayed from the U.S. position on international matters, it was careful 
not to offend American sensibilities. For example, on the very 
important and sensitive issue of the war in Vietnam, the Tolbert 
government, like Tubman’s before it, continued to support the American 
posi tion.
In 1973, when Tolbert paid an official visit to Washington, 
President Richard Nixon pledged to continue U.S. economic aid to 
Liberia. Thus, throughout Tolbert’s presidency, the U.S. remained the 
largest single supplier of aid to Liberia. In return for U.S. aid, 
Liberia permitted the construction near Monrovia of a Voice of America 
transmitter powerful enough to cover the entire African continent. This 
gave the U.S. a considerable advantage in the propaganda war with the 
USSR (Liebenow 1987, 137). The U.S. linkage was further reinforced 
through the opening in 1976 of the $7.A million OMEGA navigation station 
in Liberia. The system which provides worldwide assistance to shipping 
in all weather conditions was constructed by the U.S. government but 
administered and staffed by Liberians. It is one of eight such stations 
in the world and the tallest manmade structure in Africa (Legum 1977, 
B629; Liebenow 1987, 137).
The special relationship between Liberia and the U.S. was 
reaffirmed when President Jimmy Carter visited Monrovia in April of 
1978. Liberian relations with the Soviet Union became strained after
Ell
Soviet embassy personnel in Monrovia, and Cuban embassy personnel trom 
Sierra Leone were implicated in the "rice riot" of April, 1979. "For 
the benefit and security of the Republic of Liberia," Tolbert expelled 
three Soviet diplomats (Hughes 1979, 8; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 192-93),
Liberia and the Rest of Africa During the Tolbert Administration
Tubman’s high-profile African policy was continued under the 
Tolbert administration. Tolbert also vigorously pursued his 
predecessor’s policy of regional economic cooperation within Africa.
This was reflected in the signing in October of 1973, of the Mano River 
Declaration by President Tolbert and President Siaka Stevens of Sierra 
Leone. The Declaration established the Mano River Union (MRU) which 
brought about "closer links in trade and in cultural and economic 
cooperation" between Liberia and Sierra Leone. All customs procedures, 
regulations and laws were harmonized and a common external tariff 
between the two countries was initiated in October of 1977 (Legum 1979, 
B696).
The MRU was an integral part of the larger Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS). The Tolbert administration played an 
important role in formulating and defining the objectives of ECOWAS. In 
January of 1975, Tolbert hosted the founding meeting of ECOWAS, which 
purpose was to effect the eventual elimination of internal customs 
duties within the community and the establishment of a common external 
tariff. In addition, ECOWAS aimed to promote the free movement of labor 
and capital among all member states and to bring about the adoption ot 
common economic policies (Legum 1978, C196-98). Liberia’s strong 
commitment to ECOWAS was forcefully expressed by President Tolbert when
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Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obansanjo, the Nigerian Head of State visited Liberia. 
Tolbert declared that, if necessary, Liberia was ready to relinquish any 
privilege arising from its relations with other groups or countries in 
order that ECOWAS should realize its full potential (Legum 1980, 8684).
Under Tolbert, Liberia continued to play a key role in the OAU. 
Liberia served on many important committees of the OAU. During the 
Tolbert administration the country was best known for its work on the 
OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. For 
example, it was the Liberian initiative which ended a long-standing 
dispute between Guinea and Senegal on the one hand, and Guinea and Ivory 
Coast on the other (Legum 1979, B697; Dunn and Tarr 1988, 188).
On the issue of southern Africa, Tolbert initially adopted a 
firmer and more militant attitude than his predecessor. While lending 
both moral and material support to "liberation movements" in southern 
Africa, Tolbert repeatedly expressed his opposition to any dialogue with 
the Pretoria regime. However, in February of 1975, in a spectacular 
reversal of his position on the issue of dialogue, Tolbert invited the 
South African Prime Minister, John Vorster to Monrovia. Despite 
Tolbert’s protestations that Vorster was invited only after 
consultations with other African leaders including SWAPO leaders in 
Namibia, the meeting was roundly criticized in African circles (Liebenow 
1987, 149). The launching of a Liberation Fund for southern Africa to 
which the Tolbert administration contributed $100,000 and Tolbert’s 
renewed advocacy of a militant stance against the Pretoria government 
were probably instrumental in Tolbert’s return to respectability on this 
issue.
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Throughout Tolbert’s presidency Liberia was steadfast in its 
identification with OAU objectives. Liberia’s role in the fostering of 
greater inter-African cooperation was accorded due recognition when, in 
1978, Liberia was selected to host the 1979 OAU Summit Conference. At 
the conclusion of the conference Tolbert automatically became the 
presiding chairman of the organization.
Foreign Trade and Economic Policies, 1971-1980
Upon assuming the presidency, Tolbert outlined plans to lessen 
foreign domination of the Liberian economy, while encouraging more 
indigenous participation. He called for a more equitable partnership 
between Liberians and foreign investors (Legum 1973, B609).
Tolbert introduced some measures which were aimed at increasing 
Liberian participation in the economy. For example, privileges formerly 
granted only to foreign investors (including tax-free holidays and 
import restrictions on competing products), were extended to "qualified" 
Liberians. Some economic activities were made the exclusive preserve of 
Liberian nationals and major foreign cooperations were ordered to reduce 
the number of their expatriate employees (Legum 1973, B609; 1974,
B649).** These measures facilitated a significant increase in the 
number of Liberian entrepreneurs. For example, whereas nearly 7£ 
percent of the 8,535 businesses registered in Liberia in 1978 were 
foreign owned and by 197B, less than 60 percent belonged to foreign 
investors (Legum 1974, B649; 1980, B685).
Tolbert’s call for a more equitable partnership between Liberians 
and foreign investors was given substance when his administration 
reviewed and renegotiated the country’s concession agreements with
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Firestone, LAMCO, Bethlehem Steel and other concessionaires. The new 
agreements called upon concessionaires to give preference to qualified 
Liberians when employing labor, and further to provide on-the-job- 
training, operate vocational training facilities, and grant scholarships 
to qualified Liberian employees to pursue advanced studies abroad (van 
der Kraaij 19S3, 80-83).
Traditionally, foreign enterprises operating under concessions 
agreements in Liberia were not subject to Liberian laws. Under the new 
agreements concessionaires became subject to Liberian laws (van der 
Kraaij 1983, 228-31). However, because of their immense contributions 
to the Liberian economy, the Tolbert administration, even while 
renegotiating more advantageous concession agreements, was careful not 
to include any clauses that might have frightened the foreign investors 
away.
In fact, the Tolbert administration continued to offer incentives 
to attract foreign investment. Under a new investment code foreign 
companies were offered comprehensive guarantees against nationalization 
and tax-free holidays of up to seven years. There was also the added 
attraction of the complete absence of foreign exchange control. The 
result of Tolbert’s continued adherence to the Open Door Policy was that 
over one-third of the country’s GDP was generated by foreign firms. It 
was also clear that the renegotiations of concession agreements did not 
produce a hostile climate since foreign investors continued to find 
attractive opportunities in Liberia. Subsequently, foreign investment 



















1948 0.0 — 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.6 0.0 1.1 18.6 6 .4
1951 0.6 0.8 — 0.1 8.4 0.4 0.0 1.9 48.8 11.1
1958 0.4 1.1 — 0.8 1.3 0.6 0.5 1.7 34.6 18.4
1953 0.4 1 .8 — 0.1 3.1 1.0 1.1 8.0 85.6 18.5
1954 0.6 1.5 — 0.8 1.9 1.6 0.8 8.3 88.1 15.3
1955 1.6 8.9 0.1 0.3 8.3 1.8 0.9 8.8 37.8 16.1
1956 8.1 8.6 0.0 — 8.8 1.6 1.3 3.8 35.4 16.7
1957 8.7 4.8 0.0 0.5 3.0 1.8 1.4 3.4 31.5 84.0
1958 9.8 4.4 0.0 — 3.3 1.9 3.0 3.8 35.8 81 .3
1959 5.7 4.5 0.8 0.8 9.8 8.3 5.0 5.1 40.9 80.8
1960 6.8 6.0 1.8 1.5 14.8 3.7 11.7 7.6 43.6 37.6
1961 3.9 8.8 3.7 8.9 13.8 5.5 5.5 11.3 88.6 44.5
1963 13.1 17.1 4.7 5.0 8.3 3.7 10.1 11.4 33.4 39.0
1964 86.9 81 .8 5.3 1.8 6.8 6.5 14.8 10.7 57.3 44.1
1965 36.8 18.7 18.8 8.7 7.8 3.7 10.0 10.5 50.0 49.5
1966 48.5 — 11.5 1.9 8.5 4.5 18.7 10.6 58.3 50.6
1967 44.6 15.0 17.7 1.6 8.0 4.4 14.1 8.7 47.5 55.0
1968 33.0 10.1 18.5 8.8 83.6 4.5 10.1 11.8 43.9 43.4
1969 — — 16.9 1.7 37.7 4.3 11 .8 9.7 54.8 38.7
1970 38.1 81.7 88.1 3.7 38.6 16.8 14.0 11.1 49.5 46.4
1971 41.3 15.6 88.7 3.4 33.7 13.0 11.7 14.5 48.4 51 .9
1978 48.0 80.7 43.8 4.1 35.4 9.6 15.8 16.4 50.8 54.1
1973 55.7 83.9 48.0 4.6 40.6 6.3 55.8 18.4 65.6 53.8
1974 75.9 87.1 49.3 5.9 50.5 10.7 10.4 87.8 94.3 88.0
1975 84.7 38.8 51.0 3.5 38.5 11 .7 8 . 8 31.5 86.5 104.8
1976 186.4 49.6 63.9 11.1 85.7 83.9 11.9 38.8 88.0 119.1
1977 107.8 48.6 58.7 80.3 38.7 39.9 16.0 33.8 94.8 181.9
1978 108.9 58.4 54.9 80.5 88.7 81.7 14.6 41.5 105.5 116.7
1979 137.4 56.5 56.8 16.8 37.7 36.8 81.1 41.1 106.3 180.3
1980 144.0 50.1 61.7 4.3 51.4 39.4 81.7 31.5 184.5 180.8
1981 138.1 48.4 70.3 4.6 87.5 40.8 80.4 83.7 180.6 140.4
1988 149.0 48.9 65.9 3.8 19.8 31.0 19.7 17.3 88.5 117.3
1983 130.9 50.4 75.3 4.0 88.8 40.6 11.9 80.1 76.8 101 .3
1984 134.8 49.8 68.8 5.8 88.0 34.8 6.9 88.3 90.9 80.8
198ff 140.7 88.0 68.7 8.9 19.0 18.6 4.6 81.1 83.8 73.9
Sources: Unit ed Nations, International Trad e S t a t i s t i c s  Y e a r b o o k , 1955-
1989; *A f ri ca South of the Sahara, 1 9 8 8 , E u ro pa Pu blications, 1989.
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Under the Tolbert administration, an effort to broaden the range 
of economic ties with the global community was apparent in the area of 
international trade. For example, in 1978 alone, trade agreements were 
negotiated with East Germany, South Korea, China, the Soviet Union, 
Pakistan and Egypt (Legum 1980, B686).
In analyzing Liberia’s relationships with its major trading 
partners during this period, it is clear that despite minor fluctuations 
there was steady growth in both imports from and exports to the U.S. 
Imports from the U.S. rose from $51.9 million in 1971 to $120.3 million 
in 1980. Exports to the U.S. underwent a similar expansion, from $48.4 
million in 1971 to $124.5 million in 1980 (see Table 5.2). However, 
Table 5.3 indicates quite another story with respect to the relative 
position occupied by the United States in trade with Liberia during the 
same nine-year period. Although the U.S. continued to be the single 
most important country in terms of imports into Liberia, its share of 
total imports into Liberia fell from 32 percent to 22.5 percent. Even 
more important was the relative reduction in significance of Liberian 
exports to the U.S., with West Germany actually surpassing the U.S. as 
the major destination for Liberian exports. As the U.S. share of 
Liberian exports fell from 21.8 percent in 1971 to 20.9 percent in 1980, 
that of West Germany went from 18.6 percent to 24.1 percent over the 
same period (see Table 5.3).
Foreign Policy Under Military Rule
The April,1980 coup, the assassination of Tolbert and the 
execution of members of Tolbert’s cabinet were vigorously denounced by 
the international community (Holloway 1981, 160). African nations
217
Table 5.3















1948 0.0 — 0.0 0.0 17.1 7.1 O.E IE.4 78.6 73. E
1951 l.E 4.6 — 0.4 4.7 E.6 0.0 10.9 9S.4 65.0
1953 1.1 6.5 — 0.4 9.9 5.3 3.5 10.6 8S.7 67.0
1955 3.6 11.3 O.E 1.3 5.3 7.0 E.O 11.0 86.9 62.0
1956 4.6 9.7 — — 4.9 5.9 E.9 11.8 79.5 6S.E
1957 6,6 11.0 0.1 1.4 7.3 4.8 3.5 8.8 78.0 6E.7
1958 17.1 11.5 — — 6.1 5.0 5.6 8.3 65.6 55.5
1959 8.5 10.5 1.3 1.9 14.7 5.3 7.4 11.8 61 .1 47.0
1960 8.a 8.6 E.E E.E 17.E 5.4 14.1 11.1 5E.8 54.4
1961 6.3 9.7 6.0 3.S SS.E 6.0 8.8 IE.5 46.S 49.1
196E
1963 16.1 15.8 5.9 4.6 10.3 3.4 IE.6 10.5 41.3 36.0
1964 El .4 19.7 4.S 1 .6 5.4 5.9 11.3 9.7 45.6 39.7
1965 E6.7 1E.1 9.0 E.6 5.3 3.5 7.4 10.1 36.9 47.4
1966 E8.3 — 7.7 1.7 5.6 4.0 8.4 9.4 34.8 45.E
1967 E8.1 1S.0 11 .E 1.3 5.0 3.5 8.9 6.9 39.9 43.9
1968 19.7 9.5 11.0 S. 1 14.1 4.E 6.1 11.0 E6.E 40.6
1969 13.5 14.3 8.7 1.5 19.3 3.8 5.7 8.5 E7.7 33.9
1970 17.9 14.5 10.4 E.4 15.3 10.8 6.6 7.4 EE.7 31.0
1971 18.6 9.6 IE.9 E.l 15.1 8.0 3.3 8.9 El .8 3E.0
197E 17.E 11.6 18.0 S.3 14.5 5.4 E .3 9.E E0.6 30. E
1973 17.E IE.4 13.0 E.4 IE.5 3.1 3.4 9.5 E0.3 E7.8
1974 19.0 9.4 IE.3 E.O IE.6 3.7 E.6 9.4 S3.6 S8.4
1975 El.5 9.9 13.0 1.0 9.8 3.5 E.l 9.5 EE .0 31 .4
1976 E7.7 IE.4 14.0 S.8 5.6 6.0 E.6 8.E 19.3 E9.8
1977 E4.0 9.E 13.1 4.4 7.3 8.6 3.6 7.E El .E 26.3
1978 EE.4 10.9 11.3 4.3 5.9 4.6 3.0 9.1 El .7 E4.3
1979 E5.6 11.E 10.5 3.E 7.0 7.1 3.9 8.1 19.8 E3.7
1980 E4.1 9.4 10.3 1 .0 8.6 7.4 3.6 5.9 E0.9 EE.5
1981 S5.E 10.1 13.4 1.0 5.E 8.4 3.9 5.0 E3.0 E9.4
198E 31.5 10.0 14.0 1.0 4.E 7.E 4.a 4.0 17.5 E7.4
1983 31.0 1S.E 17.8 1.0 5.4 9.9 E.8 4.9 18.0 E4.6
1984 30.0 11.1 15.3 1 .4 6.S 9.6 1.5 6.E 20.2 EE.3
1983 3S.3 9.9 15.8 1.0 4.4 6.5 1.1 7.4 19.E E6.0
Sources: Unit ed Nations, International Trad e S t a t i s t i c s  Y e a r b o o k , 1955-
1989; *A f ri ca South of the Sahara, 1 9 8 8 , Europa Pu bl ica ti on s, 1989.
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called for the isolation of the new Liberian government. To African 
leaders* the assassination of Tolbert was especially disheartening since 
he was the current chairman of the OAU.
The overthrow of Tolbert was applauded in some quarters. The 
Soviet Union, which had had some of its diplomats expelled by Tolbert 
only a few months before the coup, was one of the first countries to 
extend diplomatic recognition to the new military government. Other 
states which expressed immediate support for the government included 
Ethiopia, Cuba and Libya (Legum 1981, B549). The PRC flirted briefly 
with Liberia’s new friends. Top Liberian government officials visited 
the capitals of some the "friendly" countries. Gabriel Baccus Matthews 
the new foreign minister visited Addis Ababa in May of 1980, and again 
in August when he travelled with Doe’s party to Ethiopia and Tanzania. 
Perry Zulu the finance minister, went to Libya in February of 1981 
(Legum 198E, B53E). Doe even sent some Liberians to Ethiopia for 
training in adult literacy and the government accepted a number of 
Libyan scholarships for Liberian students to go to Tripoli (Legum 198E, 
B533; Liebenow 1987, E00).
In the first few months of the Doe regime, Liberia’s foreign 
policy seemed to be more closely aligned with those of the East-bloc 
countries. However, by mid-1981, with the closure of the Libyan 
People’s Bureau and the drastic reduction of the staff of Soviet Embassy 
in Monrovia, this initial appearance of a reorientation in Liberia’s 
foreign policy had vanished.
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Liberia and United States Under Military Rule
Despite the mildly hostile reaction of the United States to the 
coup, it was to the United States that the new military rulers first 
turned to for assistance. Almost immediately after the coup, U.S. 
diplomats were approached by the new leaders for counsel and aid. Doe 
personally requested the U.S. military adviser in Monrovia, Col. Robert 
Gosny, for help and advice on how to maintain order after the coup 
<Legum 1981, B544; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1982, 6). 
The official American response to these initial advances was not 
encouraging. In fact, because of the executions and the unstable 
atmosphere of the immediate post-coup period, the U.S. canceled a 
Pentagon training mission that had been scheduled to go to Monrovia on 
May 1, 1980 (Sisay 1985, 167).
The U.S. soon reversed its position on this matter and, about one 
week after the coup, announced America’s continued support for Liberia 
and rescheduled the Pentagon training mission. Furthermore, a 
commission headed by Congressman William Bray of Pennsylvania was sent 
to Liberia to review the status of U.S.-Liberian relations. This high- 
level U.S. mission, which arrived in Monrovia in late May of 1980, 
included Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
(Dunn and Tarr 1988, 175-76).
At the time of the coup, the Liberian economy was on the brink of 
collapse. The PRC inherited a large outstanding debt, totaling about 
$740 million (Culley 1983). The new regime needed immediate 
international financial assistance, and recognized that it was in its 
best interest to maintain and even expand on Liberia’s special
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relationship with the U.S. Members of the Gray commission were 
sympathetic to the plight of the PRC. Upon their return to Washington, 
they recommended that the U.S. government increase its level of 
assistance to Liberia. In his report to President Jimmy Carter, 
Congressman Gray, made mention of the tremendous popularity of the coup 
and noted that the new military rulers were committed to the capitalist 
system (Sisay 1985, 168).
However, in the immediate post-coup period, Libya and other 
socialist leaning countries were making overtures to the Doe regime. 
Besides the initial favorable response to these overtures, the PRC tried 
to use the interests of these countries in Liberia as leverage, in its 
efforts to secure aid from the West. Thus, Doe warned Liberia’s 
traditional friends that, unless they increased their level of aid, his
C.
government would be forced to look elsewhere for help."' The U.S. was 
particularly disturbed by Liberia’s new African friends, fearing that 
the PRC would seek to strengthen relations with Ethiopia and Libya, two 
of its most persistent suitors. To assure that this did not happen, the 
U.S. response to subseguent PRC requests for aid was prompt and 
generous.
U.S. aid from the time of the coup to December, 1980 totaled $18 
million. In addition, the U.S. provided the PRC with military equipment 
and provided funds to help with the construction of houses for the 
Liberian army (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1982). In 
December of 1980, while announcing an American commitment to providing 
Liberia with more economic aid in the future, Secretary Moose told 
Liberia’s military rulers that it was not necessary for them to obligate
EE1
themselves to Libya out of financial concerns. He described Liberia as 
a country which has a "very special meaning to the United States." He 
noted that the U.S. and Liberia have been "valued allies" for many 
years. "We want that relationship to continue into the future/' he 
added .6
To protect American interests (which included the Voice of America 
transmitter, an OMEGA Navigational System, U.S. bank loans and private 
investments), and, at the same, to promote the special relationship, U.S 
aid to Liberia during the period of military rule shattered all previous 
records. From an annual average of $8 million in the twenty years 
preceding military rule to an annual average of about $65 million during 
the five years of military rule (see Table 5.4). By 1985, Liberia had 
become the world’s largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid, with about 
one-third of the country’s budget coming from the U.S.’
There were also certain symbolic, yet significant, gestures of
friendship between the U.S. and Liberia during this period. For
example, in response to a request by Doe, the U.S. government sent 100
U.S. Green Berets and the destroyer Thorn to Liberia. The timing of the
visit was significant, coming on the first anniversary of the coup?
Doe used the occasion of the anniversary to express his country’s
gratitude to the U.S. government, which had become Liberia’s largest aid
donor. A month later the PRC ordered the closure of Libyan People’s
Bureau and the Soviet Union was ordered to reduce its embassy staff from 
015 to six.
Despite some congressional disapproval of the lack of democracy in 
Liberia, Liberian-American relations during the period of military rule
e e b
Table 5.4
U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Liberia* 1946-1985
(in millions)
YEAR ECONOMIC AID ' MILITARY AID TOTAL AID
Loans Grants Total Loans Grants Total
1946-■48 7.5 7.5
1949-■58 8.3 8.3
1953-■61 89.8 8.3 31.5
1961- 68 11.9 1.5 13.4
1963 31.3 10.4 41.7 .1 41.8
1964 7.4 9.1 16.5 .4 16.9
1965 9.3 9.8 19.1 1.1 80.8
1966 8.8 9.5 11.7 .6 18.3
1967 1.9 8.3 10.8 .8 .8 11.0
1968 1.3 7.8 8.5 — .7 .7 9.8
1969 5.6 7.4 13.0 — .5 .5 13.5
1970 .9 7.1 8.0 — .5 .5 8.5
1971 — 8.0 8.0 — .7 .7 8.7
1978 8.1 9.8 17.3 8.0 .4 8.4 19.7
1973 18.9 5.7 18.6 — .8 .8 18.8
1974 — 6.0 6.0 — . 1 .1 6.1
1975 9.0 6.7 15.7 1.8 .1 1.9 17.6
1976 — 5.8 5.8 1.7 .1 1.8 7.6
1977 11.8 9.6 81.4 .5 .1 .6 88.0
1978 — 7.8 7.8 .5 .8 .7 7.9
1979 — 17.6 17.6 1 .8 .3 1 .5 19.1
1980 10.0 13.5 83.5 8.5 .8 8.7 86.8
1981 15.0 40.8 55.8 4.7 1.6 6.3 61.5
1988 15.0 50.5 65.5 7.0 5.6 18.6 78.1
1983 16.7 46.8 68.9 7.0 5.7 18.7 75.6
1984 15.0 51.0 66.0 18.8 18.8 78.8
1985 75.5 16.8 91.7
Source: Dunn and Tarr* Liberia: A National Polity in Transition* 198B.
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were clearly as strong if not stronger than they were during the 
preceding twenty years. The Doe regime became more pro-Western that its 
predecessors. Attacks on Soviet policies and a corresponding adoption 
of an extremely pro-American attitude was vigorously pursued by the Doe 
regime. Liberia’s voting pattern in the UN became increasingly more 
consistent with that of the U.S. (Dunn and Tarr 1988, ll^).'y Perhaps 
the clearest demonstration of the PRC’s pro-American foreign policy 
posture was the 1983 resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel 
(Liebenow 1987, 252).*' Furthermore, by the end of the military 
interregnum, the Doe regime had severed many of the communist contacts 
established by the Tolbert administration. Diplomatic relations with 
the USSR were frozen, both countries having withdrawn their personnel 
from their respective embassies (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 193).
Liberia and the Rest of Africa During Military Rule
The military coup and the assassination of President Tolbert (who 
was then the incumbent chairman of the OAU) lead to a near rupture of 
Liberia’s relations with her African neighbors. Tolbert had been a very 
active participant in OAU affairs and had acguired considerable prestige 
on the continent. Thus, his assassination and the subseguent executions 
of members of his cabinet aroused the hostility of many African leaders 
to the coup and to the new military rulers. Perhaps an even more 
profound cause for concern was the anxiety of African leaders about the 
vulnerability of their own governments to a similar kind of takeover. 
Understandably, Nigeria, which had only a few months before restored 
civilian rule after thirteen years military rule, took a strong lead in 
condemning the coup and the executions.
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Doe’s claim to automatic succession as chairman of the OAU was 
rejected and the OAU appointed President Leopold Senghor of Senegal as 
interim chairman. However, the first major open display of hostility by 
African countries toward the Doe regime came at the OAU special economic 
summit in April of 1980. When Liberian Foreign Minister Gabriel 
Matthews flew into Lagos, Nigeria in an attempt to represent Doe at the 
meeting, he was compelled to return to Monrovia when his plane was 
refused permission to land at Murtala Mohammed Airport in Lagos. It was 
later revealed that, with the exceptions of Libya and Ethiopia, all the 
other OAU member states had opposed Liberian participation (Dunn and 
Tarr 1988, 189).
The refusal to grant the Liberian delegation landing rights in 
Lagos was followed by other decisions denying Liberian participation in 
other African organizational affairs. For example, no invitation was 
extended to the new Liberian defense minister to a meeting of defense 
ministers of ECOWAS in May of 1980. Two weeks later, Sgt. Doe and his 
delegation were denied participation at the ECOWAS summit meeting in 
Lome, Togo. The decision greatly embarrassed the Liberian delegation 
who had already arrived in the Togolese capital and had been accorded a 
welcome befitting a leader and his delegation. A four-nation committee 
(Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Togo) was formed by the summit 
to monitor events in Liberia.
In response to the diplomatic snub by its African neighbors, 
Liberia recalled her ambassadors from the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, 
Nigeria, ECOWAS, and the Mano River Union. Nigeria, which had been a 
leading critic of the Doe regime, was also asked to reduce its Monrovia
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embassy staff to two officers like the Liberia embassy in Lagos. In 
announcing the diplomatic recalls) foreign minister Matthews warned that 
"the government of Liberia is not disposed to simply assume its 
responsibilities without exercising its rights in any regional or 
international organization. Liberia is therefore suspending all its 
obligations to ECOWAS until its rights are restored...."^
The presidents of Ivory Coast) Sierra Leone? Guinea and Togo 
visited Monrovia in June of 1980 and discussed the conditions they felt 
should be fulfilled before relations will be normalized. These included 
the release of A.B. Tolbertj son of the late president) the release of 
other political prisoners and the reinstatement of the French ambassador 
to Liberia (the PRC had demanded the recall of Louis Dollot) the French 
ambassador to Liberia) after A.B. Tolbert was discovered taking refuge 
in his residence). In rejecting all three conditions) the Liberian 
Minister of Information) Gabriel Nimley5 said that "the Liberian 
government would not be subject to pressures from other African 
governments to accept standards of human rights that are ignored 
elsewhere on the continent" (Holloway 1981) 173).
Following the normalization of relations between Liberia and 
Nigeria in September of 1980} relations between Liberia and the rest of 
Africa began to improve. Doe attended the 1981 OAU and ECOWAS summit 
meetings in Nairobi and Freetown. In 19B£5 the three leaders of the 
Mano River Union (Liberia) Sierra Leone and Guinea)) officially 
established a customs union.
Despite the noticeable improvements in Liberia’s intra-African 
relations) Sgt. Doe did not become as active as his predecessors in the
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determination of continental issues. With the restoration and expansion 
of the "special relationship" between Liberia and the U.S.* foreign 
policy under the PRC became decidedly pro-Western. This Western 
orientation also colored Liberia’s stands on African matters. For 
example* Liberia protested the OAU handling of the Western Sahara 
dispute. It consistently opposed the admission of the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR) in the OAU and even threatened to boycott the 
1982 OAU summit meeting if the SADR were not excluded. Liberia’s 
position on this issue was consistent with that of Morocco (another 
strongly pro-American state)* which had claims on Western Sahara. 
Finally, in July of 1985* the Doe regime accorded full diplomatic 
recognition to the SADR (Legum 198^, B493; 1987, B85).
Another clearly pro-American foreign policy initiative was the 
PRC’s 1983 decision to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. This 
decision was decidedly inconsistent with the OAU position on the Israeli 
question. In keeping with OAU policy, twenty-six African countries had 
severed diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war. Only Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi had continued to maintain 
relations with Israel since then. Zaire, another of America’s African 
ally, resumed relations with Israel in 1982.
Foreign Trade and Economic Policies Under the PRC
The success of the Open Door Policy was, for the most part, due to 
the liberal investment policies upon which it was based. However, the 
fact that Liberia has had durable civilian regimes, seemingly immune 
from coups, provided foreign-owned enterprises with another strong 
incentive to invest in the country. The April, 1980 coup was therefore
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not a welcome intervention as far as foreign investors were concerned. 
After the coup, uncertainties about the future led to a sharp fall in 
private sector liquidity, from $175.6 million in March of 1980 to $10E.6 
million in December of 1981, as both local and foreign depositors moved 
their convertible assets abroad (Clapham 1987, 597).
The actions of the new military rulers during the first few days 
following the coup (the public executions, a decree limiting the 
repatriation of earnings, and the military’s inability to halt the 
looting of business premises), seriously alarmed the foreign business 
community. Shippers were reluctant to come into port during the first 
days of the coup. Shipowners began to question the advantages of 
registering their vessels under Liberia’s "flag of convenience." Some 
even threatened to switch their registration to Panama, a move which 
would have deprived Liberia of a substantial source of revenue (Liebenow 
1987, 8^3).
Managers of foreign-owned enterprises also complained about the 
uneconomic effects of the curfew which was instituted immediately 
following the coup. Perhaps the action that caused the most anxiety 
within the foreign business community, was the announcement by the 
newly-appointed justice minister, Chea Cheapoo, that twenty managers of 
foreign corporations were to be placed under house arrest. Although the 
order was immediately rescinded by Sgt. Doe himself, the signals that 
Cheapoo’s action sent to the business and financial interests were 
ominous (Liebenow 1987, 843-^).
In an effort to soothe jittery investors and arrest the decline in 
investor confidence, the PRC gave assurances to foreign investors, to
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owners of ships registered under the Liberian flag, to local bankers, 
and to Lebanese merchants that there would be no major changes in the 
country’s free enterprise system (Legum 1981, B545; 1982, B534; Liebenow 
1987, 245). The PRC’s concern over the future of foreign investment in 
Liberia was also reflected in some long-term policy commitments, such as 
the stated intention to continue the use of the U.S. dollar as official 
currency; the promise not to make any "structural changes in the near or 
medium term;" the honoring of all foreign debts; the lifting of a post­
coup currency regulations which limited repatriation of earnings; and 
the commitment to continue the Open Door Policy (Liebenow 1987, 245).
Despite these reassurances, investor confidence was never fully 
restored, and flight of capital continued. It was estimated that $200 
million left the country between 1981 and 1983 (Legum 1985, B479). A 
proposal in January, 1983, to restrict certain types of business to 
Liberian citizens was not very well received by foreign investors and 
was rescinded in May. In the same year, the already liberal foreign 
investment code was revised to encourage more investment (Clapham 1987, 
597).
Given Liberia’s post-coup "shrunken" currency base, depressed 
prices for its principal exports (iron ore and rubber), and high oil 
import prices, the Doe regime was never able to halt Liberia’s economic 
decline. The depressed economy was further aggravated by the 
introduction of new Liberian five-dollar coins. Referring to the 
introduction of the new coins and its impact on investor confidence, the 
leader of the Unity Party, Edward Kerselly said:
Foreign investors have no confidence in Doe and until they
can have faith in him things are not going to get better. I
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will admit he has been given bad advice, but it was his 
fault that he took it. The very worst thing he could have 
done he did, and that was to listen to the people who 
suggested he mint his own money. We may never get over that
blunder (James 1986, 33).
The minting of five-dollar Liberian coins have proved economically
disastrous. Although the U.S. dollar remained the official legal
currency, it became increasingly hard to come by. Derisively referred
to as "Doe dollars" or "little soldiers" the introduction of the seven-
cornered five-dollar coin caused many in Liberia to transfer their U.S.
dollar holdings abroad or hide them (James 1986, 33; Liebenow 1987, 203,
2A5). In accordance with Gresham’s law, bad money literally drove out
good money.
When the Doe regime first assumed power, the preponderance of 
Liberia’s trade relations were with the West. The Doe regime did not 
try to be innovative and maintained these trade ties, which had proved 
to be very beneficial for Liberia in the past. Although the relative 
position occupied by the U.S. and West Germany in their trade with 
Liberia had improved during the period of military rule, in real terms 
there was a decline in trade. For example, imports from the U.S. 
declined from $120.3 million in 1980 to $73.8 million in 1985 while 
exports decline from $12A.5 million to $83.8 million over the same 
period. The trend was the same for Liberian/West German trade (see 
Table 5.2).
The U.S. continued to be the most important country in terms of 
imports into Liberia, accounting for 26 percent of total imports into 
the country. This represented an increase of nearly four percent over 
the period at the time of the coup in 1980. The U.S. also maintained
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its position as the second most important destination for Liberia’s 
exports, while West Germany’s significance as the leading destination 
for Liberia’s exports remained unchanged. West Germany’s share of total 
Liberian exports actually went up from 24.1 percent in 1980 to 32.3 
percent in 1985 (see Table 5.3).
Iron ore (64 percent) and rubber (18 percent) continued to account 
for most of Liberia’s exports and remained major sources of governmental 
revenue.^ However? the international market for both commodities was 
depressed. Thus as Liberia prepared for a return to civilian rule in 
January of 1986, the judgment on the performance of the Doe regime 
seemed clear. Capital flight, declining investment, high oil import 
prices and worsening export markets had virtually ruined the Liberian 
economy.
Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion, it is abundantly clear that the 
very survival of Liberia is inextricably tied to its international 
relations. For example, in 1985 about 60 percent of total domestic 
revenue was derived from the activities of foreign enterprises in 
Liberia (Clapham 1987, 600). Taxes on the profits of these enterprises 
were responsible for a significant proportion of governmental revenue. 
Taxes on foreign trade (e.g., customs and excise duty) accounted for 
just over 25 percent of total governmental income. Thus, when military 
rule came to an end in 1985, the Liberian government was still as 
dependent on payments from foreign companies and concessions as it was 
during the early years of the Tubman era, when Firestone alone provided 
more than half of total government revenues.
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Another characteristic of Liberia’s foreign policy that was not 
significantly changed by the alternation between civilian and military 
rule was the inordinate importance of the United States for the 
preservation of Liberia’s economic solvency. As was indicated in 
earlier pages, the overriding importance of the U.S. to Liberia stems 
from the "special relationship" which has existed between the two 
countries since the founding of Liberia as settlement for freed slaves.
Over the years, the "special relationship" has come to mean a
responsibility for the United States to provide Liberia with military, 
technical, educational, economic and other developmental assistance. In
return, Liberia has provided the U.S. with strategic sites for the
location of important facilities.
Although the United States has had a mutual defense pact with 
Liberia since 1959, and U.S. training teams have provided training for 
the Liberian armed forces, American military aid remained a distant 
second to economic aid in terms of its impact upon the Liberian society. 
Economic assistance from Washington made it possible for successive 
Liberian governments to realize most of their developmental objectives 
(e.g., the provision of good roads, drinking water, hospitals, schools 
and col leges).
Given the animosity between Americo-Liberians and indigenous 
Africans, and the role which the United States played in the 
establishment and preservation of the Americo-Liberian aristocracy, it 
was widely speculated that the coup (which instituted indigenous rule in 
Liberia) will result in the weakening of Liberian-U.S. ties. Despite an 
initial tilt towards radical and socialist-oriented states (such as
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Libya and Ethiopia), the Doe regime did not in any fashion lessen 
Liberia’s ties with the United States. Quite the contrary, a major 
outcome of the coup was that the long standing special relationship 
became more intensified during the five years of military rule.
This study does not, therefore, support the hypothesis that a 
change in the incumbent political leadership will necessarily lead to a 
change in foreign policy. The evidence also fails to support Sang-Seek 
Park’s (1980, 138-43) observation, that a violent leadership change is 
more likely to install a new regime whose ideological position is 
different from that of the incumbent.
This case study clearly shows that practical, rather than 
ideological, considerations were the most important determinant of 
public policy under both civilian and military regimes in Liberia.
Given the degree to which the Liberian economy was dependent on external 
forces, Doe’s options when he assumed power were limited. He needed the 
support of the military to stay in power; and pay raises and improved 
living conditions for the soldiers had to be provided to keep this 
support. There was also the high expectations of the indigenous 
population now that one of its own was in power. As one of Doe’s 
cabinet minister put it: "The people expect us to deliver.'14 Thus,
Doe had no good reasons to depart from Liberia’s pro-western orientation 
in foreign policy. The survival of Liberia, of the military regime, and 
of Doe himself demanded that the new military rulers maintain— and even 
intensify— the special relationship with the U.S. and that.they expand, 
or at least maintain, the Open Door Policy.
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To be sure, there were instances when the PRC deviated from the 
practices of its civilian predecessors. The quantitative results from 
chapter three provide examples of such instances. For example, total 
public expenditure as a proportion of GDP (PSPEND) was significantly 
higher under military rule than it was under civilian rule (see Table 
5.5). Similarly government spending on health education and defense was 
significantly higher during the Doe regime than it was under the 
administrations of Tubman and Tolbert. However, in large part these 
increases in governmental spending were made possible by the substantial 
increase in U.S. economic assistance to Liberia during the period of 
military rule. By 1985, U.S. aid accounted for nearly 30 percent of the 
Liberian government’s budgetary allocation (see Table 5.9). As can be 
seen in Table 5.5, despite the increases in public expenditure by the 
Doe regime, the rate of growth of GDP (CGDP80) was a negative 3 percent 
annually during the period of military whereas during the preceding 
period of civilian rule GDP grew at annual average rate of 3.2 percent.
In foreign affairs then, the Liberian military regime did not 
break with the past. But even while retaining old institutions and 
practices, it did revitalize some of them (as with Liberian-U.S 
relations) and maintain others (as with Liberia’s relations with the 
rest of Africa).
Table 5.3
Results of the Simple Country Analysis for Liberia* 1950-1985
VARIABLE MILITARY(a) CIVILIAN(a+b) t Sig.
PSPEND 0.3686*** 0.8823 -5.4388 0.0001
PHEALTH 0.0361*** 0.0167 -5.9838 0.0001
PEDUC 0.0559*** 0.0899 -5.7095 0.0001
PDEFEN 0.0349*** 0.0101 -7.6943 0.0001
PMAN 0.0758*** 0.0507 -3.0071 0.0070
PAGRIC 0.1559* 0.8016 1.7383 0.0986
CGDP80 -0.0308* 0.0384 8.1316 0.0463
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Chapter Six
REGIME TYPE AND THE ECONOMY:
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA
As is the case with most nations in sub-Saharan Africa,
agriculture is of critical importance to the Nigerian economy— as a 
provider of employment, the production of food and raw materials, and as 
a source of foreign exchange. Thus, agricultural development has tended 
to receive high priority on the policy agendas of successive Nigerian 
regimes. But since Ghana has provided a case study assessing the impact 
of regime type on agricultural development, this chapter will be 
concerned with a different, but equally important, policy issue area—  
the impact of regime type on industrial development.
Like Ghana, Nigeria is ideal for examining the relationship 
between regime type and public policy because Nigeria has spent more
than two-thirds of its life as an independent nation since 1960 under
military rule. Both countries have also experienced at least two 
alternations between military and civilian regimes. Finally, Ghana and 
Nigeria are two among a handful of sub-Saharan African states for which 
updated records and reasonably reliable data are available. Thus, for 
the purpose of the comparative study of regime performance in sub- 
Saharan Africa, Nigeria is a suitable focus of attention.
Nigeria is the biggest nation in Africa, with a population of 
about 100 million. This means that one out of every five people in 
Africa is a Nigerian. In terms of size and population, Nigeria offers a 
market sufficiently large to enable modern industries to develop. 
Furthermore, the nation has a great variety of agricultural and mineral
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resources to sustain these industries. Consequently, successive 
Nigerian regimes have placed emphasis on the development of the 
manufacturing sector. Although the manufacturing sector has 
consistently ranked a distant third to mining (crude oil in particular) 
and to agriculture in terms of its contribution to gross domestic 
product (GDP), its importance to the Nigeria economy has increased 
considerably since the end of the colonial era.
In the following pages, the accomplishments of alternating 
Nigerian regimes as they relate to the development of the manufacturing 
industry will be examined. Following the approach of earlier case 
studies an attempt will be made to determine whether it makes a 
significant difference for a nation to be governed by civilian or 
military leaders. In the process, the budgetary priorities and the 
socioeconomic consequences of the policies of each regime type will be 
evaluated.
Historical Background
Before the colonial era, the geographical area known as Nigeria 
was made up of a collection of small independent states with different 
historical, political and cultural backgrounds. The major cultural 
groups inhabiting the area at the onset of the colonial period were the 
Yoruba, Bini and Ibo in the south and the Hausas, Fulani, and Kanuri in 
the north (Irukwu 1983, 111-12). Early British involvement in the 
region led to the creation of Lagos Colony and the protectorates of 
Northern and Southern Nigeria. Nigeria did not become one country until 
191A. That was the year when the British protectorates of Northern and 
Southern Nigeria— including Lagos Colony— were amalgamated to form the
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"Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria" (Ostheimer 1973, 14-20; Rinehart 
1982, 31).
On October 1, I960, after half a century of British rule, Nigeria 
became an independent nation. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was 
elected Prime Minister in December of 1959 and continued to serve in 
that position until January of 1966. Nigeria became a republic in 1963. 
In 1963, the mid-West Region was created, bringing the total number of 
regions to four (the other three were the North, West and East).* 
Although the Balewa government made some notable improvements in the 
Nigerian economy, its performance in the political sphere was not very 
impressive. Nigeria’s first six years of independence was marred by 
incessant and often violent political strife.
The first major political disturbance started in the Western 
Region, where an ideological rift between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the 
leader of the Action Group (AG) political party, and S. L. Akintola, the 
deputy leader of the party, led to a split within the party, with one 
faction supporting Awolowo and the other supporting Akintola. The 
disagreement between the two factions sparked rioting across the region. 
(Ostheimer 1973, 48-51; Isichei 1983, 468; Adamolekun 1986, 79).
As events in the region took a turn for the worse, the federal 
government intervened by declaring a state of emergency and suspending 
the region’s constitution and government. Following a judicial enquiry 
into the affairs of the region, Awolowo and twenty-seven others were 
arrested and placed on trial for treason. Awolowo was found guilty and 
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment (Rinehart 1982, 47; Irukwu 1983,
133). With Awolowo and the other leading party members in jail, the
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Action Group ceased to be an effective national opposition party. The 
removal of the opposition in this fashion marked the end of the effort 
to conduct the affairs of the federal parliament on the Westminster 
model (Pedler 1979, 213).
In 1962, another controversy arose over the census figures. As 
soon as the 1962 census figures were announced it was rejected by 
northern leaders because it showed a decreased proportion of Nigerians 
1iving in the North. The census was canceled and another count took 
place in 1963. Although political leaders from the southern regions 
were unhappy with the new figures, the census was used as the official 
basis for any calculations in which population was a relevant factor 
(Rinehart 1982, 50; Irukwu 1983, 133-34). Public displeasure with the 
performance of Nigeria’s first civilian rulers was already very high by 
the time of the 1964 general elections.
The federal elections of 1964 and the 1965 legislative elections 
in the Western region only served to further undermine public confidence 
in the ability of Nigeria’s political leaders to administer the affairs 
of the country. Charges of electoral malpractice were widespread.
Unable to resolve their differences in the polling booths, political 
factions fought in the streets. The fighting was especially violent in 
the Western Region where an estimated 2,000 persons died (Rinehart 1982, 
52). On January 14, 1966, with the country on the brink of a major 
political debacle, the military intervened, bringing an end to Nigeria’s 
First Republic.
The army’s Commander in Chief, Major General Johnson Aguiyi 
Ironsi, an Ibo, assumed the leadership of the country as the head of the
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newly formed Federal Military Government (FMG). The FMG suspended the 
constitution, ordered the dissolution of all legislative bodies and 
banned all political parties. On July 29, 1966, while on an official 
visit to the Western Region, Ironsi was assassinated (Rinehart 1982,
54). The Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from a 
small northern ethnic group (the Angas), assumed the leadership of the 
FMG.
Gowon received the support of most Nigerians in his efforts to 
restore order and stability. However, the military governor of the 
Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, an Ibo, refused to 
acknowledge Gowon as supreme commander and asserted that the new federal 
government was illegal. However, the Gowon regime was faced with a more 
serious problem. Thousands of Ibos were killed and their properties 
looted and destroyed as fighting broke out in the North (Ostheimer 1973, 
64). An angry Ojukwu summoned all easterners to return to the East and 
all non-Easterners (except mid-Western Ibos) to leave the eastern 
region. Perceiving this and other related actions by Ojukwu to be a 
prelude to complete secession, Gowon declared a state of emergency.
Using his newly acquired emergency powers, Gowon appointed a 
government consisting of both military and civilian commissioners, 
abolished the regions, and divided the country into twelve states.
Ojukwu responded to these actions by pulling the Eastern Region out of 
Nigeria. On May 30, 1967, citing the FMG’s inability to protect the 
lives of easterners and suggesting its culpability in genocide, Ojukwu 
formerly proclaimed the Eastern Region as the independent Republic of 
Biafra (Rinehart 1982, 56; Pedler 1979, 223-25). Initially the FMG
BM
initiated a "police action" to end the secession. In July of 1967, the 
"police action” turned into a full-scale war. During the ensuing war, 
which lasted for thirty months, there were over a million casualties.
The literature on the Nigerian civil war is rich and its ample coverage
by other studies renders any detailed discussion of it superfluous
?here.
Having successfully prosecuted the civil war (or the "war of 
national unity" as it was labeled by the FMG), and supervised the 
peaceful assimilation of easterners into the Nigerian society, the Gowon 
regime had to deal with the task of returning the country to civilian 
rule. in a broadcast marking the tenth anniversary of Nigerian 
independence, Gowon declared that it would take his government six years 
before the country would be readied for a return to civilian rule. The 
reasons for such a protracted period of preparation for civilian rule 
were set out in a nine-point program which, according to Gowon, must be 
completed "before the government of the country can be handed over with 
a full sense of responsibility" (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, 4). The 
program included the following:
1. The reorganization of the armed forces.
2. The implementation of the National Development Plan
and the repair of the damage and neglect of war.
3. Eradication of corruption in Nigeria’s national life.
4. Resolution of the issue of the creation of more 
states.
5. The preparation and adoption of a new constitution.
6. The introduction of a new formula for revenue
allocation.
7. Conducting a national population census.
2<*e
8. Organizing of "genuinely national" political parties.
9. The organization of elections and installing popularly 
elected governments in all the states and at the 
center (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, A; Irukwu 1983,
186).
The target date for completing this political program and for restoring 
the country to civilian rule was 1976.
No assessment of the political performance of the Gowon regime 
would be complete without at least a brief examination of its handling 
of its nine-point program. The Second National Development Plan, which 
got under way in October of 1970, was aimed primarily at the 
reconstruction of facilities damaged or neglected during the war. By 
the time the Gowon regime was toppled in 1975, significant progress had 
been made toward fulfilling the FliG’s objective of repairing "the damage 
and neglect" of the war.
However, the reorganization of the armed forces was another 
matter. At the end of the civil war, the Nigerian army had grown from a 
force of about 11,500 in 1966, to over 850,000 (Europa Yearbook 1967, 
953, Legum 1973, B693). The substantial cost of maintaining such a 
large army in peace-time was an enormous financial burden for Nigeria. 
However, despite the FMG’s recognition of the need for extensive 
demobilization of soldiers, no meaningful reduction in the size of the 
army took place (Irukwu 1983, 187).
The Gowon regime did not make any significant headway in its 
attempts to eradicate corruption. In fact, the FMG under Gowon was 
widely perceived to be tolerant of corruption. Although it issued a 
decree in 1973 establishing a special anti-corruption police (the X- 
Squad, whose subsequent investigations revealed that ingenious forms of
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extortion and fraud was rampant in government and other sectors of the 
Nigerian society)) the problem of corruption actually got worse during 
the Gowon regime (Legum 19739 B686-96; Rinehart 1982s 66).
The most politically sensitive part of the nine-point program was 
undertaken in 1973. During that year the FMG conducted a national 
population census. Despite the elaborate measures taken to ensure a 
more accurate count than had been possible in 1963) the 1973 results 
once again confounded many Nigerians, as well as informed demographers. 
Not only had the national population apparently risen from 55 million to 
79 million in ten years5 but the northern states now contained 64 
percent of Nigeria’s total population) as compared to 53 percent in 
1963) which was believed to be an exaggerated figure even then (Rinehart 
1982) 65-66). The 1973 census5 upon which any future electoral 
representations and revenue allocations would be based) revived fears of 
ethnic domination.
The other five points in the nine-point program were not realized 
during the life of the Gowon regime. For example) the questions 
concerning the creation of more states and the preparation of a new 
constitution were ignored; no new formula for revenue allocation was 
introduced; the ban on political parties remained in force; and the 
promise to hold elections and return the country to a popularly-elected 
civilian government in 1976 was abandoned when9 in his 1974 independence 
day broadcast to the nation) Gowon declared:
Our own assessment of the situation as of now is that 
it will be utterly irresponsible to leave the nation in the 
lurch by a precipitate withdrawal which will certainly throw 
the nation back into confusion. Therefore) the Supreme 
Military Council) after careful deliberation and full 
consultation with the hierarchy of the armed forces and
2 w
police, have decided that the target date of 1976 is in the
circumstances unrealistic and that it would indeed amount to
a betrayal of trust to adhere rigidly to that target date.^
Gowon assured Nigerians that the FMG had not abandoned plans of 
returning the country to civilian rule. However, he did not indicate 
when civilian rule will be reinstated. In the face of rising public 
discontent with Gowon’s vacillation on the issue of a return to civilian 
rule, his regime was toppled in a bloodless coup on July 29, 1975.
Gowon was succeeded by another northerner, Brigadier Murtala Ramat 
Muhammed. One of the first acts of the new regime was to cancel the 
1973 census and replace it with normal population projections from the 
baseline of the 1963 census. On October 1, 1975, Muhammed announced a 
five-stage program which he said would culminate in the return to 
civilian rule. The program was to be accomplished as follows:
1. Appointment of a Constitution Drafting Committee in 
October, 1975, to work on a preliminary draft.
2. Creation of new states by April 1976; completion of
the first draft of the constitution by September,
1976.
3. Election of members of a Constituent Assembly in
October, 1977.
b. Ratification of the Draft Constitution by the
Constituent Assembly by October 1979, and lifting of 
the 1966 ban on political parties.
5. States and federal elections by October, 1979 (Irukwu
1983, 201).
Muhammed named October 1, 1979, as the date when the military would hand 
the control of government to civilians. He promised that his regime did 
not "intend to stay in office a day longer than is necessary, and 
certainly not beyond this date.,ft
2^5
The Muhammed regime had more success with its stated political 
objectives than did Gowon’s. In October of 1975* a 50-man committee to 
draft a new constitution was appointed. On February 3, 1976, the FMG 
announced the creation of seven new states, bringing the total number of 
states to 19. The FMG’s progress toward the realization of its stated 
political objectives was briefly interrupted when Muhammed was 
assassinated in a failed coup attempt on February 13, 1976. Muhammed 
was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, a westerner of Yoruba 
origin. The change in leadership was accomplished without any 
noticeable lapse in the progress toward civilian rule. The draft 
constitution was completed in September of 1976, and in August of 1977, 
a Constituent Assembly (CA) was elected. The CA completed its task in 
August of 1978, and a month later a new Constitution, patterned after 
that of the United States, was promulgated into law as Decree No. 25.
Soon after the ban on politics was lifted in September of 1978, 
many political parties were established. However, only five of the new 
parties met the required criteria for registration. The five political 
parties that were registered by the Federal Electoral Commission 
(FEDECO) to contest the 1979 elections were: the Unity Party of Nigeria
(UPN), the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), the Great Nigerian People’s 
Party (GNPP), the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), and the People’s 
Redemption Party (PRP). The legislative and presidential elections were 
held in months of July and August respectively. Alhaji Shehu Shagari of 
the NPN won the presidential race and was installed as the President of 
Nigeria’s Second Republic on October 1, 1979.
2^6
During the first two years of the Shagari administration, the 
affairs of the government progressed very slowly. For the most part, 
this was because the president’s party, the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN), did not have a commanding majority in the National Assembly. 
Efforts to sustain a working coalition with the Nigerian People’s Party 
(NPP) failed when a shaky alliance between the two parties broke up in 
July of 1981. The slow progress of government was demonstrated by the 
fact that, after two years of civi1ian rule, the National Assembly had 
passed only 17 bills (Legum 1982, B504).
Furthermore, the Shagari administration had to deal with the 
hostilities of opposition party members who accused his ruling NPN of 
political victimization and intimidation. There were also intei— party 
conflicts in the various states (Legum 1981, B569; 1982, B507; Falola 
and Ihonvbere 1985, 79). Having survived a problematic first term in 
office, Shagari was re-elected president in the 1983 elections.
However, the results of the elections were widely disputed. There were
c
accusations of electoral fraud by defeated candidates.J Except for 
supporters of the victorious NPN, Nigerians were generally critical of 
the conduct and results of the elections (Falola and Ihonvbere, 220-23). 
It came as no surprise to most Nigerians when less than four months 
after the elections the Shagari regime was toppled in a military coup.
The new FMG was headed by Maj. Gen. Muhammed Buhari, the former 
Commissioner for Petroleum in the last military regime (1975-1979).
Upon assuming office, Buhari stated that the elimination of corruption 
and the restoration of the nation’s economy were the principal 
objectives of the new military rulers. One of the new regime’s major
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initiative was the introduction of what it called the "War Against 
Indiscipline" (WAI). WAI was aimed at re-educating Nigerians to refrain 
from corrupt and non-productive activities.
In an effort to curb the rising incidence of crime, Buhari’s 
regime promulgated several decrees which mandated the death penalty for 
a number of offenses, including armed robbery, oil smuggling, and drug 
trafficking.*5 The execution in April, 1985, of three men for cocaine 
smuggling so appalled the people that they called for a change in 
policy. However, the new military leaders were not swayed by popular 
demands for milder sentences.
Another cause of public concern was the promulgation of Decree No. 
4 (Protection Against False Accusation) on April 17, 1984. The decree 
was supposedly intended to protect government officials from "falsehoods 
and inaccuracies of press reports" (Legum 1985, B550). However, to most 
Nigerians, it represented an attempt by the Buhari regime to curb the 
freedom of expression to which they have become accustomed (under both 
civilian and military rule). The initial popularity which the regime 
enjoyed soon gave way to fear and disenchantment, as the regime became 
rigid and uncompromising in its posture. After only twenty months in 
office, Buhari was ousted by his fellow officers who "could not stay 
passively and watch a small group of individuals misuse power to the 
detriment of our national aspirations and interest" (Legum 1985, B545).
Economic Developments
The issue of economic development is one that has loomed quite 
large in the affairs of successive Nigerian governments. Irrespective 
of the nature of the regime, successive Nigerian governments have
2^8
advanced policies designed to bring about the rapid development of the 
country’s economy. In the settings of such policies, these regimes have 
tended to place the greatest emphasis on the development of the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. Within the industrial sector, two 
areas have received most attention: petroleum and manufacturing. In 
later pages, the performance of alternating Nigerian civilian and 
military regimes will be laid out, in an effort to determine how 
effective they have been at attaining their objectives. Since the case 
study of Ghana focused on the agriculture sector, and the petroleum 
sector was not an important part of the Nigerian economy until the late 
1960s, the manufacturing sector has been selected as the focus for a 
detailed examination of regime performance in Nigeria.
Economic Developments During the Colonial Era 
In the wake of the British control of Nigeria came the development 
of a cash economy based mainly on the production of cocoa, palm oil and 
kernel, rubber, cotton, and timber, as well as the mining of tin ore and 
coal. The primary concerns of the colonial administration were to 
stimulate the production and export of these cash crops and to encourage 
the consumption and expand the importation of British manufactured 
goods. The fact that these economic considerations were the major 
reasons for the colonization of Nigeria is supported by the observation 
of the first British Governor General of Nigeria, Lord Lugard.
According to Lugard, "the partitioning of Africa was, as we all 
recognize, due primarily to the economic necessity of increasing the 
supplies of raw materials and food to meet the needs of the 
industrialized nations of Europe" (Stavrianos 1981, 278).
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Consequently, the colonial administrators encouraged agricultural and 
mining activities, while giving little or no support to manufacturing 
activities.
Agriculture
The colonial government established a number of institutions for 
the general advancement of agricultural production. Schools, 
plantations and agricultural research stations were established. These 
institutions greatly enhanced the production of major cash crops: palm
oil and kernels, cocoa, groundnut, cotton and rubber. These products 
made significant contributions to the colonial economy.
Throughout the colonial era, the agricultural sector remained the 
most important sector of the Nigerian economy. By 1960, the sector 
accounted for over 75 percent of total export earnings. The colonial 
administrators encouraged the production of cash crops because this not 
only met the need for such crops in Britain, but it also provided the 
Nigerian farmers the income with which they could pay the head tax that 
was the main financial prop of the colonial government.
Mining
A distant second to the agricultural sector in its contribution to 
the Nigerian economy was the mining sector. British colonial rule 
resulted in the extensive exploitation of Nigeria’s mineral resources. 
The exploitation was particularly severe in the case of tin mining. 
Foreign mining of tin was begun by the Champion (Nigeria) Tin Fields 
Company around 1909. By the end of 1910, over fifty companies had taken 
up licenses to prospect for tin in Nigeria. The quantity of tin
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exported rose from 737 tons in 1910 to a high of 15,166 in 19**5 
(Ekundare 1973> 179). Other minerals including columbite, coal and gold 
also contributed to export earnings.
Manufacturing
The type of manufacturing establishments that were allowed to 
develop in colonial Nigeria were primarily those involved in first-stage 
processing of raw materials. Saw-milling, cotton ginning, groundnut 
shelling and groundnut oil extraction, and palm fruit processing 
characterized the industrial activity in colonial Nigeria. Because the 
British used their colonies primarily as a source of raw materials and 
not as a center for manufacturing, the latter was never given the 
necessary impetus to develop in Nigeria. During the colonial era, some 
local industries continued to operate, but at a much reduced capacity. 
The increasing importation of foreign goods brought with it new tastes 
for better, and sometimes cheaper, industrial goods from Europe.
A notable feature of colonial rule was the decline in the 
industrialization of the Nigerian economy. Iron smelting ceased to 
exist. Salt production declined, surviving only insofar as it catered 
to local preferences. Local pots were partly displaced by imported 
enamel ware. The production of soap and local textiles declined 
(Isichei 19B3, **31). This process of industrial decline was facilitated 
by the policies of the colonial administration. For example, the 
Caravan Tax of 1902 added to the cost of Hausa textiles, and the 
abolition in 190** of tolls on British textiles gave them a competitive 
advantage over those that were manufactured in Nigeria. Furthermore, in 
response to the demands of British mining companies, the colonial
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government banned the local smelting industry (Isichei 1983, 427-31). 
Even as late as 1946, the colonial government foiled plans by the United 
Africa Company (UAC) to open a textile factory in Nigeria. The plans 
were well advanced when the company was informed that if its projected 
textile factory resulted "in an appreciable diminution in the yield of 
import duties on textiles the factory’s products would be made liable to 
an equivalent excise duty" (Pedler 1979, 103).
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the situation began to change as
4
Nigerian nationalists started agitating for more substantial 
participation in government. This led to a series of political 
developments that created the conditions under which Nigerians could 
become more involved in the determination of the nation’s economic and 
political growth. The most important of these developments was the 
promulgation in June, 1951, of a new constitution, the Macpherson 
Constitution (named after the incumbent governor, John Macpherson). The
new constitution marked the beginning of a period of effective transfer 
of political authority from British administrators to Nigerians. It 
allowed for regional autonomy, transforming the regions which had been 
merely administrative divisions into complete political and governmental 
systems, with executive councils and legislative assemblies (Ostheimer 
1973, 24-25; Rinehart 1982, 41-42). The regional governments were given 
the responsibility for formulating and implementing policies in several 
areas, notably agriculture, education and industry.
Another important development began in 1946 when, under the 
stimulus of the scheme for Nigeria contained in the 1945 Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act, a ten-year plan for development and welfare
was inaugurated. The plan allocated funds for a variety of projects 
ranging from small community improvements to the construction of major 
health, educational and research facilities (Ekundare 1973, 230).
Government policies on economic development during the 1950s were 
aimed at encouraging private investment, particularly in manufacturing 
and agriculture. In 1952, the initial steps were taken to encourage 
pioneer industries. Any business venture which satisfied the provisions 
of the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance (which were, broadly that, 
that the industry must be favorable to Nigeria and in her interest) 
might be declared a pioneer industry. Such industries were relieved 
from payment of company or profit tax during the first two years of 
their existence. This ordinance was superseded by the Industrial 
Development (Income Tax Relief) Ordinance of 1958, which extended the 
period of guaranteed tax relief and also liberalized the procedure for 
granting pioneer certificates (Ekundare 1972, 40-41). Although some 
businesses abused the privileges provided by the ordinance (upon making 
substantial profits some companies folded up as soon as their pioneer 
status expired), the ordinance led to the establishment of many 
manufacturing enterprises in Nigeria (Pedler 1979, 105-107).
Another factor that provided an impetus for the growth of 
manufacturing industries during the 1950s was the expansion of the 
Nigerian market and the increase in the purchasing power of the 
population. During this period the value of imports underwent a 
tremendous expansion and it soon became apparent to trading companies 
that the Nigerian market will be able to sustain some types of 
manufacturing industries. Consequently, the large trading companies
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channelled some of their profitsj which would ordinarily have been 
transferred overseas, into establishing some light manufacturing 
industries in Nigeria (Isichei 1983, 432; Rodney 1974, 171). Thus, the 
trading companies became pioneers of industrialization, but it was not 
long before the were joined by others. Because of a lack of indigenous 
capital most of the new industrial establishments were foreign-owned.
For example, the giant UAC (the largest trading company in Nigeria since 
the advent of colonial rule), founded the Nigerian Breweries, Ltd. and 
many other light manufacturing enterprises; Portland Cement Company 
built a cement manufacturing plant; and the makers of Raleigh bicycles 
and Bedford lorries (trucks) established plants for assembling their 
products in Nigeria (Isichei 1983, 432).
Colonial Policies and Foreign Investment
The domination of the manufacturing industry by foreign firms 
became a major concern of the colonial government as Nigeria moved 
toward independence. Although some colonial policies, such as the 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance, helped to encourage the development of 
indigenous manufacturing enterprises, the incentives provided by the 
ordinance proved to be more of a boon for foreign entrepreneurs than for 
indigenous ones. The Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief) 
Ordinance, which authorized the repayment of part or all of any duty 
paid on imported materials used in the manufacturing sector, was also 
more beneficial to foreign-owned enterprises (Ekundare 1972, 41). In 
1956, the concern over foreign domination of the Nigerian economy led to 
the creation of a national committee on Nigerianization of business 
ventures. Among other proposals, the committee recommended that aliens
254
be barred from distributive trades. This recommendation was not adopted 
until well after Nigeria achieved independence (Whitaker 1982, 142). 
Nevertheless, by the time Nigeria attained independence, the 
manufacturing sector was expanding rapidly (see Table 6.1) and was 
beginning to contribute to the overall growth of the economy. During 
the 1950s, the sector contributed a yearly average of nearly 4.5 percent 
to the gross domestic product (GDP).
Economic Development During the Balewa Administration (1960-1966)
During the first six years of independence, significant progress 
was made in the areas of commerce and industry. During the Balewa 
administration, Nigeria’s foreign trade continued the upward trend begun 
after the Second World War. The value of exports rose from 327 million 
naira in 1959 to 568 million in 1966, while the value of imports rose 
from 357 million naira to 512 million naira over the same period. The 
composition of Nigeria’s exports witnessed a significant change during 
this period. In 1959, agricultural products accounted for over 75 
percent of total exports, while crude petroleum accounted for only 1.7 
percent. However, by 1965, the contribution of agriculture to Nigeria’s 
exports had declined to 51.6 percent, while that of crude petroleum had 
risen to 26 percent (Aboyade 1972, 558). The growth rate of the gross 
domestic product (GDP), averaged an impressive 5 percent per year during 
the live of the Balewa government (1960-1965).'
Manufacturing, 1960-1966
Like most African leaders, Nigeria’s governing elite were 
convinced that the manufacturing industry was the basis of the strength
Table 6.1
Increase of Manufacturing Industry in Nigeria* 1950-1960 




Baker ies 19.0 316.0 1550
Oil Milling 363.6 2610.0 618
Beer and Soft Drinks 257.9 2B00.0 911
Tobacco (Cigarettes) 1395.B 2190.0 57
Textiles 4.5 613.0 1350
SOURCE: Pedler (1979), p. 105.
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of Europe and North America, and that its absence was the principal 
cause of Africa’s underdevelopment. Consequently, after Nigeria 
achieved independence, the Balewa administration devoted a great deal of 
attention to industrial development.
Under the Balewa administration, all sectors of the economy grew 
rapidly. Agriculture remained the dominant sector of the economy in 
terms of its contribution to economic growth. Despite the government’s 
attempts to diversify the economy by emphasizing the development of 
other sectors (manufacturing in particular), the contribution of the 
Agricultural sector to GDP amounted to over 50 percent in 1965 (Tables 
6.2 and 6.3). As can be seen from Table 6.3, the contribution of the 
mining sector to GDP increased more than threefold between 1960 and 
1965, when as a result of increased production of crude oil, the sector 
contributed nearly 5 percent to the GDP.
This period also witnessed a significant increase in the 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to the nation’s economy.
During the period 1960 to 1965, this sector grew at an average annual 
rate of over 12 percent. The sector’s contribution to the GDP in real 
terms grew from 107.6 million naira in 1960 to 214.6 million in 1965 
(Olaloku 1979, 4-5). The fact that manufacturing was becoming an 
important contributor to economic growth in Nigeria can be seen in Table 
6.3. The table shows that the sector’s share of GDP rose from 4.5 
percent in 1960 to over 6.4 percent in 1965. Import substituting 
ventures were undertaken on a wide scale, resulting in a significant 
decline in the importation of manufactured goods. The number of 
manufacturing establishments in Nigeria grew from 524 in 1962 to 776 in
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Table 6.2
Gross Domestic Product by Kind of Economic Activity* 1960-1985
(in Billion Naira)
YEAR SDP AGRICULTURE MANUFACTURING
1960 2.4 1.41 0.11
1961 2.4 1.45 0.13
1962 2.5 1.62 0.14
1963 2.9 1.67 0.16
1964 3.1 1.67 0.19
1965 3.4 1.69 0.21
1966 3.6 1.84 0.22
1967 2.9 1.53 0.21
1968 2.9 1.41 0.20
1969 3.8 1.71 0.28
1970 5.6 2.49 0.38
1971 7.1 2.97 0.41
1972 7.7 3.00 0.51
1973 10.9 3.10 0.50
1974 18.8 3.46 0.66
1975 21.8 4.05 1.17
1976 27.6 6.12 1.46
1977 32.5 7.31 1.55
1978 35.5 8.05 1.78
1979 43.1 9.10 2.04
1980 49.7 10.08 2.35
1981 52.2 9.86 2.65
1982 55.7 12.41 2.73
1983 55.2 12.16 2.37
1984 56.7
1985 65.5
Source: United Nations* National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of Main
Aggregates (1979-88).
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1965, an increase of over 48 percent (Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 
1966-1968). The most impressive increases occurred in the manufacturing 
of textiles* beverages* footwear, printing, soap, cement and cigarettes 
(IBRD 1974, 83; Boahen, Ade Ajayi and Tidy 1986, 167). This growth was 
in large part due to the changing role of government with respect to 
manufacturing. Prior to 1950, in its effort to secure and preserve the 
Nigerian market for British manufactured goods, the colonial government 
deliberately discouraged the development of certain manufacturing 
activities. The transfer of governmental authority to Nigerians, who 
were, in general more anxious to attain rapid economic development, led 
to the adoption of policies designed to encourage growth in the 
manufacturing sector.
A number of measures were introduced to attract manufacturing 
establishments into the country. For instance, legislation was passed 
that gave income-tax-free holidays to those firms engaged in "pioneer" 
or favored industries. In the early 1960s, additional fiscal incentives 
were introduced, such as import duties relief on imported materials, 
accelerated depreciation allowance on plants and equipment, and tariff 
protection. A number of non-fiscal incentives such as the provision of 
industrial estates, with facilities such as roads, drains, water, 
electricity and accommodation for workers was also a major inducement to 
manufacturers (Pedler 1979, 106). Industrial and training research 
organizations were also established, and loan financing was introduced.
In pursuit of the goal of creating and industrial society in the 
shortest possible time, and, in the absence of sufficient domestic 
private investment capital, the Balewa administration tried to attract
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Table 6.3
Sectoral Composition of the Gross Domestic Product (in Percentages)
VEAR AGRICULTURE MANUFACTURING






1960 58 A .5 2 12 5
1961 61 5.0 2 11 5
1962 6A 5.5 3 11 A
1963 57 5.5 2 12 5
196A 53 6.0 2 12 5
1965 50 6.0 5 12 5
1966 51 6.0 5 12 A
1967 52 7.0 A 12 A
1968 A9 7.0 3 12 5
1969 AA 7.0 8 12 A
1970 AA 7.0 10 12 3
1971 A2 6.0 15 11 2
1972 39 7.0 16 10 3
1973 28 A.5 18 20 A
197A 18 3.5 33 16 3
1975 19 5.0 22 20 3
1976 22 5.0 25 20 3
1977 22 5.0 2A 21 3
1978 23 5.0 2A 20 3
1979 21 5.0 28 21 A
1980 20 5.0 32 20 A
1981 19 5.0 27 22 A
1982 22 5.0 2A 21 5
1983 22 A.3 22 22 A
Source: United Nationsj National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of Main
Aggregates (New York: United Nations, 1979-88).
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foreign investors. However* during this period foreign investors were 
very cautious and only interested in projects which were guaranteed to 
be profitable and did not require substantial initial investments.
Thus, foreign private investment tended to be concentrated in light 
manufacturing industries (such as beverages and textiles). In the face 
of the political pressure for factories at all cost, federal and 
regional governments were compelled to become entrepreneurs. In a 
number of cases the governments’ ventures into the manufacturing 
industry turned out to be very costly as they invested in many non- 
viable projects. For example, in some factories owned by the government 
of the Eastern Region (including a glass factory, a bottling plant, a 
brewery, and a ceramic factory), over-staffing, nepotism and other 
corrupt practices limited their profitability (Schwarz 1968, 290).
The federal government, for its part, entered into a number of 
questionable joint-venture agreements with foreign investors. Most of 
the projects were package deals featuring turnkey projects, with little 
local technological participation. These projects were financed by 
suppliers’ credits or "contractor finance." Under these agreements, 
irrespective of the viability of a project, the foreign investor made 
substantial profits by selling the machinery which are used in the 
projects. If he had a stake at all, his holding was generally so small 
that any loss was far outweighed by the profit on the selling of the 
machine. Early in 1965, outstanding Nigerian debts under these 
arrangements totalled 55.3 million pounds (Schwarz 1969, 290). A senior 
Nigerian civil servant with experience in this field complained about;
...guaranteed riskless investments which involve government
guarantees in foreign exchange and in which the government
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has to undertake to meet all obligations falling due if the 
investment is not viable. In such projects the foreign 
investor generally contributes five percent of the equity 
capital; the rest comes from the government. The foreign 
partner supplies the equipment under suppliers’ credit 
terms. There are known cases where the foreign investor is 
the consultant who prepared the feasibility study for the 
projectj the financial adviser and the banker who finalized 
the credit arrangements, the manufacturer who supplied the 
equipment, the technical partner and management agent who 
runs the factory under a management agency agreement, with 
fees and commissions. The economic "Mikado" gets a 
government guarantee that if the project fails, the 
government would from its budgetary resources service the 
loan for the equipment (A. Ayida, quoted in Schwarz 1969,
291).
As the foregoing clearly illustrates, far from serving as a means 
for the transmission of capital into the Nigerian economy, this form of 
foreign investment actually resulted in a net drain of capital from the 
country. Furthermore, the policies of the Balewa administration also 
assured the continued domination of Nigeria’s economy by foreign 
enterprises.
Government Policy and Foreign Investment, 1960-1965
Aside from its commitment to a policy of industrialization the 
Balewa administration also expressed a commitment to the 
"Nigerianization" or indigenization of the economy. Hence, although his 
administration made sustained efforts to attract foreign capital, it was 
equally concerned about encouraging foreign domination of the economy. 
Accordingly, Balewa (1964, 33), noted that while his administration was 
"anxious to see a large and vigorous private sector developed," it was 
"also anxious that our own people should take an increasing part in the 
development of that sector." His administration’s concern was expressed 
in the Nigeria’s first National Development Plan (1962-1968), in which
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it was stated that the government would adopt policies "to enable 
Nigerians to participate to an ever increasing extent in the ownership, 
direction and management of Nigerian industry and trade" (Akinsaya 1983, 
166).
Nigeria’s level of development in the 1960s made it difficult for 
the Balewa administration to implement its policies of rapid 
industrialization and Nigerianization at the same time. The lack of 
sufficient domestic capital and inadequate technical know-how meant that 
the government’s goal of rapid industrialization could not be realized 
without substantial foreign participation. Hence, speaking before 
Parliament in 196A, Balewa expressed his concern about the foreign 
domination of the country’s economy. At the same time he stressed his 
administration’s intent to maintain an open-door policy toward foreign 
investment:
It must be obvious that no Nigerian can be content so long 
as any major sector of the economy is controlled by 
foreigners. But we are realists and we say that so long as 
there is a dearth of Nigerian capital, so must there be an 
opportunity for foreign capital in Nigeria. We do not seek 
the withdrawal of foreign capital from any area of the 
economy before Nigerian enterprise is able to replace it.
When the time for withdrawal has come, due notice will be 
given (Proehl 1965, 159).
This official liberalism was expressed in practical terms in the 
shape of generous incentives for foreign investors. These included 
liberal income tax and import duty relief, accelerated depreciation 
allowances and the imposition of protective duties and import quotas. 
There were no restrictions on the remission of profits and repatriation 
of private salaries (Schwarz 1969, 286). Aside from these economic 
inducements, the regulations relating to foreign investments provided
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for guarantees of fair compensation in the event of nationalization.
The Balewa administration indicated that it had no plans "for 
nationalizing industry beyond the extent to which public utilities were 
already nationalized" (Akinsanya 1983, 1^6). This liberal attitude 
toward business, and the absence of a strongly established socialist 
element in the nation’s politics? helped to attract more foreign capital 
into Nigeria. As a result? the foreign domination of the economy in 
general, and of the manufacturing sector in particular, was maintained 
throughout the life of Nigeria’s first civilian regime.
Economic Development from Gowon to Obasanjo (1966-1979)
Economic policy during the civil war period was directed toward 
raising sufficient funds to prosecute the war. During this period 
defense expenditure increased more than ten-fold, as public spending in 
other areas declined. Expenditures on defense, which accounted for only 
11.3 percent and 16.£ percent of total current and capital expenditures 
in 1965, accounted for 50.5 percent and 65.6 percent, respectively, in 
1971. Conversely, current and capital expenditures for economic 
services declined from 11.6 percent and 55.8 percent to £.7 percent and 
19.7 percent, respectively, over the same period (Nafziger 1983, 1£7- 
37).
The devastation caused by the civil war necessitated the 
implementation of a massive program of physical repair and 
rehabilitation of the country’s infrastructure. The successful 
execution of the program was made possible by Nigeria’s new-found wealth 
from the exploitation and exportation of crude oil. By the time the war 
ended in 1971, crude oil had become Nigeria’s major export, accounting
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for about 60 percent of total exportsj as against 86 percent in 1965.
The dramatic rise in world oil prices in 1974 (when oil accounted for 
nearly 98 percent of total exports) resulted in a dramatic increase in 
Nigeria’s export earnings.
Spurred by the increase in oil revenue) the FMG embarked on a 
spending spree* which included expenditures on a variety of non­
productive, grandiose projects. For example, the FMG spent over 140 
million naira for the construction of facilities for the international 
Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC), which was originally scheduled 
for the end of 1975 (Kirk-Greene and Rimmer 1981, 18-13). Income from 
oil revenues was unevenly distributed, as government investment was 
concentrated in the urban centers, while the rural areas received very 
little attention. With more public investment going to the cities, 
labor was attracted away from the less profitable agricultural sector. 
This led to high urban unemployment, as people leaving the agricultural 
sector were often unable to secure jobs in the cities. The inflation 
rate rose considerably during this period, reaching a peak of 43 percent 
in 1975 (Legum 1975, B750; 1977, B6B3).
With more attention being paid to the petroleum sector, 
productivity in the neglected agricultural sector suffered. Agriculture 
which was, for a long time, the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy 
(accounting for 75 percent of total exports in 1960 and 55 percent in 
1965), accounted for only 4.4 percent of total export earnings in 1975 
(Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 186). Declining agricultural productivity 
eventually led to food shortages. However, the enormous increase in oil 
revenue during this period enabled the country to supplement local food
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production with imported food products. Subsequently, Nigeria which was 
once a major exporter of food* became a net importer of food.
After Gowon was overthrown, the new FMG tried to arrest the 
decline in agricultural productivity. It launched Operation Feed the 
Nation (OFN) which aimed to promote increased agricultural productivity 
and make the nation self-sufficient in food output. Despite impressive 
increases in budgetary allocation to agriculture, the OFN program did 
not alleviate Nigeria’s food problem. Inflation remained a major 
problem, as food prices continued to escalate at a much faster pace than 
before (Legum 1979, B753). The FMG was not helped by the world oil glut 
and the subsequent decline in oil prices after 1977. As the revenue 
from oil began to decline, the FMG was forced to borrow funds from 
abroad to carry out its development programs. Consequently, Nigeria’s 
external debt, which stood at only 54 million naira in 1975, rose to 364 
million in 1979 (Legum 1981, B5B0).
Manufacturing, 1966-1979
The Nigerian government has always been a major investor in the 
manufacturing industry. Thus, the decline in government expenditure on 
economic services during the civil war led to a decline in manufacturing 
output. Total manufacturing output declined by over 10 percent between 
1966 and 1968. The number of manufacturing establishments declined from 
776 in 1965 to 540 in 1968 before rising to 704 in 1970 (National 
Accounts Statistics, 1978-88; Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 1968-74).
After the war was over the Gowon regime turned its attention to 
economic development. According to the Guideposts for the regime’s 
Second National Development Plan (1966, 2-3), one of the most important
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aim of the plan was to promote the rapid industrialization of the 
economy. Toward this end, the Gowon regime placed more emphasis on the 
development and expansion of the manufacturing sector. The major 
objectives of the government’s industrial policy included:
1. The promotion of even development and the fair 
distribution of industries in all parts of the 
country.
2. Ensuring a rapid expansion and diversification of the
industrial sector of the economy.
3. Promoting the establishment of industries which cater 
for overseas market in order to earn foreign exchange.
b. Raising the proportion of indigenous ownership of
industrial investment (Onyejekwe 1981, 158).
By the time the Gowon regime was toppled in 1975, nearly all the 
manufacturing industries damaged during the war had been reactivated.
The growth rate within the sector was about 10 percent between 1970 and 
1975. The number of manufacturing enterprises rose from 70^ to 12^6 
over the same period (Legum 1975* B750; Industrial Statistics Yearbooks 
1972-76; Onyejekwe 1981, 159). Despite the impressive growth rate the 
industrial sectors’ contribution to GDP actually declined during this 
period, falling from 7 percent of GDP to 5 percent (see Table 6.3).
The Third National Development Plan was launched by Gowon in March 
of 1975, but it was implemented by the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime (1975- 
1979). The plan was launched under extremely favorable circumstances; 
Nigeria had become the world’s eight largest oil producer; and the 1973 
oil crisis which facilitated a substantial increase in oil prices led to 
an increase in Nigeria’s revenue from oil. Consequently, the third plan 
was much more ambitious than its predecessors and aimed at radically 
transforming the national economy. Investment in this new plan period
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was more than twelve times as much as the investment covered by the 
second plan (Bailey 1977, 158-59). Although agriculture had the highest 
allocation in the plan, the largest percentage increase over previous 
plans was in the allocation to industry. Apart from expenditures 
connected with the oil industry, the biggest single industrial project 
in the plan was the establishment of an iron and steel industry (Bailey 
1977, 159; Legum 1976, B801-803).
The decline in world demand for oil during the late 1970s, 
however, adversely affected the implementation of the third development 
plan. In 1977, due to worsening economic conditions and the drop in the 
level of Nigeria’s foreign exchange reserves, the Obasanjo 
administration restricted the importation of a variety of goods.
Although this measure was designed in part to protect domestic 
manufacturing industries, it actually led to the collapse of a few 
businesses. Stricter foreign exchange controls caused delays in the 
importation of raw materials needed in some manufacturing enterprises. 
Inadequate supply of raw materials forced others to shut down (Legum 
1981, B608-609). Consequently, by 1978 the total number of 
manufacturing establishments in Nigeria was only 1075, compared to 1246 
in 1975 and 1418 in 1977 (Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 1976-80). In 
1979, on the eve of the return to civilian rule, the sector’s 
contribution to GDP remained relatively low at only 4.7 percent (see 
Table 6.3).
An important characteristic of the manufacturing sector was 
unaffected by the policies initiated during the period of military rule. 
This sector continued to be dominated by light manufacturing enterprises
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(food processings beveragess cigarettes and textiles). Furthermore, the 
import content of manufactured goods remained very high. On the 
averages 3A percent of raw materials used in the sector was imported 
(Jakande 1975s 27^-76). Another important characteristic of this sector 
was the level of government participation. During the thirteen years of 
military rule (1966-1979), the government’s participation in 
manufacturing enterprises increased substantially. The government 
invested in a variety of projectss including salts oils petrochemical 
and gas refineriess auto assembly plantSs cements glass and beer 
factoriess textile mills and many more (Ostheimer 1973s 1A9; Jakande 
1975, 276; Olorunsola 1977, 35).
Most of the FMG’s activities in manufacturing was in partnerships 
with foreign companies. The lack of adequate domestic capital meant 
that the more technologically advanced sub-sectors of the manufacturing 
industry continued to be dominated by foreign investors. The FMG’s 
concern over the low levels of indigenous participation in manufacturing 
sector led to the implementation of a number of measures aimed at 
remedying the situation. Two of these measures was the creation during 
the Gowon administration of the Nigerian Bank of Commerce and Industry 
and the Agricultural Credit Bank. It was hoped that these banks would 
facilitate the development of private indigenous enterprises by 
extending credit facilities to enterprising Nigerian entrepreneurs 
(Akinsanya 1983, 160). Another, and perhaps the most significant 
measure, was the promulgation of decrees which were intended to bring 
about a reduction in foreign participation in a variety of enterprises 
in Nigeria.
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The Indigenization Decrees of 1972 and 1977
Like its civilian predecessor? the FMG acknowledged the need for 
foreign capital investment in Nigeria’s drive for rapid 
industrialization. Like its civilian predecessor, the FMG also sought 
to reassure foreign investors that their investments would be safe in 
Nigeria. Thus, for example, the Second National Development Plan 
included the promise that there will be no program of "indiscriminate 
nationalization" (Ostheimer 1973, 151). The third development plan also 
sought to encourage foreign private investment by promising "to further 
open the doors to both indigenous and foreign private investors in most 
sectors of manufacturing" (Jakande 1979, 305).
While trying to attract foreign investment, the FMG also expressed 
its concern over the continued foreign domination of the country’s 
economy. Thus, it was stated in the Second National Development Plan 
that:
Experience has shown through history, that political 
independence without economic independence is but an empty 
shell.... The interest of foreign private investors in the 
Nigerian economy cannot be expected to coincide at all times 
and in every respect with national aspirations...a truly 
independent nation cannot allow its objectives and 
priorities to be distorted or frustrated by the 
manipulations of powerful foreign investors (quoted in 
Schatz 1981, 22).
In an effort aimed at attaining some degree of economic 
independence, the FMG promulgated the Nigerian Enterprises and Promotion 
Decree (Decree No. 4) of 1972. The decree listed 22 selected industrial 
activities (called Schedule I industries) as the exclusive preserve of 
Nigerian entrepreneurs. The industries affected included small, labor
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intensive manufacturing and local service-related enterprises, many of 
which were already Nigerian-owned by 1972.
Enterprises exempted on the basis of their size (i.e., those with 
paid-up capital in excess of A00,000 naira), were required to make
available to the Nigerian public up to A0 percent of their total
equity. The businesses in this schedule included construction firms, 
some large import substitution industries, and wholesale and retail 
distributors. The largest and most important industries (e.g., tobacco 
and textiles), were completely unaffected by the 1972 decree. The 
failure to indigenize these enterprises which were among the most 
profitable in the country, caused many Nigerians to call for an 
expansion of the number of industries covered by the decree. The 
government responded with the promulgation of a second indigenization 
decree in January of 1977.
The second decree added 20 new industries to the list of Schedule 
I industries which were to be completely Nigerian-owned. Thirty-three 
new industries were added to Schedule II, and the mandatory sale of
shares was raised from A0 to 60 percent. A third schedule was added to
the new decree which listed all remaining industries and required that 
they make available A0 percent of their equity to Nigerians (Biersteker 
1983, 190).
The various provisions of the first decree were to have been 
implemented by the end of 197A, but only about a third of the foreign 
business affected had completed the process of indigenizing their 
businesses by mid-1975 (Whitaker 1982, 1A3). The second decree was 
similarly only partially effective. Virtually every foreign firm
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operating in the country found ways to neutralize the indigenization 
requirements. The specific strategy or combination of strategies varied 
from firm to firm; however, they were all designed to ensure a minimal 
loss of control over operations. Biersteker (1987, 113-225) identified 
the variety of strategies that foreign firms adopted to circumvent the 
provisions of the decrees. Thus, although the decrees facilitated some 
structural changes, they failed to alter significantly the composition 
of the ownership of businesses in Nigeria.
Economic Development During the Shagari Administration (1979-1983)
Upon return to civilian rule the new government continued with the 
economic programs of its military predecessor. Monetary and fiscal 
policies were directed at stimulating domestic production and reducing 
inflation. Rising oil revenues in 1979 and 1980, as well as the 
maintenance of the previous military regime’s restrictions on imports 
helped to improve Nigeria’s foreign exchange situation (Legum 1981, 
B579). With the improvements in the country’s foreign exchange 
situation, the Shagari administration was eventually able to relax the 
restrictions on imports.
The new civilian government promised to make the nation self- 
sufficient in food production by 1984. Consequently, when the Fourth 
National Development Plan (1981-1985) was introduced in March, of 1981, 
the highest priority was given to agriculture, which was allocated over 
10 percent of total planed expenditure (Legum 1982, B523-24). The 
administration launched a "Green Revolution" program which emphasized 
the "revitalization of the small land holders," as well as encouraging 
the establishment of privately owned large-scale farms.
272
A major portion of the program of the fourth development plan was
to be funded by revenue derived from the exportation of crude oil.
Shagari alluded to this fact when the plan was inaugurated:
The Fourth Plan is being launched at a time when the 
country’s production of crude oil, which is the main source 
of government revenue and foreign exchange earning, has 
virtually stabilized. A basic strategy of the Fourth Plan 
would therefore be the promotion of optional utilization of 
resources. Oil is a wasting asset. The resources generated 
from this sector must therefore be used to promote all-round 
expansion in the productive capacity of the economy so as to 
ensure self-sustaining growth in the shortest time possible 
(Shagari 1981).
The estimates for the plan were based on projection of revenues 
derived from sales of crude oil in 1979 and 1980. The plan envisioned a 
production rate of 2.19 million barrels per day at $36 per barrel 
(Bienen 1985, 54). Neither of the projections turned out to be 
accurate. By August of 1981, oil production fell to 650,000 barrels per 
day, as world oil prices began to fall. Revenue from oil underwent a 
dramatic decline, from $23.4 billion in 1980 to $10.1 billion in 1983.
As a result of the decline in oil revenues, the Shagari administration 
was unable to sustain its commitment to programs in the fourth 
development plan. Therefore, agricultural productivity remained low and 
the government was compelled to use scarce foreign exchange to import 
food. The country went heavily into debt. By the time of the coup in 
December, 1983, the country was on the verge of economic collapse. 
Between 1981 and 1983, GDP declined by 8.5 percent and consumer prices 
rose at an annual average rate of over 20 percent (Hackett 1988, 767). 
Unemployment remained a major problem, particularly among university and 
polytechnic graduates (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 83-145). However, the
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most serious economic problem was the country’s external debt, estimated 
at about $20 billion (Legum B530-32).
Manufacturing, 1979-1983
When it launched the Fourth National Development Plan in 1981, the 
Shagari administration indicated that a primary objective of the 
programs in the plan was the promotion of self-reliance. In addition to 
agriculture, the plan accorded high priority to increasing industrial 
productivity (Legum 1981, B583; Olayiwola 1987, 127). The plan promised 
to encourage "the maximum growth of investment and output so as to 
ensure a full realization of the country’s industrial potential in the 
shortest possible time." The plan projected a growth rate of 15 percent 
for the manufacturing industry over the plan period (Legum 1982, B526- 
27).
The need to reduce the manufacturing sector’s dependence on 
imported raw materials has compelled successive Nigerian governments to 
include the establishment of an iron and steel industry as an important 
part of their development plans. Although it was included in the first, 
second and third development plans, the project never got off the ground 
(Onyejekwe 1981, 161). Under the Fourth Development Plan, the 
establishment of an iron and steel industry was again made a priority of 
government. The government’s commitment to the project was demonstrated 
when a minister of cabinet rank was appointed to be "solely responsible 
for steel development." Furthermore, the Shagari administration 
allocated over one billion naira to the project in its 1981 capital 
budget (Tijjani and Williams 1981, 258-65).
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Yet the administration realized part of its planned objectives, 
when three steel-rolling mills and a steel plant (with the capacity to 
produce 960,000 tons of steel a year) were opened in 19BE. The much 
larger Ajaokuta steel complex opened its first light section mill in 
1983 (Hackett 1988, 771). To be sure, some of these projects were 
inaugurated during the tenure of the Obasanjo administration.
Another sector that witnessed some growth during the early years 
of the Second Republic was the automotive industry. The industry 
continued to expand with Britain, France, Italy, Austria and Germany all 
involved in joint ventures with national and state governments for 
vehicle assembly. However, despite the expansion in the domestic 
automobile manufacturing, local demand remained well above supply 
(Tijjani and Williams 1981, £68; Hackett 1988, 771).
The expansion in steel and automobile industry, however, was not 
sustained throughout the tenure of the Shagari administration. As has 
already been noted, because of the decline in oil revenues the Shagari 
administration was unable to sustain its commitment to programs in the 
fourth development plan. The decline in oil revenue after 1981 forced 
the reduction or stoppage of several planned projects (Hackett 1988, 
771). The introduction of austerity measures, including restrictions on 
imports, resulted in a sharp decline in economic activity. Most 
manufacturing establishments struggled to operate without essential 
imported raw materials and spare parts. In 1983, over 100 of these 
establishments were forced to close for some time as nearly 70 percent
Qof their inputs were imported (Legum 1984, B5E9).
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The manufacturing sector during the Shagari administration 
continued to be dominated by light manufacturing industries. In 1983, 
textiles, beverages, cigarette, soaps and detergent accounted for 60 
percent of total manufacturing output (Hackett 1988, 771). The 
contribution of the sector to GDP declined slightly, from 4.7 percent in 
1979 to 4.3 percent in 1983 (see Table 6.3). After reaching a record 
234S in 1981, the total number of manufacturing establishments declined 
to £112 in 1983 (Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1985, 407).
Government Policy and Foreign Investment, 1979-1983
In spite of the indigenization decrees, domestic private 
investment in the manufacturing sector remained relatively small 
throughout the Second Republic. Investment in the sector continued to 
be dominated by the government and by foreign firms. Like its 
predecessors, the Shagari administration expressed a commitment to the 
Nigerianization of the economy. However, due to deteriorating economic 
conditions the administration was unable to diligently enforce the 
provisions of the indigenization decrees. In fact, as part of the plan 
to increase industrial and agricultural production, the Shagari 
administration liberalized restrictions on foreign equity ownership in 
joint ventures in agriculture.
As early as 1980, restrictions on foreign participation in several 
industries were eased in order to encourage foreign investment. Foreign 
investors were allowed to have 60 percent participation, against the 
previous 40 percent, in the production of metal containers, fertilizers 
and cement (Legum 1981, B587). Legislation was also passed that relaxed 
investment restrictions, so that a foreign parent company would be able
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to keep control of new subsidiary companies in Nigeria. Another action 
taken by the Shagari administration to attract foreign investors 
included the establishment of two information centers in the United 
States) to acquaint prospective investors with available opportunities 
in Nigeria. The administration also signed a "Memorandum of 
Understanding" with the Washington, which led to the creation of the 
Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC). The JACC promoted 
joint ventures and investments by U.S. firms in the establishment of
q
large-scale farms and food processing companies in Nigeria. These 
efforts by the Shagari administration to attract foreign investment, 
however, were not very successful. A weak economy and an unstable 
political climate may have contributed to the reluctance of foreign 
investors to come to Nigeria.
Economic Development Under the Buhari Regime (193^-1985)
On the economic front, the Buhari regime did not fare much better 
than its civilian predecessors. In an effort to control inflation and 
improve the nation’s foreign exchange situation, the regime introduced 
severe austerity measures. Among other things, foreign exchange for new 
students to study abroad was curtailed, severe restrictions were placed 
on imports, all imports became subject to import duties, and almost all 
goods manufactured in Nigeria was covered by excise duty (Legum 1984, 
B532).1*'1 Like Shagari’s civilian administration, Buhari’s military 
regime gave priority to improving agricultural productivity. In the 
19B4 and 1985 budgets the sector received 21 percent and IB percent 
respectively, of total capital expenditure (Legum 19B5, B561).
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Despite the regime’s efforts, no noticeable improvements were 
recorded. Even the decision to change the country’s currency (a move 
aimed at foiling the operations of currency smugglers), failed to 
alleviate the deteriorating economy. The Buhari regime also failed in 
its attempts to reach a loan agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Although the regime met most of the conditions set by the 
IMF (including imposing import restrictions, reducing of government 
expenditure, and giving priority to the agricultural sector), it refused 
to accede to two other important conditions: a 60 percent devaluation
of the naira and an end to subsidies on petroleum products (Novicki 
1985, A-9; Legum 1985, B560).
Manufacturing
The FMG under Buhari continued to work within the framework of the 
Fourth National Development Plan. However, because demand and prices of 
crude oil continued to sag, a number of projects were abandoned and 
funding for others were reduced. Although a substantial proportion of 
government expenditure was devoted to the manufacturing sector (steel 
development was allocated 523 million naira), a 15 percent reduction in 
total government expenditure meant that the sector received much less in 
real terms than it did under earlier administrations (Legum 198A, B532). 
A rolling mill for the production of steel wire rods was opened at the 
Ajaokuta steel complex. However, output was sporadic, owing to 
shortages of imported billets (Hackett 1988, 771).
Private investment in the manufacturing sector was severely 
hampered by the policies of the Buhari regime. The imposition of import 
duties, ranging from 5 to 200 percent, on imported raw materials
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increased the cost of production for most manufacturing activities. 
Furthermore, the imposition of excise duty on goods manufactured in 
Nigeria added more to the price of locally manufactured goods thus, 
robbing them of any competitive advantage they may have had over their 
legitimately imported or smuggled competition. Yet another problem was 
the lack of foreign exchange, which made it difficult for manufacturing 
establishments to purchase raw materials from abroad. All of these 
factors combined to produce difficult times in the manufacturing sector 
during the Buhari regime. There were dramatic declines in productivity 
in nearly all manufacturing industries. For example, output of all 
commercial vehicles declined from 30,000 units in 1981 to 10,000 units 
in 1984 as most automotive assembly plants were operating well below 
capacity. The only industry that witnessed an increase in output was 
the brewing industry (Hackett 1988, 771).
Government Policy and Foreign Investment (1984-1985)
The generation of domestic investment capital continued to be a 
problem during the Buhari regime’s brief tenure in office. Thus, during 
this period, in an effort to encourage foreign private investment in 
neglected areas, the provisions of the indigenization decrees were 
selectively relaxed. For example, in his 1984 Budget speech Buhari 
announced that the FMG was considering "a proposal to amend the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree to enable non-Nigerians to own up to 80 
percent of large farm projects" (Olayiwola 1987, 141).
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Conclusion
All of Nigeria’s leaders (civilian and military) since 
independence believed that the development of the manufacturing sector 
was a necessary precondition for the country’s economic development. 
Consequently, they adopted policies which they hoped would lead to the 
rapid development of Nigeria’s manufacturing industry. However, 
irrespective of the type of regime in power, the outcomes of these 
policies were negligible.
Throughout the period under review, the manufacturing industry 
continued to be dominated by light manufacturing enterprises that were 
technologically simple. The sector remained heavily dependent on 
imported raw materials. According to the Manufacturers’ Association of 
Nigeria (MAN), up to 60 percent of all raw materials that local industry 
used in 1985 were imported. Furthermore, the contribution of this 
sector to the GDP remained relatively low throughout the period under 
review. At no time did the sector contribute more than 7 percent to 
GDP; and in fact the sector’s contribution to GDP actually declined 
during the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 6.3). These tendencies indicated 
that after twenty-five years of independence, and in spite of the 
commitment of successive Nigerian regimes to increasing productivity in 
manufacturing, this sector remained underdeveloped.
Another important concern of successive Nigerian governments was 
the low level of indigenous participation in the nation’s economy. 
Although the Balewa administration recognized the need to initiate 
policies which would promote more indigenous participation in 
manufacturing, it was unable to achieve this goal because of the
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shortage of domestic investment capital. It was left to the succeeding 
military administration to promulgate an indigenization decree.
However, contrary to some assertions (Iwayemi 1979, 63), the 
promulgation of the 1972 and 1977 indigenization decrees had more to do 
with Nigeria’s improving economic status than with the type of regime in 
power. The massive increase in oil revenue after the 1973 oil crisis 
meant that the government could embark on its industrial development 
projects without the aid of much foreign investment. However, as soon 
as oil revenues began to fall in the 1980s, both the civilian regime of 
Shehu Shagari and the Military regime of Muhammed Buhari were compelled 
to relax the provisions of the decrees.
The results of the quantitative analysis from chapter three 
support the general conclusion that regime type was not a significant 
determinant of public economic policy in Nigeria. Whatever difference 
may have existed between the two regime types was negligible. The 
results of the simple country analysis for Nigeria (which is reproduced 
in Table 6.^) also indicated that there were no significant differences 
in the budgetary priorities of both regime types. As might be expected, 
defense spending was significantly higher under military rule than when 
civilians were in power. However, budgetary allocations for health and 
education, as well as output in the agricultural sector, were 
insensitive to regime type. More importantly, the results show the 
regime type had no impact on output in the manufacturing sector. The 
sector contributed an annual average of 5.7 percent (PMAN = 0.0569) to 
the GDP during periods of military rule and 5.2 percent (PMAN = 0.0523) 
during periods of civilian rule.
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lable 6.4
Results of Simple Country Analysis for Nigeria* 1960-1985
VARIABLE MILITARY(a) CIVILIAN<a+b) t Sig.
PSPh'ND 0.1625 0.1589 -0.1699 0.8667
PHEALTH 0.0069 0.0078 0.8103 0.4268
PEDUC 0.0226 0.0215 -0.3401 0.7372
PDEFEN 0.035"/** 0.0121 -4.5103 0.0002
PMAN 0.0569 0.0523 -1.1630 0.2573
PAGRIC 0.3396 0.4278 1.3385 0.1944
CGDP80 0.0566 0.0152 -0.8946 0.3803
*.05<prob. < . 10 
*?01 <prob. < .05
*** i_ - /->,prob.< .01
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The lack of any meaningful difference in the performance of 
civilian and military regimes in Nigeria can be attributed to a variety 
of factors. Among the most pertinent are: ineffective planning; the
reliance of both regime types on the same bureaucratic structures for 
the implementation of public policies; inefficient and corrupt political 
institutions and societal cleavages which inhibit the ability government 
to promulgate universally beneficial policies. Although some of these 
factors will be discussed at considerable length in the concluding 
chapter, at this point a brief statement about them is in order.
Perhaps the most important consideration when developing public 
policy in Nigeria is how it will be perceived by members of the numerous 
ethnic groups in the country. It was implied in Chapter Two that 
because of their corporate solidarity military rulers will have a 
significant advantage over civilian ones in governing ethnically 
fragmented societies. The Nigerian experience has proved that this is 
not always the case. For example, a few weeks after the inauguration of 
the first military regime ethnically motivated rioting broke out in 
various parts of the country. This was followed a few months later by 
one of the most violent civil wars in the annals of African history. 
Military rulers did not only fail to contain ethnic disturbances in the 
country, but like their civilian counterparts they allowed ethnic 
considerations to effect the implementation of important developmental 
programs.
Although successive regimes since independence recognized the need 
to build an iron and steel complex, and made provisions for the 
construction of such a complex in their National Development Plans,
nothing came of it until the late 1970s. The primary reason for this 
delay in the implementation of a project which many observers considered 
to be of paramount importance to the nations industrial development was 
the inability of civilian and military leaders to decide on an 
appropriate site for the project. The major regionally-based? ethnic 
groups clamored to have the complex built in their region. Not wanting 
to incur the wrath of any of the major ethnic groups? the nation’s 
leaders deferred the implementation of the project. It was not until 
late in the life of the Obasanjo administration that a site was finally 
selected for the project. Ajaokuta? the site selected for the complex 
was close to the center of Nigeria in a region not dominated by any of 
the major ethnic groups. The need to please the various groups in 
Nigeria or at least not to offend any one of them has equally hindered 
the performance of both civilian and military regimes.
As was the case in Ghana? successive civilian and military regimes 
in Nigeria were handicapped in their efforts to accomplish their stated 
objectives because they were not able to develop effective development 
plans. Plan objectives under both regimes were often designed to 
accommodate the demands of the various groups in the country. 
Consequently? these plans were rarely consistent with the government’s 
ability to fund them. Furthermore? development plans in Nigeria were 
often based upon inaccurate and unrealistic projections of expected 
revenues. This was the case with the Third National Development Plan 
which was launched during the Gowon regime and partially implemented 
during Obasanjo administration (Bailey 1977? 158-59? Legum 1976? B801- 
803). The Fourth National Development Plan which was launched during
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the Shagari administration was also overly ambitious and based on faulty 
projection of revenues from crude oil sales (Bienen 1985, 5**).
Under both civilian and military regimes, the Nigerian bureaucracy 
played a major role as architect and executor of national development 
plans. Since the bureaucracy was the only governmental institution that 
remained relatively unchanged throughout successive periods of civilian 
and military rule, the tendency therefore, was for public policies to 
remain relatively constant from one regime type to the other.
The prevalence of corruption in governmental institutions have 
proved to be a major handicap to regime performance under both civilian 
and military rule. The amount of money which was discovered in the 
possession of some Nigerian political leaders after the 1983 coup would 
have been sufficient to enable the country meet its immediate financial 
obligations. For example, the minister of transport under the Shagari 
administration was reported to have misappropriated over six billion 
dollars, through what was described as a series of "fraudulent 
practices" (Momoh and Agbabiaka 1985, 1800-1801).^ Similarly, the 
Gowon regime in Nigeria was notoriously corrupt. After the regime was 
toppled in 1975, properties and other assets valued in the billions of 
dollars, reportedly acquired improperly, were confiscated from former
isofficials of the regime.
When public policies are susceptible to the same procedural and 
institutional constraints it becomes more likely that policy outputs and 
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Chapter Seven 
CONCLUSION: CONSTRAINTS ON REGIME PERFORMANCE
To what extent can policy outputs and outcomes in sub-Saharan 
Africa be explained by the type of regime in power? Does it "make a 
difference" for a sub-Saharan African state to be governed by civilians 
or military officers? And which regime type (if any), will be most 
effective in dealing with the developmental problems of the countries in 
this region? The preceding four chapters have focused on the 
performance of civilian and military regimes in a number of sub-Saharan 
African countries in an effort to provide answers to these questions.
This chapter attempts to draw together the findings of the 
preceding four chapters as they relate to regime performance. Using the 
four hypothesis which were specified in Chapter Two as guidelinesj the 
nature of the impact of regime type on public policy will be analyzed.
More importantly) an attempt will be made to provide explanations for
the correlation of policy outputs and outcomes with regime type. To 
recapitulate) the four guiding hypotheses are:
H j: Defense expenditure should be higher in countries
where the military controls the policy-making 
institutions than in those where they do not.
Hg: Military rule will be negatively correlated with
variables indicating budgetary allocations to economic 
and social sectors) whereas civilian rule will have 
the opposite effect.
Hg: Within any given African country, changes in regime
type should be associated with shifts in the pattern
of spending priorities exhibited by that country.
H^: Socioeconomic development in the emerging nations of
sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to occur under 
military led regimes that are predisposed to
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modernization than under regimes headed by civilians 
who are similarly predisposed.
Of the four hypotheses, only HI is supported by the findings in 
the preceding chapters. Even on occasions when the economic situation 
called for increases in the budgetary allocations to the more productive 
sectors of the economy, military regimes never felt compelled to reduce 
defence spending.
While defense spending was rarely affected by austerity budgets 
under military regimes, under civilian regimes defense spending was not 
spared. For example, when declining cocoa revenue forced the Ghanaian 
civilian regimes of Nkrumah and Busia to introduce austerity budgets, 
defense spending was one of the major items to be cut (Afrifa 1966, 109; 
Rothchild 1980, 968). However, when Ghanaian military rulers were 
confronted with a similar situation, they actually increased the 
budgetary allocation to defense. For example, between 1972 and 1975, a 
time when Ghana’s economic survival was still uncertain, the Ghanaian 
military government reduced public expenditure in agriculture from 6 to 
5 percent, but increased spending on defense from 8 to 9 percent 
(Rothchild 1980, 972). Similarly, in 1981, the Liberian military 
regime, in compliance with an austerity program, removed a $9 million 
subsidy on rice prices, but instituted a threefold increase in defense 
spending (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 96).'
Surprisingly, however, increases in defence spending under 
military regimes were seldom associated with decreases in budgetary 
allocations to economic and social programs. This may be due to the 
fact that substantial savings were realized when some political 
institutions are abolished after the military assumes power. The
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salaries that are paid to African elected officials (including 
presidents, prime ministers, ministers, congressmen or members of 
parliament), as well as the cost of maintaining their residences and 
places of work (e.g., executive mansions, houses of assembly), often 
account for considerable portions of government expenditure in sub- 
saharan African states. In some countries, like Nigeria and the Sudan, 
the cost of maintaining and staffing regional executive offices and 
assemblies can be quite substantial. The suspension of these 
institutions following a coup can result in substantial savings, which 
may sometimes even be sufficient to offset the increases in defense 
spending.
It is also noteworthy that defense spending in most African 
countries is usually for small items, such as uniforms, barracks 
facilities, wages and small armaments. The governments of most African 
countries do not need, and cannot make a good case for purchasing, the 
sort of advanced and expensive weapons systems which are often 
associated with exorbitant defense spending in the more advanced 
nations. Not only do African nations not have the kind of adversaries 
that demand the use of sophisticated weaponry, they also lack qualified 
personnel to man advanced weapons systems.
Because defense expenditures in African countries are often on 
small items, it is possible for military regimes to increase defense 
spending without reducing the budgetary allocations to the social and 
economic sectors of the economy. This was the case in Liberia where 
most of the increases in defense expenditure during the period of
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military rule went toward the construction of houses for members of the 
army (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1982).
Ghana was the one notable case in which an increase in military 
spending was associated with a reduction in government spending on other 
sectors of the economy (mainly agriculture and industry). However> even 
in this instance the increase in military spending was to make up for 
the conspicuous neglect of the military by a previous civilian 
administration. For example, in referring to the past neglect of the 
armed forces by the Nkrumah administration. Brigadier A.A. Afrifa wrote 
about Ghanaian soldiers without boots and in "tattered and ragged" 
uniforms (Afrifa 1966, 104). Thus the increase in defense spending went 
to finance improvements in pay and conditions (Omari 1972, 164; Bayham 
1988, 229). Apart from Ghana, it would seem that military regimes in 
other sub-Saharan countries have been able to finance the increases in 
defense spending with the savings accrued from payments which once went 
to defunct political institutions from the preceding civilian eras.
Another reason why increases in defence spending under military 
regimes were seldom associated with decreases in budgetary allocations 
to economic and social programs may be due to the fact that African 
countries are glaringly underdeveloped. In the types of underdeveloped 
societies found in Africa, social and economic facilities (such as 
education, health, transport and communications network) are still at 
very rudimentary stages of development. It does not require any special 
talent to recognize the critical need for substantial improvements in 
these areas. Consequently, no matter what type of regime is in power, 
African governments have always felt an obligation to allocate
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substantial portions of total public expenditure to these important 
growth sectors. In most African states, the agricultural sector often 
receives the largest share of budgetary expenditure under both regime 
types. Most of the funds going to the sector are in form of subsidies. 
Efforts by the World Bank to get African governments to reduce such 
subsidies have met with strong resistance from both civilian and 
military regimes. These regimes recognize that their very survival is 
dependent upon their ability to provide the basic necessities such as 
food, shelter, medicine and education. The inability of some African 
regimes to provide these things has precipitated their unceremonious 
removal from office. Even the use of guns and other instruments of 
coercion has not guaranteed the survival of military governments which 
have failed to provide these basic needs. For example, when the 
military ruler of the Sudan, Gaafar El Nimeiry, tried to comply with the 
demands of the World Bank and removed the subsidy on bread, he was 
promptly overthrown (Clark 1985).
It would appear that at certain stages of development, the type of 
regime in control of a nation’s government may not have any significant 
effect on the levels of government expenditure. This may suggest why 
(except for defense spending), there were no significant differences in 
the budgetary priorities of African civilian and military regimes.
Thus, the more important question may be, how successful has a regime 
been in achieving its stated objectives?
Without exception, the primary goals of African civilian and 
military regimes has been to formulate and implement policies in an 
effort to promote accelerated socioeconomic development. Both regime
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types have invariably emphasized increased productivity in the 
agricultural and/or industrial sectors as the path to achieving their 
primary objective. This fact is borne out by the various National 
Development Plans. The last hypothesis (H^) suggests that military 
regimes should perform better than civilian ones in their respective 
efforts to attain a sustainable rate of rapid economic development. 
Theoretically, there are some good reasons (explained more fully in 
Chapter Two), to expect military rulers to perform better than their 
civilian counterparts. Yet the material presented in the three case 
studies (Liberia, Ghana, and Nigeria) show that this was clearly not the 
case.
Many of the planning experiences of both regime types were 
characterized by a wide gap between aspirations and achievement. The 
poor overall performance of Ghana’s second military regime, as well as 
the indifferent records of Liberian and Nigerian military rulers, for 
example, clearly indicate that African military regimes do not have a 
markedly superior capacity to promote economic development. This 
observation is consistent with the findings of R.D. McKinlay and A.S. 
Cohan (1975) and Robert Jackman (1975).
Based on available evidence including the quantitative results in 
Chapter Three, there is no reason to believe that the conclusion reached 
thus far would be different for other sub-Saharan African state. The 
quantitative results in Chapter Three also indicated that no one regime 
type has a superior ability in attaining its developmental objectives. 
The results showed that productivity in the two most important sectors 
of the economies of several African states (agriculture and industry),
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were rarely responsive to regime type. Similarly the overall 
performance of the economies of African states as measured by changes in 
GDP was not sensitive to regime type.
The overall conclusion, therefore, is that regime types have had 
no pronounced effect on public policy outcomes in sub-Saharan African 
countries. The results also demonstrate that military regimes in sub- 
Saharan Africa are not a homogeneous group which can be clearly 
differentiated from civilian ones. In fact, under both kinds of 
regimes, the economies of African countries have continued to 
deteriorate since the end of colonial rule; and both regime types have 
been equally unsuccessful in their efforts to reverse this trend. A 
military coup, then, in the perceptive conclusion of Ruth First (1970, 
22), is "a method of change that changes little." There are several 
reasons for this impasse. The reasons can be grouped under two broad 
headings: institutional constraints and international constraints.
Institutional Constraints on Regime Performance
Perhaps the major reason for the ineffectiveness of both African 
regime types is the notable absence of modern political structures and 
procedures. Both regimes exhibit what Huntington has referred to as 
"political decay" (Huntington 1968, 1-92).
The post-independent political structures in most sub-Saharan 
African nations were built around bureaucracies which were established 
by the colonial powers. Upon attaining independence, successor 
politicians to the colonial rulers inherited bureaucracies which were, 
in most cases, largely Africanized. Although the role of the bureaucrat 
underwent some significant changes after independence, the civilian
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political leaders who led African nations into independence continued to 
rely on them for advice and implementation of public policies (Schaffer 
1969* 199; O ’Connell 1980, 62). Similarly, in those states where 
civilian leaders were ousted by military coups, the new military leaders 
were unable do without the services of established civil servants.
Unlike the other organizations connected with a deposed regime, 
African bureaucracies tended to emerge from a military coup relatively 
unscathed. In fact military regimes tended to engender more powerful 
bureaucracies. African bureaucracies became more politicized as 
military officers, unschooled in the art of government, brought in top 
bureaucrats to assist them in efforts to realize the regime’s planned 
objectives (if it had any to begin with). As noted in earlier chapters, 
there were some instances in which the military had intervened without 
any clear idea of what it would do upon assuming control of government 
(Bebler 1973, 38; Baynham 1988, 220). In such instances, the new 
military leaders relied on the bureaucracy for the formulation, as well 
as the implementation, of public policies.
Such was the case in Ghana where, followinq the 1966 overthrow of 
Nkrumah’s civilian regime, the military-led National Liberation Council 
(NLC), brought in top civil servants to formulate critical economic 
decisions. According to reports in the Ghanaian press during the early 
period of military rule, committees consisting primarily of civil 
servants were "wielding effective executive power in the country" (Dowse 
1969, 290). Similarly, in Nigeria following the 1966 coup civil 
servants were not only involved in the formulation and implementation of 
public policy, but they also became intimately involved in the
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determination of fundamental political questions (such, for example, as
the efforts aimed at devising a strategy for maintaining national unity
during the civil war period). The power of the Nigerian bureaucrats
during periods of military rule was well expressed by Nigeria’s former
President, Shehu Shagari, who as commissioner for finance during the
period of military rule, was well placed to observe their behavior.
According to Shagari:
In a military regime, actually the policies are formulated 
by the civil servants themselves, not by the military, not 
by the commissioners. It is the civil servants themselves 
who formulate policies and execute those policies. That is 
the position in a military regime.... Under military rule, 
when a commissioner and his permanent secretary were in 
disharmony, it was the commissioner who was removed (quoted 
in Adamolekun 1986, 118).
Accordingly, an important consequence of military rule has been 
the expansion of bureaucratic power. To be sure, the expansion of the 
civil service has not been limited to military regimes. Civilian 
regimes have also encouraged the expansion of the bureaucracy by relying 
on it for the formulation and implementation of development plans, which 
became very popular in post-independent Africa. Thus, an important 
characteristic of sub-Saharan African states is that civil servants 
acquired primary responsibility for policy advice— and oftentimes policy 
formulation, as well— and the implementation of settled policies under 
successive regime types (Adamolekun 1986, 178).
Since both regime types rely on the same institution for the 
formulation and implementation of public policy, it logically follows 
that policies under both regimes will be subject to the same 
environmental constraints associated with the African bureaucratic 
institution. Because of the characteristic demands of bureaucratic
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organizations it became unlikely that strategies adopted to achieve 
planned national objectives will vary significantly from one regime type 
to another* Some of the relevant constraining characteristics of the 
traditional bureaucracy include the following: routinization;
functional specialization; and organizational hierarchy.
Routinization means that within a specific bureaucratic 
organizations particular patterns tend to be reiterated. There are set 
rules which guide the behavior of its civil servants. For examples past 
cases are used as precedents to determine present ones. Policy choices 
tend to be derived from established parameters. Arbitrariness is rarely 
tolerated. As a consequence of this bureaucratic tendency toward 
repetitions and aversion for innovations strategies for the 
implementation of stated policy objectives tend to be limited. The 
result is thats within the same country5 where the policy objectives of 
civilian or military regime types are similars the strategies adopted 
for pursuing that objective will also tend to be the same. Even when a 
military regime comes to power with all the instruments of coercion at 
its disposals it often finds that bureaucrats are not easily swayed from 
their set patterns of behavior. For examples NLC members criticized the 
inefficiency and deliberateness of Ghanaian civil servants in 
implementing policies. General E.K. Kotoka deplored the lack of a sense 
of urgency on the part of the bureaucracy and he complained that "things 
don’t go as expected" (Pinkney 1972s 51-52).
Bernard Schaffer (1969s 188-89) has suggested that while the 
modern bureaucratic style of administration (including the emphasis on 
functional specialization and on adaptive rather than innovative ways of
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attaining policy goals), may be adequate for advanced polities, it 
serves as a barrier to socioeconomic development in less developed 
polities. According to Schaffer (1969, 198), "if we consider 
bureaucracy as a particular kind of solution for the various 
requirements of administration, we see that it is particularly difficult 
to afford in less developed societies where rapidly induced change is 
being sought." He noted that colonial bureaucratic administrations were 
excusable "in so far as they were providing what has-been called good 
government rather than development" (1969, 199).
□To be sure, the modern bureaucratic style of administration, 
which sub-Saharan African countries inherited from their former colonial 
masters was partly responsible for the inability of both civilian and 
military regimes to achieve their policy objectives fully. However, a 
more significant constraint on African regime performance was perhaps 
due to the deviation of African bureaucracies from the Weberian precepts 
of the bureaucratic style. It has been observed that in most developing 
societies, bureaucratic traditions which were inherited from the period 
of colonial rule exist alongside new traditions which were developed 
following the attainment of independence (Eisenstadt 1968, 286-93). 
Unlike the colonial bureaucracies which were highly apolitical, the 
"new" civil service in independent Africa was highly politicized. For 
example, the upper echelons of the civil service in post-independent 
Ghana were staffed by members of Nkrumah’s governing Convention’s 
People’s Party (CPP). Even lower level civil servants were pressured 
into joining the CPP (Kraus 1971, 59). Similarly, the top bureaucrats 
in the Liberian civil service during Tubman and Tolbert administrations
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belonged to the True Whig Party (Liebenow 1987s 107). According to S.N.
Eisenstadt <1968» £88-89):
These party bureaucracies have been oriented more to the 
political manipulation of groups of population and to the 
provision of political support and loyalty to the new regime 
than to the upholding of universalistic legal normsj the 
development of public services) or the creation of new 
public administrative service.
Even in a nation such as Nigeria) where no one major political 
party was able to dominate political affairs at the national level) the 
politicized civil service also became a feature of the post-independence 
bureaucratic tradition. In Nigeria) as well as in the many other 
culturally pluralistic societies of sub-Saharan Africa) the bureaucrat 
saw himself as fulfilling chiefly partisan functions) either as 
implementing political goals) or as representing) articulating) and 
regulating the political interests and activities of different groups 
and social strata.
Nowhere is the politicization of the African bureaucracy more 
clearly manifested than in its role as architect and executor of 
national development plans. Since in most African countries the 
government is often the dominant economic actor5 civil servants have 
come to exert a great influence on the direction of economic development 
(Eisenstadt 1968) £86-93). As was observed earlier5 the level of such 
bureaucratic influence is not significantly altered by changes in regime 
type. Conseguently) economic policy initiatives in most sub-Saharan 
African countries) which have had both civilian and military regimes) 
have tended to remain the same under alternating regime types. Despite 
the post independence changes within the African bureaucracy) the average
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civil servant was still predisposed to performing tasks according to 
predetermined standard operating procedures.
The significant impact of the postindependence bureaucratic style 
is foundj therefore, in the performance of different regime types with 
regard to achieving planned goals. The politicization of the "new" 
African bureaucracy necessarily had its chief impact on the ability of 
the government to achieve major political, social and economic goals. 
Among the more important consequences of the new orientation of African 
bureaucracies, the following have been especially noteworthy: (1) the
lack of qualified personnel (leading to a decline in technocratic 
skills); (2) the limited extent of functional specialization, and the 
consequent overlapping between different echelons and departments; (3) 
inadequate communication between different levels and departments; (4) 
over-centralization, poor coordination, inadequate delegation of 
authority, and lack of autonomy and initiative of junior civil servants; 
and (5) a high incidence of corruption.
After independence, it became common practice in most African 
countries for the recruitment of civil servants to be based on ethnic 
origins, familial connections, political orientation and other non­
performance related criteria. This inevitably led to the prevalence of 
inadequately staffed bureaucracies, with very low technocratic 
capacities. When civilian and military leaders delegate the 
responsibilities for the formulation and implementation of development 
plans to such bureaucracies, the attainment of planned objectives is put 
out of reach from the very beginning. There is little doubt that the 
existence of incompetence within the African civil service has been a
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major contributing factor leading to the perennial problem of under­
implementation of national development plans (O’Connell 19B0j 53-71; 
Adedeji 1980, 72-77).
The emergence of effective African bureaucracies has also been 
hindered by the lack of adequate departmental specialization. The 
problem of overlapping jurisdictions and conflicting sets of 
responsibilities among government departments and agencies have 
adversely affected several African development plans. Military rulers, 
coming from organizations where the clear definition of areas of 
operational responsibility is the norm, are generally very discouraged 
by this bureaucratic confusion. For example, General A.K. Ocran of NLC 
blamed the performance failures of the military regime on the 
disappointing performance of Ghanaian civil servants. He complained 
that in his ministries, unlike the army, "the line of authority was ill- 
defined and diffuse, the civil servants often did not know who was 
responsible for what" (Pinkney 1972, 52).•
The lack of appropriate communication among different bureaucratic 
organs also has often made it difficult for the policy objectives of 
African regimes to be formulated and implemented constructively. For 
example, Professor Gordon Idang (I960, 3A-52) has suggested that a major 
deficiency in Nigeria’s economic development planning was the inadequate 
provision for communication and coordination among relevant departments 
and agencies. The development plans of African regimes is further 
hindered by the high level of ovei— centralization of authority. Because 
responsibility is not sufficiently delegated and independent initiative 
is often discouraged, some people who may posses the particular talent
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or skill to facilitate the realization of planned objective are often 
undei— uti1ized.
Like most institutions in sub-Saharan Africa? the bureaucracy is 
beset with corruption. This is a problem which has been openly and 
officially recognized in most African countries by the appointment of 
advisory commissions on the suppression of corruption in the civil 
service. At times? the level of bureaucratic corruption has reached 
such monumental proportions that some governments now maintain anti­
corruption agencies. The problem of bureaucratic corruption extends 
from the high-ranking civil servants who embezzle millions of dollars in 
state funds? to those at the lower levels? who extort a "dash" or a 
bribe for the simplest service.
The relative importance of these constraining factors naturally 
has varied from one country to another. However? it is also significant 
that the professional shortcomings of the bureaucracy within individual 
African states has remained essentially unchanged under successive 
regime types (Adamolekun 1986? 179). Furthermore? the cumulative effect 
of these problems were the same across countries and regime types: they
resulted in the under-achievement of policy priorities and development 
plans and? consequently? led to the perpetuation of African 
underdevelopment.
Evidently? bureaucracies were not the only institutional 
constraints on regime performance in sub-Saharan Africa. Civilian and 
military leaders alike were equally to blame for the unimpressive 
outcomes of their policy initiatives. A great deal of public criticism 
of African regimes arises because of the considerable gaps between
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promise and fulfillment. While bureaucrats who draw up the plans share 
some of the blame for these discrepancies] the shortcomings are, 
however* frequently the result of a regime’s attempt to please 
everybody. John Kenneth Galbraith (1964, 73) described the situation 
thus:
To be outside the plan is to have a nasty sense of exclusion 
with practical financial consequences as well. The desire 
not to be accused of overlooking something is also strong.
So there is a tendency for the plan to become not a plan but 
a list of all the things that should be done, that everyone 
would like to have done, or that anyone believes ought to be 
done or which might be a cause of criticism if overlooked. 
Specification of the things of strategic urgency is lost.
In culturally differentiated African societies, pressures from
various sectors of the society have tended to force some government
leaders to include far too many projects in their development plans. As
the earlier case studies focusing upon Ghana and Nigeria demonstrated,
civilian and military regimes were equally subject to these pressures.
In both countries, each regime type responded by approving plans that
were beyond the reach of available resources.
Although they control the instruments of coercion, African
military elites have found that force alone (where they have attempted
to use it), is not sufficient to insure success. Such measures as the
suspension of the constitution and the banning of political parties have
failed to ensure immunity from the same problems which civilian leaders
faced. For example, in Ghana the NLC found that it could dismantle only
part of the extensive state intervention and welfare systems erected by
the CCP. Furthermore, even when individual measures for reprivatization
of the state sector and selling unprofitable enterprises to foreign
capital seemed the most economically expedient thing to do, the NLC ran
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into vehement domestic opposition and had to modify its stand (Bebler 
1973, 41).
Perhaps the single most important constraint on regime performance 
in sub-Saharan Africa is the endemic nature of corruption among both 
civilian and military leaders of government. All too often, the rulers 
of sub-Saharan Africa have behaved as if public goods were their private 
property. Friends, relatives, and clients have received appointments, 
favors, and high salaries, to the detriment of the common good. The 
negative impact of corruption on a nation’s economic development has 
been demonstrated in several sub-Saharan African countries, including 
Ghana and Nigeria where the national treasuries were plundered by the 
very people in whose custody it was placed.
Corruption among civilian leaders has often been a favorite reason 
given by soldiers staging a military coup. However, the experience of 
several African states has shown that, despite such rationalizations, 
military intervention is not an effective remedy for corruption.
Mention has already been made (in Chapter Six) of the corruption 
existing under civilian and military rulers in Nigeria. Similarly, 
corruption in Ghana has not been a uniquely civilian phenomenon.
Charges of corruption and elitism, which were leveled at Nkrumah, were 
also leveled at the military regimes that succeeded him. The corruption 
or "kalabule" of Acheampong’s military regime, for example, has stood 
out as the extreme example of immorality; it ranged from overcharging 
for goods and services, to "a system whereby top officials issued chits 
(giving loans or import licenses) to young women who paraded the
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corridors of power offering themselves for libidinal pleasures in return 
for favours" (Oquaye 1980* 17; Jeffries 1982, 314).
The frugality that is (in the Western minds at least) supposedly 
associated with the military has not been confirmed by the performance 
of African military rulers. When they are in power, African military 
rulers have frequently indulged in all sorts of extravagances (sumptuous 
living quarters, high salaries, lavish receptions, frequent trips 
abroad, and the like), fully as much as their civilian predecessors and 
successors. For example, not long after they assumed power in Liberia, 
Doe and his colleagues began adopting the same style of life formerly 
identified with the deposed TWP leadership. Doe soon gave up his modest 
apartment and moved into the executive mansion previously occupied by 
Tolbert. His wife took over Victoria Tolbert’s Mercedes and demanded 
police escorts for her trips to the supermarket (Liebenow 1987, SOI).
The corrupt practices and the extravagant lifestyles of some civilian 
and military rulers have accelerated the depletion of the national 
treasuries of some African nations.
Another institutional constraint is related to the brief duration 
of African regimes. The sort of development programs which many African 
regimes were undertaking stand a much better chance of being realized if 
they can be sustained over time. Too often the military intervenes 
before a policy has been given sufficient time to work. When ample time 
does not exist in which to implement policies, it is not likely that 
such policies will be effective. Under these circumstances, in which no 
single regime type has been afforded the opportunity to govern for an
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extended period of time, it is not likely that public policies 
promulgated by either regime type will solve a nation’s problems.
Another important institutional constraint is directly related to 
military rule. In general military rule tends to destroy fledgling 
democratic institutions in Africa, as elsewhere. Nigeria’s First and 
Second Republics, as well as Ghana’s Second and Third Republics, were 
not given enough time to be properly established. Military rule, 
contributed to a decline in the political skills of future civilian 
leaders. Extensive periods of military rule encourages the 
underutilization and underdevelopment of important political skills 
(e.g., bargaining skills), which are necessary to insure political 
stability. This fact may partially explain why, in the few cases where 
military governments have been succeeded by civilian democracies (Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda), the new civilian rulers were unable to 
perform up to the expectations of their citizens.
International Constraints on Regime Performance
Domestic institutional factors were by no means the only ones 
responsible for the failed policies of regimes in sub-Saharan Africa.
In the modern world, virtually no nation lives in isolation from the 
world community. Great powers such as the United States and the Soviet 
Union, as well as lesser powers such as China, France, Germany, Great 
Britain and even Cuba, adopt explicit policies of military and economic 
aid that can affect the ability of an African regime to promote and 
implement stated national objectives.
Similarly, the approval (or lack of it) of economic assistance by 
the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can be the
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primary determinant of the success or failure of a development plan.
Most African development plans rely heavily on foreign aid. For 
example* successive development plans in Nigeria have relied on foreign 
sources for substantial portions of planned capital expenditure (Idang
1980, <*2). In Liberia, more than 80 percent of total capital investment 
is financed from abroad, and up to 30 percent of total budgetary 
expenditure comes from the United States alone (van der Kraaij 1983, 
228).4 The notion of neocolonialism is thus a  very important factor in 
the determination of public policy in sub-Saharan Africa (Stravianos
1981, 665-80).5
Another important international constraint is the world market 
economy. Most African states are dependent on earnings from exports of 
raw materials (cash crops, such as cocoa, coffee, tea and tobacco), for 
revenue to fund their budgetary expenditures and development plans. 
However, cash crops as well as metals and oil which provide most of the 
foreign exchange for African states, are all commodities susceptible to 
the vagaries of the international marketplace. The dismal economic 
record of many African regimes is often due to the fact that their 
countries’ economies are extremely sensitive to changes in world 
patterns and terms of trade for their major exports and imports. Thus 
in the mid 1970s, as oil prices rose and the world price for cocoa fell, 
the Ghanaian economy suffered accordingly.
Ghana’s economic fate has been inextricably tied to fluctuations 
in the international cocoa market (Pel low and Chazan 1986). Attempts to 
lessen the nation’s vulnerability by diversifying the economy through 
industrialization has thus far proved unsuccessful. Since most of the
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raw materials used in the new industrial establishments had to be 
imported, industrial productivity in Ghana became vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the market for industrial raw materials (Dowse 1969,
237; Woronoff 1972, 178).
Similarly, the excessive dependence of successive Nigerian regimes 
on revenues from oil exports to finance their economic policy objectives 
has proved to be detrimental to the nation’s economic development. The 
sharp drop in world demand for oil during the 1980s led to a complete 
reappraisal of Nigeria’s national development plan. Certainly, it was 
the special misfortune of the Shagari administration that its tenure 
coincided in time with a protracted period of oil glut and falling 
prices. It is most doubtful that a military regime would have fared any 
better under the same circumstances.
It is widely recognized that international factors have a major 
impact on the ability of African states to develop (Andreski 1969;
Rodney 1974; Amin 1976). However, the impact of international factors 
on regime performance would be less severe if policy makers took certain 
necessary precautions. Experience from the three nations examined in 
this study has demonstrated that failure to realize planned objectives 
was often the result of the incapacity of the regime in power to make 
the reguired adjustments in time and to enforce austerity measures after 
these have been introduced. For example, African governments 
contributed to the decline of their economies by a failure to diversify 
and manage the economy in the wake of wasteful, sometimes willful, 
dissipation of existing resources. Moreover, the neglect of important 
sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, has led to a situation in
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which most African countries can no longer feed themselves.
Consequently, the very survival of large population groups throughout 
Africa has been put in jeopardy, as the continuing need to import food 
increases the vulnerability of these nations to the vagaries of the 
international market economy.
It is clear from the foregoing that both civilian and military 
regimes in sub-Saharan Africa were equally inefficient and ineffective 
in their efforts to realize specific socioeconomic objectives. Yet, the 
similarities between the two regime types does not represent the entire 
story. A look at the performance of both regime types with respect to 
intrinsically desirable political objectives will reveal some important 
differences between African civilian and military regimes.
The performance of military regimes has been even more dismal in 
the sphere of political development than in the sphere of economic 
development. Military regimes have tended to accentuate the problems of 
political development with which their civilian predecessors were 
initially faced. Upon assuming power, African military rulers severely 
restrict the free flow of the political process and force civilian 
politicians into long periods of hibernation, depriving them of the 
opportunity to acquire much needed political skills, thus perpetuating 
the chain of political underdevelopment (Maniruzzaman 1987, 12).
Although civilian rulers in Africa have not done much to develop 
the political institutions of the continent, they have, nonetheless, 
provided channels for some form of participation by the people. On the 
other hand, military rulers have often failed to develop legitimate 
political institutions and to ensure meaningful participation by the
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people in the political process. In Nigeria, for instance, the process 
of political disintegration started after the coup of January 15, 1966, 
when some junior officers led by Major Nzeogwu launched a ruthless 
attack on prominent military and political figures in Nigeria. As 
Talukder Maniruzzaman (1987, 7) rightly observed, periods of military 
rule is usually a total waste as far as the development of political 
skills is concerned.
Even more important than their detrimental impact on the 
development of political institutions, is the military’s assault on 
democracy and abuses of human rights. Having banned political parties, 
and often lacking the ability to establish new and viable parties, the 
African military is not well placed to promote democracy. The 
incompatibility of military rule and the democratic ethic is clearly 
manifested in the very decision of the soldiers to seize power in 
situations where institutionalized non-violent procedures exist for 
changing the rulers.
An important difference between African civilian and military 
regimes is concerned with the issue of violations of human rights. 
Although some African civilian leaders are on occasion inclined to 
resort to the use of force to settle disputes, they are often more 
likely resort to bargaining. The African military regime, when 
confronted with a problem promptly resorts to the its specialization—  
effective utilization of force. As Claude Welch (1971, 226) noted; 
"Devised to use force in the most efficient manner, armies have a 
natural proclivity to turn to violence rather than palaver, to 
repression rather than compromise."
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African military regimes, desirous of pursuing their stated 
socioeconomic objectives in an orderly environment, have often adopted 
policies of systematic repression, starvation, and mass murder. The 
continents most reviled tyrants have come from the military. Uganda 
under Idi Amin (1970-1979), the Central African Republic under Jean 
Bedel Bokassa (1966-1979), and Liberia under Samuel Doe (1980-1985) were 
consistently targeted as major violators of human rights. Other 
military-led regimes were also widely criticized for abuses of human 
rights: Ethiopia during the "Red Terror" (1977-1978) and Zaire since
the mid-1970s (Mazrui 1989; Amnesty International 1986; Young 1988,
537). Based on the level of political brutality and the violent 
sanctions that they bring to bear against offenders it is clear that, in 
terms of governance, military regimes are on the average, as Robert 
Jackman (1986, 888) notes, "more repressive than non-military ones."
It would be hazardous to make a general judgment relating to all 
African military or civilian regimes, since their effectiveness has not 
everywhere been the same. In some states the military elites have 
proved to be much bolder and more imaginative in attacking national 
problems than in others, where a more conservative approach to national 
problems has prevailed. Moreover, the particular challenges confronting 
military and civilian regimes in no two eras or nations are the same.
In Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), in recent years, for example, 
the military saw their major task as essentially one of putting the 
nation’s finances in order. In Benin (formerly Dahomey), it was acting 
as arbiter among the nation’s guarrelsome politicians, each of whom 
commanded loyalty in a different part of the country. In the Central
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African Republic the challenge was mainly saving the nation from the 
Chinese Communist peril (Du Bois 1969, 9).
Thus in each of these states, the military’s justification for 
exercising governmental power is significantly different. Obviously, in 
all African societies, the military must contend with common problems, 
such as the maintenance of public order, the administration of 
governmental services, and the imposition and collection of taxes.
However, it is important to note that a fundamental question of 
priorities is involved. If the military accords top priority to solving 
what is seen as a central problem (such as eliminating corruption) in 
their country, then these other functions will necessarily receive only 
secondary, or even no more than incidental, attention. However, as the 
case studies of Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria have shown, in practice there 
is a tendency for military and civilian regimes to accord top priority 
to the same set of socioeconomic tasks.
Whatever a regime’s priorities may be, what matters in the end is 
whether a regime’s tenure in power has brought about any positive 
changes within the society. For example, has a regime performed better 
than its predecessor, by reversing negative economic trends, such as 
reducing inflation, unemployment, the national debt or increasing 
agricultural and industrial productivity? A basic conclusion of this 
study is that no single regime type in Africa exhibited a consistent 
ability to achieve its stated objectives, and none appeared to possess a 
unique capacity for dealing effectively with dominant issues of national 
concern.
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As pointed out in an earlier chapter, available data on African 
systems lack the reliability needed to permit the establishment of 
cause-and-effect relationships with great confidence. Consequently, the 
outcome of contemporary empirical research undertakings that employ 
these data, including this effort, should be interpreted with particular 
caution.
Whether the available data are reliable or not, predictions about 
Africa are much more risky than normal. The rapid pace of change on the 
continent and great diversity among African states combine to invalidate 
most generalizations and projections as soon as they are made. 
Nonetheless, it seems save to predict that the present trends of inept 
leadership performance by both military and civilian regimes in Africa 
will continue well into the foreseeable future. The inescapable outcome 
of recent tendencies is that the increasing frequency of successful and 
abortive coup attempts to overthrow military and civilian regimes in 
Africa will result in a shortage of people with good leadership 
qualities. As early as 1976, for example, Lt. Ben. T.Y. Danjuma noted 
that the shortage of experienced officers had become an extremely 
serious problem within the Nigerian army (Legum 1977, B671-72). In some 
African states the shortage of senior and experienced officers has 
resulted in situations in which soldiers with little or no executive 
ability have assumed power after a successful coup. Liberia and Burkina 
Faso, where a master sergeant and a captain, respectively, became heads 
of governments, are two recent examples of this phenomenon.
In the future, with the increasing tendency of coup leaders to 
eliminate potential opposition by executing them, the administration of
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African nations by governments headed by incompetent soldiers from the 
lower ranks of the military will become commonplace. Furthermore, since 
coups have become the common means of effecting leadership change in 
Africaj more qualified individuals, cognizant of the high personal cost 
of failure, will refrain from seeking political office. Under these 
anticipated circumstances, the similarities in regime performance noted 
in this study is likely to be more pronounced, as African civilian and 
military regimes lapse into mediocrity.
In most cases military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa has 
created a vicious circle that has perpetuated the conditions of economic 
and political underdevelopment that initially brought about military 
rule. The consequent decline in the quality and efficiency of 
government throughout Africa foretells a lamentable future for African 
nations, irrespective of the regime in power.
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Endnotes
1. Africa Report; Nov./Dec. 1981, E7.
2. The term modern bureaucratic style is used here in the technical
sense developed by Max Weber. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop <1982,
186) summarized Weber’s analysis as follows:
1. Bureaucracy involves a carefully defined
division of tasks and operates according to set 
rules.
2. Authority is impersonal, vested in the rules 
which govern official business. Decisions are 
reached by the methodical application of the 
rules to particular cases and not on the basis 
of any private motive.
3. People are recruited to serve in the bureaucracy 
on the basis of potential or demonstrated 
competence.
*♦. Officials who perform their duties competently
are secure in both salary and employment. 
Competent officials can expect promotion
according to seniority or merit.
5. The bureaucracy is a disciplined hierarchy in
which subordinate officials are subject to the
authority of their superiors.
3. Leoon Observer, 17 February 1967.
Africa Report, Nov./Dec. 1985, 39.
5. In its simplest form the notion of neocolonialism suggest that
Europe, through the slave trade and colonialism, imposed upon 
Africa a framework of unequal exchange. Through its incorporation 
into the world capitalist economic system, Africa is seen as being 
drained of its resources. External constraints and influences 
intrude upon the trade patterns, political process and choice of 
policy in African states.
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